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Esposizione riassuntiva
La gestione del traffico aereo in Europa (Air Traffic Management, ATM) e` un’ attivita` complessa, poiche´
molti attori e componenti vi interagiscono per garantire l’efficienza e la sicurezza delle operazioni. Negli
ultimi dieci anni questo sistema ha iniziato a mostrare segni di debolezza in termini di capacita` di
sostenere in modo efficiente il traffico in costante crescita. Dal 2012, otto Centri di Controllo (Area
Control Centre, ACC) hanno riferito sistematicamente gravi ritardi causati da carenza di capacita` dello
spazio aereo. Tali carenze sono evidenti anche analizzando la distribuzione del traffico attuale e dal
momento che le previsioni a lungo termine di crescita del traffico Europeo prospettano un inccremento
del 50% dei voli nei prossimi venti anni, il livello di congestione non puo` che aggravarsi.
Questa tesi di dottorato e` stata realizzata nell’ambito di un progetto SESAR WP-E denominato
SATURN (Strategic Allocation of Traffic Using Redistribution in the Network), in il cui obiettivo era
investigare sulla possibilita` di mitigare questi squilibri della domanda di capacita` nella fase strategica della
pianificazione dei voli, cioe` con mesi di anticipo dalla giornata delle operazioni, attraverso la modulazione
delle tasse di sorvolo. Queste sono le tasse che le compagnie aeree devono corrispondere ai fornitori di
servizi di navigazione (Air Navigation Service Provider, ANSP) per l’utilizzo del rispettivo spazio aereo.
Le tasse di sorvolo sono raccolte da Eurocontrol e redistribuite agli ANSP per coprire i costi legati alla
fornitura di servizi di comunicazione, navigazione e controllo.
Il lavoro si sviluppa in due parti: la prima comprende un capitolo che descrive il funzionamento del
sistema ATM attuale e i criteri con cui le tasse di sorvolo vengono attualmente calcolate. Il capitolo
successivo fornisce una panoramica di quali metodi di tariffazione sono applicati in settori diversi dal
trasporto aereo per affrontare i problemi di congestione.
La seconda parte della tesi e` di carattere sperimentale e presenta un’ applicazione di un approccio
centralizzato di peak load pricing, PLP, al sistema ATM europeo. PLP e` una tecnica di tariffazione
comunemente applicata a trasporti e utenze i cui picchi di domanda sono periodici e prevedibili. Nel
PLP viene assegnato un prezzo piu` alto per il consumo del servizio quando si prevede forte domanda,
e uno piu` basso per l’utilizzo del servizio nel tempo e/o posizioni che non sono critici. L’applicazione
al sistema ATM europeo e` modellata come un gioco di Stackelberg che rappresenta l’interazione tra
un’autorita` centrale che imposta le tasse di sorvolo per tutti gli ANSP europei, e le compagnie aeree
che vogliono operare voli al costo minimo. Questa interazione e` formulata attraverso un problema di
ottimizzazione bilivello, presentato nel terzo capitolo. Il capitolo successivo e` dedicato alla preparazione
e gestione di dati reali del traffico aereo al fine di ottenere istanze di dati che possano essere utilizzate
per testare il modello presentato (e anche per le prove computazionali degli altri modelli studiati in
SATURN). L’ultimo capitolo e` dedicato agli approcci risolutivi adottati per la risoluzione esatta del
modello di peak load pricing sulle istanze di dati ottenute. Questo obiettivo ha presentato diverse sfide
dal punto di vista computazionale, sia per la difficolta` intrinseca del modello bilivello, sia per le grandi
dimensioni delle istanze di dati. I risultati ottenuti sono realistici nella prospettiva di un’applicazione
reale e mostrano che la modulazione delle tasse di sorvolo puo` indurre una redistribuzione piu` sosteni-
bile del traffico attraverso la scelta di rotte alternative e moderate modifiche agli orari di partenze e arrivi.
Parole chiave: gestione del traffico aereo, tasse di sorvolo, congestion pricing, peak load pricing,
programmazione bilivello, ottimizzazione combinatoria, data engineering, basi di dati geografiche.

Abstract
European Air Traffic Management (ATM) is a complex system where many actors and components
interact to ensure the efficiency and safety of operations. In the last ten years this system has started to
show signs of weakness in terms of its ability to sustain a growing amount of traffic in an efficient way.
Since 2012, eight Area Control Centres have systematically reported severe en route Air Traffic Flow
Management delays due to shortages in airspace capacity. Such shortages are evident also in the current
and short-term analysis of traffic distribution. Since long term forecasts of European air traffic growth
expect the amount of flights to likely increase by 50% in the next twenty years, the level of congestion
is only likely to become more severe.
This thesis was carried out within a SESAR WP-E project named SATURN (Strategic Allocation
of Traffic Using Redistribution in the Network), which investigated the possibility of mitigating these
demand-capacity imbalances at the strategic level of flight planning, that is, months in advance of the
day of operations, through the modulation of en-route charges. These are the charges that airspace users
have to correspond to Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) when flying through the respective
airspace. They are collected by Eurocontrol and redistributed to ANSPs for covering the costs of air
navigation and communication service provision.
The work unfolds in two parts: the first comprises a chapter that illustrates how the current ATM
system works and how airspace users are charged for air navigation services. Then an overview of how
pricing methods are applied in industries other than air transport to tackle congestion issues is also
provided. The second part of the thesis is experimental and presents an application of a centralised
approach to peak load pricing (PLP) to European ATM. This is a common pricing technique in trans-
ports and utilities where peaks in demand are periodic and predictable; PLP assigns a higher price
for the consumption of the service when high demand is expected, and a lower one for using the ser-
vice in time and/or locations that are not critical. The application to European ATM is modelled as
a Stackelberg game that represents the interaction between a central authority that sets peak and off
peak rates for all European ANSPs and airspace users that want to operate flights at the minimum
cost. This interaction is formulated into a bilevel optimisation problem, that is illustrated in the third
chapter. The following one is dedicated to preparation and management of actual air traffic data in
order to obtain data instances that could be used for testing the presented model (and used for testing
other models within SATURN also). The final chapter is dedicated to the exact resolution approaches
attempted to solve the centralised peak load pricing model on the obtained data instances, a task that
presented several computational challenges due to both the intrinsic difficulty of the bilevel model and
to the large size of the data instances. A large size regional example on one country, together with some
further insights obtained from a metaheuristic solving approach carried out within SATURN are also
provided. Obtained results are realistic with regard to the application. They show that pricing modula-
tion can, indeed, become an effective mean for tackling demand-capacity imbalances by inducing airspace
users to apply reroutings and moderate schedule displacements to the flights involved in such imbalances.
Keywords: air traffic management, en route charges, congestion pricing, peak load pricing, bilevel
programming, combinatorial optimisation, data engineering, geographic databases.
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Introduction
European Air Traffic Management (ATM) is a complex system where many actors and com-
ponents interact to ensure the efficiency and safety of operations. In the last ten years this
system has started to show signs of weakness in terms of its ability to sustain a growing amount
of traffic in an efficient way. After a steady period following the 2008 economic crisis, traffic
has started to grow again, and so have delays. Since 2012, eight Area Control Centres have
systematically reported severe en route Air Traffic Flow Management delay, that is, more than
one minute per flight for more than 30 days in a year. Capacity shortages and associated delays
are evident in the current and short-term analysis of traffic distribution and since long term
forecasts of European air traffic growth expect the number of flights to increase by 50% in the
next twenty years, the level of congestion is only likely to become more severe.
This work investigates the possibility of mitigating these demand-capacity imbalances at
the strategic level of flight planning, months in advance of the day of operations, through the
modulation of en-route charges, a practice that is already allowed by European regulations,
but currently not applied systematically by any Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP). It is
expected that such a modulation could induce airspace users to redistribute traffic in a more
sustainable way by means of reroutings and mild schedule displacements.
The first part of the thesis is dedicated to an overview of the problem investigated and of
the state of the art, both in practice and in scientific literature.
Chapter 1 describes the organisation of the European ATM system, first by introducing
the relevant actors that will be the focus of the remainder of the work; then, by explaining
how airspace is organised, how sectorisation works and how routes are structured. To this
end, the flight planning process is also illustrated, and the charges that airlines have to pay
for Air Navigation Services provision are explained: these comprise charges for navigation and
communication services at aerodromes and for the en route portion of the flight. A brief
introduction to the Single European Sky regulations is also given, as a legislative background.
The end of the chapter presents forecasts of traffic and and en route delay growth, which
provide an idea of the magnitude of the problem. To this end, a SESAR WP-E project named
SATURN (Strategic Allocation of Traffic Using Redistribution in the Network) was carried out
between 2013 and 2015 to investigate the impact of a strategic modulation of en route charges,
through different pricing approaches, to redistribute traffic and reduce delays by mitigating
demand-capacity imbalances already in the strategic phase (i.e., months in advance of the day
of operations). This thesis has been carried out within this project and, where not differently
stated, represents the personal contributions brought to it.
The following Chapter 2 investigates how the problem of congestion has been dealt with in
other economic sectors, more specifically, in industries whose main business is the sale of services
on a network. These comprise sectors that as different as telecommunications, utilities, such as
electricity, gas and water, different modes of transport such as road and rail and so on. The
chapter provides a classification of different pricing methods applied to four of these, specifically:
data networks, electricity wholesale and distribution, road transport and rail transport, with
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a particular focus on when these pricing techniques were adopted with the aim of reducing
imbalances between demand and available capacity. A discussion is the carried out to investigate
which of these approaches could be effective also for the European ATM system. To this end,
the few existing works in scientific literature dedicated to en route charges modulations are also
presented and briefly discussed.
Chapter 3 opens the second, more exploratory, part of the thesis, and is dedicated to peak
load pricing (PLP). This is a simplified form of congestion pricing with the fundamental as-
sumptions that peaks in demand are predictable by occurring periodically in time and at some
specific locations, and that demand has some degree of elasticity towards time and/or location
of service consumption (and therefore is sensitive to its price). A PLP policy assigns a higher
price where and when a peak in demand is expected, and a lower price for off-peak areas and/or
times. By doing so, it is expected that part of the peak demand will redistribute to cheaper op-
tions. From the analysis carried out in Chapter 2, PLP appears to be one of the most common
pricing policies applied in transports and utilities for dealing with demand-capacity imbalances,
and its assumptions are compatible with the European ATM scenario. The chapter therefore
illustrates the application of a peak load pricing policy for en route charges modulation in a cen-
tralised approach, where a central authority (or Central Planner, CP) is responsible for setting
en-route charges on the network and airspace users (AUs) need to route each flight, based on the
set charges. The interaction between CP and AUs is modelled as a Stackelber game, using the
bilevel optimisation framework. The remainder of the chapter describes how to reformulate the
non-linear bilevel optimisation model into a linear Mixed Integer-Linear Problem formulation
that can be implemented in a standard MILP solver software. This linearised formulation is
referred to as cPLP (centralised PLP).
Since the objective of the project SATURN was to test the effectiveness of different pricing
models on realistic data instances representing actual traffic, Chapter 4 is entirely dedicated to
data preparation and management. Data availability is a well known issue for research carried
out on European air traffic and air traffic flow management. Sources are scarce, non integrated
and non-publicly accessible (differently, for example, from the United States case). Due to
these reasons most of the research carried out within the European context relies on randomly
generated data instances that likely lack realism; this can potentially limit the reliability of
the presented results with regard to actual application of the proposed solutions. Illustrating
how to obtain realistic data instances from actual traffic therefore represents one of the major
contributions of this work.
The chapter describes the data sources used, the corrections applied for fixing the found
inconsistencies, the simplifications applied and their rationales, like the clustering process per-
formed on aircraft types for estimating flight operational costs, and on routes to group together
those flying within the same airway. The result of this cleaning and reorganisation process
performed on the data is a relational database with geographic capabilities, whose structure is
presented in the final section of the chapter (and, in greater detail, in Appendix A).
The following Chapter 5 illustrates the solving approaches attempted to tackle the cPLP
model presented in Chapter 3 on the data instances obtained from the process described in
Chapter 4 and used also for the project SATURN. These data instances present a challenge
in size, since they are at least an order of magnitude larger than those commonly found in
test results in scientific literature on bilevel optimisation models. The reason for this lies in
the intrinsic difficulty of bilevel problems: in fact, the reformulations carried out to linearise
them cause an exponential growth in the number of variables and constraints of the problems,
making them hard to solve through standard optimisation techniques such as branch and bound,
even for relatively small data samples. The largest instances found in literature have at most a
hundred users, while the simplest data instance created for SATURN, that is, one hour of traffic
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on a single country, counts at least five hundred flights, since no realistic results can be obtained
from a traffic sample with less than one hour of traffic. The purpose of the chapter is therefore
to explore how far it is possible to go with data of this size and a complex bilevel model
with some standard optimisation techniques. The chapter first investigates how to properly
set some model parameters that assess the relative weight of schedule displacements, capacity
violations at sectors and airports and ANSP revenues. Then, some improvements carried out
on the model are described: tighter bounds provided to strengthen the formulation and simple
heuristics for providing initial solutions to the branch and bound algorithm. In the following, the
resolution of a regional-scale example on French airspace is illustrated. Two pricing variants of
cPLP are tested on eight hours of traffic (approximately 4 700 flights) where severe congestion
occurs in historical data. Results show the effectiveness of the proposed policy in terms of
traffic redistribution through a relatively mild modulation of the en route charges, but the
computational time to obtain these results remains high. For comparison purpose, results
obtained from a multiobjective implementation of cPLP, solved through a Genetic Algorithm
heuristic by a colleague within the project SATURN, are presented in the final section of the
chapter. This approach allowed to solve, though not to optimality, much larger data instances,
up to one day of traffic on the whole European network (30 000 flights and forty states).
Most observations obtained from this larger scale test confirm those drawn from the regional
example in terms of traffic redistribution through charges modulations, as well as the existence
of unavoidable tradeoffs among schedule shifts and capacity constraints violations when demand
is high and capacity is scarce.
Finally, some conclusions are presented to wrap up the main findings and considerations
that can be drawn from this thesis and to outline some possible ideas for future work.
15
16
Part I
Background and
motivations for the study
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Chapter 1
Air Traffic Management in Europe
Air traffic management (ATM) is a considerably complex system, with many agents involved.
The purpose of the present chapter is to introduce the aspects of European ATM that are
relevant to this study, to provide a more complete picture of the problem addressed that is,
the delays caused by the congestion of airspace, and the rationale behind the proposed way
to alleviate it, the modulation of en-route charges. The most relevant entities that are to
be considered when investigating this problem are the Network Manager, the Air Navigation
Service Providers and the Airline Operators. These are introduced in Section 1.1. A brief
overview of the relevant aspects of European Air Traffic Management, including structure and
organisation of airspace and routes, as well as the way flight planning is currently carried out
is given in Section 1.2. Note that this introduction focuses on the management of the en-route
portion of the flight, which is why airports operations and related slot assignment, which alone
are subjects as complex as the en-route related operations, fall beyond the scope of this study
and are therefore omitted here. An overview of the legislative framework that is regulating the
evolution of the European ATM system (EU’s Single European Sky regulations) is provided in
Section 1.3. Furthermore, Section 1.4 illustrates traffic load and ATC-capacity-related delays in
the current European ATM system with some figures on expected traffic growth in the short-
to-medium and long term. Finally, an introduction to the project named SATURN (Strategic
Allocation of Traffic Using Redistribution in the Network), within which the current study was
developed, and whose purpose was to evaluate the impact of en-route charges modulation on
the distribution of traffic as a mean of mitigating airspace congestion is provided in Section 1.5.
1.1 Relevant stakeholders
In the present section the main actors that are relevant to this study are briefly introduced,
namely, Eurocontrol, Air Navigation Service Providers and Airline Operators.
1.1.1 Eurocontrol (EU designated Network Manager)
Eurocontrol is the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation. It is a civil inter-
national organisation working for seamless, pan-European air traffic management. Eurocontrol
currently has 40 member states (plus the European Union, which is also a member) out of the
44 belonging to the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) area (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2).
Eurocontrol was originally founded in 1960 as a civil-military organisation to deal with air
traffic control for civil and military users in the upper airspace of its six founding European
Member States.
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Figure 1.1: ECAC member states (source: Eurocontrol)
Figure 1.2: Eurocontrol member states (source: Eurocontrol)
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Eurocontrol currently coordinates and plans air traffic control for all of Europe. This involves
working with national authorities, air navigation service providers, civil and military airspace
users, airports, and other organisations. Its activities involve all gate-to-gate air navigation
service operations: strategic and tactical flow management, controller training, regional control
of airspace, safety-proofed technologies and procedures, and collection of air navigation charges.
In addition, it has been delegated parts of the Single European Sky regulations by the European
Commission under the role of Network Manager.
Among the many functional units that comprise this organisation, two are particularly
relevant to this study and need to be mentioned: the Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU),
which manages the flows of the ECAC states to ensure the demand from the airlines does
not overload the capacities offered by the infrastructure and the Central Route Charges Office
(CRCO), which charges airspace users for providing ATM services on behalf of the Member
States through the route charges system (illustrated in detail in Sec. 1.2.4).
1.1.2 Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs)
Air navigation service providers (ANSPs) are agencies that manage flight traffic at regional
or national level. According to ICAO, Air Navigation Services (ANS) should be provided by
independent authorities, entities or companies specifically established to operate these services,
rather than by civil aviation authorities, as is sometimes the case today (Cook 2007). ANSPs
are commonly administered as a government department depending on the state budget, as
autonomous bodies belonging to the public sector (still property of the state but separate from
it) or as fully or partially privatised agencies (see Table 1.1). In any case, each European state
is responsible for providing air traffic services as a public service and has sovereignty over the
airspace above its territories.
European ANSPs are mainly funded through the air navigation charges levied by Eurocon-
trol’s CRCO from airspace users. The funding is carried out according to one of the following
two methods (Eurocontrol 2015d):
• Full cost Recovery: route charges are calculated based on the estimated costs and traffic
for that same year. An adjustment mechanism is applied to ensure that only the actual
costs of the service are eventually recovered.
• Determined costs: the costs are determined by the contracting states at the level of the
charging zone and are estimated prior to the beginning of each reference period (which
covers from three to five years) as part of the performance plan for each calendar year.
Country ANSP Regulation
Spain ENAIRE State Agency
Germany DFS Government corporation
France DSNA State Agency
Italy ENAV State Agency
UK (continental) NATS Public-private partnership
Eurocontrol MUAC International organisation
Table 1.1: Type of regulation applied to the largest European ANSPs (source: Eurocontrol
2014a)
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1.1.3 Airline Operators (AOs)
Airline Operators represent the final users of the ATM system. According to Eurocontrol, every
year more than nine million Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flights are performed by scheduled
and business airlines in the ECAC region, corresponding to an average of over 28 thousands
flights per day with an average duration of an hour and a half each (see Eurocontrol 2015e,
and Table 1.2 for a summary). For the purpose of this study, only scheduled IFR flights (both
passengers and cargo) are of interest and will be considered in the remainder of it. Concerning
the passenger segment, there are currently over 50 airlines that move each more than one million
passengers to, from and within European countries (see Table 1.3 for figures about the largest
ten).
Breaking down the operational costs of airline operators in order to assess their potential
sensitivity to the modulation of air navigation charges is no easy task. In fact airlines are highly
heterogeneous with regards to market scope (e.g., regional carrier, international carrier, pure
passenger carrier, pure cargo carrier, mixed passenger and cargo etc.) and business models (e.g.,
traditional full service carrier, low cost carrier, charter etc.).
A rough estimate is provided in IATA Cost Management Group’s presentation from 2015 titled
“ACMG best year ever” which shows an average cost structure breakdown obtained from a
survey on passenger airlines carried out in 2014. The data used for the analysis is the result of
the submission of 59 airlines worldwide with European airlines representing 51% of the share
and 47% of the passengers carried (Eurocontrol 2015e). Figure 1.3 is sourced from the afore-
mentioned presentation and shows that over 50% of the operational costs of the surveyed AOs
are due to fleet fuelling, operation and maintenance. Air navigation charges on average make
up for a 4.1% of the costs, a figure inferior to the one for airport charges, which sums up to 4.9%.
A more precise estimate can be inferred from the annual investor reports that airlines publish
every year (these documents are freely accessible from companies’ websites). As an example,
and to provide a more detailed insight on the European market, the breakdown percentages
of operational costs are illustrated for a full service carrier (Lufthansa Passenger), a low cost
carrier (Ryanair) and a cargo carrier (Lufthansa Cargo) in Tables 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 respectively.
These three companies are each the largest carrier in Europe for the respective market segment.
From Ryanair’s figures it is evident how the cost of fuel and oil has a much more significant
weight for low cost carriers, compared to IATA’s average (46.03% vs. 33.4% for 2014). The
same however also applies to charges. Route charges in particular amount to approximately
12% of the total operating cost, which is almost three times the IATA average figure of 4.1% (a
similar proportion applies to airport charges as well).
As for the full service carrier, the figures appear more aligned to IATA’s average values with
regard to fuel and oil expenses (29.04% vs. 33.4% for 2014). The figures regarding fees on the
other hand are much less aligned. Although Lufthansa does not provide separate figures for
airport and route charges, the combined percentage of approximately 23% is more than twice
the 9% that combining IATA’s 4.9% (airport charges) and 4.1% (route charges) gives.
The scenario is again very different for the cargo carrier. The main component of the cost
Operator Segments IFR Flights
(x1000)
Avg. distance Avg. Fuel Con-
sumption
Avg. Flight Duration
Scheduled Airlines 8 655 652 NM (1 207 km) 7 547 kg 100 minutes (1.66 hours)
Business Aviation 600 485 NM (898 km) 1 136 kg 82 minutes (1.37 hours)
Total Scheduled and Business 9 255 641 NM (1 187 km) 7 132 kg 99 minutes (1.64 hours)
Table 1.2: IFR Flight Information per Operator Segment in 2014 (source: Eurocontrol 2015e)
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Rank Country Airline/Holding 2015 2010 2005 Fleet Destinations
1 Germany Lufthansa Group 107.7 90.2 51.3 602 321
2 Republic of Ireland Ryanair 101.4 72.7 33.4 319 186
3 United Kingdom/Spain International Airlines Group 88.3 50.6 - 520 248
4 France/Netherlands Air France-KLM 79.0 70.8 70.0 574 231
5 United Kingdom easyJet 69.9 49.7 30.3 226 136
6 Turkey Turkish Airlines 61.2 29.1 14.1 300 280
7 Russia Aeroflot Group 39.4 14.1 8.1 239 189
8 Germany Air Berlin Group 30.2 31.8 - 143 145
9 Sweden/Norway/Denmark SAS Group 30.2 23.1 26.5 137 157
10 Norway Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA 25.8 13.0 3.3 102 130
Table 1.3: Largest airlines in Europe by total scheduled and chartered passengers carried in
millions (source: Wikipedia)
Figure 1.3: Average airline costs breakdown (source: IATA)
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Ryanair % for 2015 % for 2014 % % for 2013 %
Fuel and oil 43.19 46.03 45.25
Airport and handling charges 15.46 14.04 14.65
Route charges 11.90 11.97 11.72
Staff costs 10.92 10.59 10.43
Depreciation 8.22 8.06 7.85
Maintenance, materials and repairs 2.94 2.65 2.93
Aircraft rentals 2.33 2.30 2.34
Marketing and distribution 5.03 4.37 4.81
Table 1.4: Operational expenses breakdown for a low cost carrier (source: Ryanair 2015)
breakdown in this case is, again quite predictably, the operating lease (since subcontracting is
very common in the air cargo business), which in turn drives down the “direct” expenses for
fuel. Again, only a combined figure is provided for airport and route charges, corresponding
to approximately 12% of the total. Since cargo flights are mostly performed during the night
because airport charges are generally lower during those hours, it can be safely assumed that
in this case route charges make up for the larger part of these costs.
Lufthansa Passenger % for 2014 % for 2013
Fuel 29.04 29.81
Fees (airport, handling and route charges) 23.12 22.25
Staff costs 19.55 19.27
Depreciation and amortisation 4.82 6.03
Maintenance and repair services 5.26 6.69
Operating lease 0.15 0.34
Other operating expenses 14.29 13.83
Table 1.5: Operational expenses breakdown for a traditional passenger carrier (source:
Lufthansa 2014))
Concerning the relative share of route charges from ATM services in Europe (which cover
ANSP infrastructure, staff and other operational costs) per Aircraft Operator segment, Euro-
control provides the figures illustrated in Table 1.7 for 2014. This data is sourced from Network
Manager flight plans, Eurocontrol’s Central Route Charges Office (Eurocontrol 2015e). Accord-
ing to these figures, traditional, low cost and pure cargo airlines together account for 83.6% of
flights and 86.3% of the charges collected.
Lufthansa Cargo % for 2014 % for 2013
Fuel 19.89 22.86
Fees (airport, handling and route charges) 12.21 12.26
Staff costs 17.00 16.64
Depreciation and amortisation 2.81 1.16
Maintenance and repair services 5.31 5.49
Operating lease 30.83 30.92
Other operating expenses 11.95 10.68
Table 1.6: Operational expenses breakdown for a cargo carrier (source: Lufthansa 2014)
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Segment % of flights % of KM flown % of total charges collected
Traditional scheduled airlines 55.20 62.80 74.30
Low cost airlines 24.90 19.20 8.70
Business aviation 7.20 4.80 6.70
Charter airlines 5.40 6.10 4.70
All cargo 3.50 4.90 3.30
Military 1.30 1.30 0.90
Other 2.60 0.90 1.50
Table 1.7: Route Charges Share per Aircraft Operator Segment (source: Eurocontrol 2015e)
1.2 Introduction to European Air Traffic Management (ATM)
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is a component of the so-defined Air Navigation Services (ANS),
which comprise, besides ATM, also communication, navigation and surveillance services (CNS),
meteorological services and further auxiliary aviation services (see Figure 1.4). ATM includes
all services related to air navigation, that is, Air Space Management (ASM), Air Traffic Services
(ATS) and Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM). ATS includes Air Traffic Control (ATC),
flight information services and alert services (e.g., contact with rescue bodies in case an aircraft
is in difficulty). Air Traffic Control services deal with the movement of traffic in the airspace
controlled. Civil (commercial and private) flights are referred to as General Air Traffic (GAT),
while military flights are known as Operational Air Traffic (OAT). A pilot planning a flight
can choose between two different types of flight rules, namely Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). Under VFR, the pilot is responsible for maintaining visual
contact with other airspace users and for determining his route with the help of geographical
landmarks. Under IFR on-board instruments serve as navigation aids, and together with the
indications transmitted by air traffic controllers make up for the lack of visibility and provide
the information required for the pilot to be aware of his position at all times (Cook 2007).
Figure 1.4: Air Navigation Services in Europe (source: Eurocontrol)
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1.2.1 Airspace structure and organisation
Since each state is responsible for the airspace above its territories, Flight Information Regions
(FIRs) have generally been established according to national borders, with limitations dictated
mainly by military and ATC infrastructural needs. Some countries operated a further vertical
split by creating an Upper Information Region (UIR). Splits typically occur at Flight Levels
195, 245 and 285 (corresponding to approximately 6, 7.5 and 8.7 Km of altitude respectively);
due to a lack of harmonisation, states were initially free to choose the altitude at which to
operate the split. One of the mandate of the SES regulations (see Section 1.3) is to create a
European UIR. Figures 1.5 and 1.6 illustrate FIRs and UIRs in the ECAC area for lower and
upper airspace respectively.
FIRs and UIRs are controlled by Area Control Centres (ACCs); currently there are around
70 ACCs in the ECAC area. According to various factors such as airspace type, quantity of
traffic, military requirement and controller availability, ACCs are further divided into smaller
sectors. Sectors are defined as the smallest portion of airspace under specific control and their
shape and size are ultimately limited by the number of aircraft a controller can handle at any
given moment. Based on this empirical figure, a capacity for the sectors is established (a typical
figure for European sectors is around 30 aircraft entries per hour) and published to the airspace
users and the CFMU. Since aircraft typically cross several sectors in one ACC, the capacity of
the ACC is less than the sum of its individual control sectors (Cook 2007).
Sectorisations are not unique: according to controller availability and traffic forecasts an
ACC can be organised according to different sector configurations, where sectors can be merged
in case of lower capacity demand (for example, during the night) or split when the traffic in-
creases (e.g., during peak hours in the morning and afternoon). ACCs can switch from one
configuration to another several times per day. Figure 1.7 shows two example configurations of
a German ACC.
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Figure 1.5: Flight Information Regions in ECAC area, lower airspace (source: Eurocontrol)
Figure 1.6: Flight Information Regions in ECAC area, upper airspace (source: Eurocontrol)
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Figure 1.7: Day configuration (left) and night configuration (right) for ACC EDUUUTAS
(source: NEST)
A special block of airspace is what is defined as Terminal Control Area or Terminal Ma-
noeuvring Area (TMA), that is, a special type of airspace located above an airport, designed to
handle aircraft arriving and departing the airport(s) contained within it. TMAs include SIDs
and STARs (Standard Departure and Arrival Routes and procedures defined on some airports,
see Sec. 1.2.2) but not aerodrome aprons. Being the most complex type of airspace, only IFR
flights are allowed in them.
Figure 1.8: Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA, source: International Virtual Aviation Orga-
nization)
The SES-2 legislative package (see Sec. 1.3) introduced a further functional organisational
layer of FIRs, the so-called Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs). FABs are defined as airspace
blocks based on operational requirements and established regardless of State boundaries, where
the provision of air navigation services and related functions are performance-driven and op-
timised with a view to introducing, in each functional airspace block, enhanced cooperation
among air navigation service providers or, where appropriate, an integrated provider. Eurocon-
trol has been issued by the EC a mandate for supporting the establishment of FABs as part
of the Network Manager tasks. The SES-2 regulation requires all EU members to be part of a
FAB by 2012. As of today, nine FABs have been declared and established (see Figure 1.9). As
of the latest available update (January 2014 according to Eurocontrol (2015b)) FIRs and UIRs
are grouped in FABs as follows:
• UK-Ireland FAB (Scottish FIR&UIR, London FIR&UIR, Shannon FIR&UIR);
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• Danish-Swedish FAB (Copenhagen FIR, Sweden FIR);
• Baltic FAB (Warszawa FIR, Vilnius FIR&UIR);
• BLUE MED FAB (Nicosia FIR&UIR, Athinai FIR&UIR, Brindisi FIR&UIR, Milano
FIR&UIR, Roma FIR&UIR, Malta FIR&UIR);
• Danube FAB (Sofia FIR, Bucarest FIR);
• FAB CE (Zagreb FIR, Budapest FIR, Ljubljana FIR, Praha FIR, Wien FIR, Sarajevo
FIR&UIR, Bratislava FIR);
• FABEC (Brussels FIR&UIR, Langen FIR, Mu¨nchen FIR, Rhein UIR, Hannover UIR, Bre-
men FIR, Amsterdam FIR, Bordeaux FIR, Reims FIR, Paris FIR, France UIR, Marseille
FIR, Brest FIR, Switzerland FIR, Switzerland UIR);
• North European FAB (Tallinn FIR, Finland FIR&UIR, Enor FIR, Riga FIR, Bodo Oceanic
FIR);
• South West FAB (Canarias FIR&UIR, Lisboa FIR, Madrid FIR&UIR, Barcelona FIR&UIR).
Figure 1.9: Functional Airspace Blocks (source: Eurocontrol)
1.2.2 Routes
In en-route airspace, the main routes for aircraft currently consist of airways (usually with
widths of 5 NM either side of the centre-line) and Upper Air Routes (with no defined width).
These routes follow straight lines between significant points commonly referred to as “way-
points” or “navpoints”. Waypoints are represented by three letter identifiers (e.g., DME) when
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there is an associated ground-based navigation aid, for example a beacon and by five letters
identifiers (e.g., KONAN) when the point is just a geographical coordinate with no ground-
based navaid. In addition, airline-defined waypoints can be inserted in flight plans, for example
as a temporary routing to avoid weather, or to better navigate a climb or a descent. These
ad-hoc waypoints do not appear on official charts.
Figure 1.10: Upper air routes and waypoints in the Cardiff area (source: NATS)
To increase the capacity and flexibility of airport operations, Standard Instrument Departure
Routes (SIDs) and Standard Terminal Arrival Routes (STARs) have been introduced. Both offer
the pilot a pre-planned IFR procedure. SIDs promote highly specific departure procedures,
which is very important nowadays with noise abatement and environmental protection being
relevant factors around airports. STARs are designed to expedite ATC arrival procedures and
to facilitate the transition between en-route and instrument approach segments. Each STAR
procedure is presented as a separate chart and may serve a single airport or more than one
(Cook 2007).
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1.2.3 Air Traffic Flow Management and flight planning
In Europe, Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM), nowadays often referred to as Air Traffic
Flow and Capacity Management (ATFCM) service has been established to utilise the limited
capacity available to the maximum extent possible while enabling a safe, orderly and expeditious
flow of air traffic. There are three phases to ATFCM (Cook 2007):
• Strategic Flow Management which occurs from six months up to seven days in advance
of the day of operation, when long-term demand and capacity matching will be planned
(e.g., planning for extra traffic due to holidays and seasonal peaks);
• Pre-Tactical Flow Management which occurs in the six days before the day of operation
during which the strategic plan is fine-tuned in the light of updated demand as filed flight
plans are received. An ATFM Daily Plan is published in preparation of the tactical phase;
• Tactical Flow Management occurs on the day of operation with the ATFM Daily Plan
being updated as actual traffic and capacity are known. Traffic is managed through slot
allocation and re-routings.
Since 1996, Eurocontrol’s Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) controls the flight plan-
ning and message distribution in the Integrated Initial Flight Plan Processing System (IFPS)
zone (IFPZ). IFPS service is split between two functionally identical units located in Haren
(Brussels) and Bre´tigny-sur-Orge (Paris). Flight plans are sent to both sites and the workload
is then shared between them. Once received by the IFPS, flight plan data is checked for syntax
and semantic correctness in order for the system to build a 4-dimensional profile of every flight
within the IFPZ. The window for filing flight plans to IFPS for processing is between 120 and
3 hours before the Estimated Off-Block Time (EOBT). Repetitive flight plans can be filed in
advance of the current season (there are two “seasons”, summer from the end of March and
winter from the end of October) but full IFPS processing occurs only around 20 hours before
EOBT. When a flight plan message is accepted by the system, an Acknowledgement message
(ACK) is sent back to the airline operator.
The syntax for flight plan messaging is defined by ICAO in a document named Procedures
for Air Navigation Services - Air Traffic Management, also known as PANS-ATM or “Doc
4444”. Flight Plan messages contain all information needed for planning IFR flights, including
aircraft type, departure and destination airports, EOBT and route as sequence of waypoints
with associated altitude (expressed as the corresponding Flight Level, FL).
When entering the pre-tactical phase, flight plans are processed by the Enhanced Tactical
Flow ManagementSystem (ETFMS). This system calculates demand in every airspace sector
within the CFMU area using planned information (filed flight plans) received from the IFPS
and calculates and allocates capacity slots by the Computer Assisted Slot Allocation (CASA,
explained in the following) system. Information is continuously updated until the operational
phase using surveillance radar data from ANSPs and position reporting data from aircraft
operators. The availability of accurate real-time information allows ETFMS to recalculate the
4-D profile of flights and manage traffic demand in a more accurate way (Cook 2007).
Filing a flight plan to IFPS represents a request for a departure slot. The Estimated Off-
Block Time (EOBT) declares the time the aircraft operator expects the aircraft to be ready to
depart. Whether the aircraft is permitted to depart at this time depends on the presence of
any flow restrictions (called “ATFM regulations”) on the aerodromes and the airspace through
which the route is planned. A flight affected by an ATFM regulation receives an “ATFM slot”
31
from CFMU. Slot calculations and assignments are operated according to the “first planned,
first served” principle by the CASA system. This system calculates the Estimated Time Over
(ETO) for the point of entry at each sector used in the planned route of a flight, and inserts
that flight in these sectors’ slot lists. When the number of aircraft in a slot exceeds capacity,
a regulation is activated and all flights that cannot be assigned to the scheduled ETO slot are
assigned to the next available one and are therefore delayed.
After this process is completed, a Calculated Takeoff Time (CTOT) is determined for the
flight, and the corresponding departure slot is assigned. When a flight is subject to multiple
regulations, the delay of the most penalising one takes precedence.
1.2.4 ANS charges
The costs of air traffic management services in Europe (infrastructure, staff and other opera-
tional costs) are funded through air navigation charges. ATM services are funded through the
“user pays” principle, meaning that the airspace users (i.e., the airlines) are directly charged
for the operated traffic. There are different sorts of air navigation charges: route charges, ter-
minal navigation charges, and communication charges. Air navigation services (ANS) charges
are imposed to recover the cost of providing ANS services in three phases of flight: movements
at and around airports (aerodrome control), approach and departure of flights, including initial
climb and descent (approach control) and en-route phase (en-route/area control).
Air navigation services provision in Eurocontrol member states is based on the principle of
recovering a a-priori determined costs for a reference period (the so-called determined cost
system, mandatory for SES signatories) or the full cost recovery system (applied by the nine
Eurocontrol member states which are not SES signatories).
Route charges represent the remuneration for the costs of en-route ANS provision, including
Eurocontrol costs. There is a harmonised route charging system in the Eurocontrol area, the
legal basis of which is the Multilateral Agreement relating to Route Charges. This Agreement
dates back to 1981, and has set forth common policy on ANS route charges in the Eurocontrol
area. Regulation EC 1794/2006 (European Commission 2006), laid down a common charging
scheme for ANS services and introduced the notion of charging zones. An “en-route charging
zone” is a volume of airspace for which the states establish a single cost base and a single
unit rate. This “en-route charging” zone extends from the ground up to, and including, upper
airspace. A Contracting State is permitted to establish a specific zone for a complex terminal
area (a Terminal Manouvering Area, TMA, see Sec. 1.2.1), after consultation with airspace
user representatives. En-route charging zones are listed in Annex 1 of Conditions of application
of the route charges system and conditions of payment (Eurocontrol 2011).
A single en route charge is levied for each flight performed in the Eurocontrol airspace,
irrespective of the number of Member States overflown. The system for billing and collection of
route charges is common and operated by Eurocontrol’s Central Route Charging Office (CRCO).
The billing of route charges is done on a monthly basis and charges income is disbursed weekly
to the ANSPs. In principle, all flights are subject to route charges. However, there are several
categories of flights exempted from payment in all Eurocontrol states (European Commission
2006), namely:
• Flights performed by aircraft with maximum takeoff weight inferior to 2t;
• Mixed VFR)/IFR flights in the charging zones where they are performed exclusively under
VFR and where a charge is not levied for VFR flights;
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• State flights performed exclusively for the transport of reigning monarchs, heads of state
of government or ministers on official mission;
• search and rescue flights authorised by the appropriate competent body.
In addition, some states may exempt from payment of route charges all military flights, training
flights performed for the purpose of obtaining a licence or testing equipment, circular flights,
humanitarian flights and flights performed by customs or police officers. Where exemption is
granted, the state concerned bears the cost which would otherwise be chargeable to the flights.
How route charges are established
The total charge per flight collected by Eurocontrol (R) equals the sum of the charges generated
in the charging zones defined by states:
R =
∑
i
ri (1.1)
The individual charge (ri) is equal to the product of the unit rate (ti) and the number of service
units (si) in charging zone i for this flight:
ri = ti · si (1.2)
The number of service units, si, is defined as a product of the distance factor (di) and the weight
factor (p) for a given flight:
si = di · p (1.3)
The distance factor, di, is equal to 1/100 of the great circle distance (expressed in km) between
the aerodrome of departure within, or the point of entry into, the charging zone (i), and the
aerodrome of first destination within, or the point of exit from, that charging zone.
The distance to be taken into account is reduced by 20 km for each take-off and for each landing
within a charging zone (i). The entry and exit points are the points at which the lateral limits
of the charging zone are crossed by the route described in the flight plan filed by the operator
and approved by the CFMU 30 minutes prior to take-off.
The route description per flight is extracted from the flight plan filed by the operator and
approved by the Central Flow Management Unit (CFMU) 30 minutes prior to take-off. This
enables the CRCO to calculate the distances flown in each State’s airspace (Eurocontrol 2014b).
The weight factor, p, is proportional to the maximum takeoff weight of the aircraft used and
is calculated according to following formula:
p =
√
MTOW/50 (1.4)
where the MTOW is the maximum takeoff weight of the aircraft, expressed in metric tonnes
and rounded to one decimal place.
MTOW values are calculated as explained in the following: towards the end of each calen-
dar year, airlines are required to submit to the CRCO a declaration of the composition of
their fleet (registration markings, aircraft type, version and certified MTOW). Based on this
information, the CRCO calculates the weight factor based on average weight of all aircraft of
a basic type. These weight factors then become valid from the 1st January of the following year.
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Unit rates (t) are calculated based on required equality of total costs and revenues of an
ANSP, as a ratio of cost base (forecast or determined) and forecast number of service units.
The cost base includes operating costs, depreciation costs, cost of capital, and a state’s share
of Eurocontrol costs.
Each Eurocontrol Member State establishes the unit rate of en-route charges (basic unit rate)
for the airspace within its responsibility. Each November, the enlarged Commission approves
the basic unit rates for the following year.
Basic unit rates are adjusted every month if the national currency of a Member State is not
the Euro. The monthly unit rate is recalculated by applying an exchange rate between the
Euro and the national currency. This exchange rate is the average of the Closing Cross Rate
calculated by Reuters based on the daily Bid rate, for the preceding month.
Terminal charges
Terminal charges are meant to remunerate the cost of aerodrome control services and air traffic
services related to the approach and departure of aircraft within a certain distance (at present
typically 20 km) of an airport. Although not being further investigated in this study, they are
briefly explained here for the sake of completeness. Depending on the country, terminal charges
can either be included as part of airport charges (which is the case for example in Belgium and
Greece) or paid directly to the ANSP through the CRCO, similarly to the route charges (e.g.,
Austria, France, Finland and Germany).
Terminal charges (TC) are usually based on aircraft MTOW, but there is no unique formula
according to which they are calculated. Regulation EC 1794/2006, as amended by Regulation
EC 1191/2010 (European Commission 2010) proposes to harmonise them according to the
following formula (that should be mandatory since January 2015):
TC = (MTOW/50)0.7 · t (1.5)
According to Implementing Regulation (EU) No 390/2013, Member States may decide not
to apply this Regulation at airports with fewer than 70 000 IFR air transport movements per
year. It however must be applied to the airport with the highest number of IFR movements in
each Member State, regardless of its traffic volume.
1.3 Legislative framework: the Single European Sky (SES) ini-
tiative
As a response to the growth in air travel witnessed in the last two decades, the European
Commission passed two Single European Sky (SES) packages to create a legislative framework
for European aviation. The main objective is to reform ATM in Europe in order to cope with
sustained air traffic growth and operations under the safest, most cost- and flight-efficient and
environmentally friendly conditions. This implies de-fragmenting the European airspace, reduc-
ing delays, increasing safety standards and flight efficiency to reduce the aviation environmental
footprint, and reducing costs related to service provision. The EC states that as a result of the
SES policy, average delays for en-route air traffic flow management are now close to 0.5 min per
flight, which is a remarkable achievement compared to the heavy delays that occurred in the
1990s and 2000s.
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The SES legislative framework consists of four Basic EC Regulations (the SES I Package,
n. 549/2004, 550/2004, 551/2004 and 552/2004) covering the provision of air navigation ser-
vices, the organisation and use of airspace and the interoperability of the European Air Traffic
Management Network. The four SES I regulations were revised and extended in 2009 with
Regulation (EC) n. 1070/2009 aimed at increasing the overall performance of the air traffic
management system in Europe (the SES II Package). SES II changed the SES focus from ca-
pacity to performance and environmental impact. The regulation is structured around four key
areas, or “pillars” of the ATM reform, namely performance, single safety, new technologies and
managing capacity on the ground (Figure 1.11).
Figure 1.11: SES II pillars (source: SESAR Joint Undertaking)
1. Regulating performance Three measures are proposed under this pillar:
• Driving the performance of the air traffic control system: establishment of an inde-
pendent Performance Review Body (PRB) to oversee the performance of the system
and proposes Communitywide targets for delays, cost reduction and the shortening
of routes. These objectives are then approved by the EC and passed on to national
supervisory authorities who organise consultations to agree binding national and
regional objectives.
• Facilitating the integration of service provision: establishment of Functional Airspace
Blocks (FABs) by the end of 2012 at the latest; FABs are bottom-up initiatives
led by the States; they aim at an enhanced cooperation between the air navigation
service providers (ANSPs) and the national supervisory authorities (NSAs) to obtain
operational efficiency gains through such strategies as common procurement, training
and optimisation of air traffic controllers (ATCs) resources. More generally, FABs
aim at better coordinating the airspace by arranging it around traffic flows instead
of state boundaries.
• Strengthening the network management function: designation of a European Net-
work Manager to supervise tasks such as European route network design, slot coor-
dination and allocation and management of the deployment of the Single European
Sky ATM Research (SESAR) technologies (to be carried out by different actors).
This function has been entrusted to Eurocontrol up to 2019.
2. Single safety framework The growth in air traffic, the congestion of air space and aero-
dromes, as well as the use of new technologies justifies a common approach to the de-
velopment and application of harmonised regulation in order to improve safety levels in
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air transport. Following this approach the EC proposes to extend the competence of the
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to the remaining key safety fields: aerodromes,
air traffic management and air navigation services.
3. New technologies The present air traffic control system is being pushed to its limits, work-
ing with obsolescent technologies and suffering from fragmentation. SESAR (Single Eu-
ropean Sky ATM Research) is the technological pillar of the Single European Sky. It aims
to improve ATM performance by modernising and harmonising ATM systems through
the definition, development, validation and deployment of innovative technological and
operational ATM solutions. These innovative solutions constitute what is known as the
SESAR concept of operations. This concept is defined in the European ATM Master Plan,
which also defines the operational changes that needed and a roadmap for their implemen-
tation; the components of the concept are developed and validated by the SESAR Joint
Undertaking (SJU) . The validated essential operational changes are deployed through
Common Projects supported by dedicated SESAR deployment governance and incentive
mechanisms. All three of these processes (definition, development and deployment) are
components of a virtual lifecycle that actively involves the stakeholders and the Commis-
sion in different forms of partnerships.
The SESAR ATM Master Plan has these goals for 2020:
• improved safety performance by a factor of 10;
• enabled a three-fold increase in capacity;
• reduced delays both on the ground and in the air;
• lowered the cost of air navigation service provision by more than half; n provided a
10% reduction in the environmental impact per flight.
4. Managing capacity on the ground Establishment of an Airport Observatory, composed
of Member States, relevant authorities and stakeholders, to exchange and monitor data
and information on airport capacity as a whole, as well as to provide advice on the
development and implementation of Community transport legislation.
Finally, the European Commission proposed an interim update of the SES rules, called Single
European Sky 2+ (SES2+). The SES2+ proposal was made in June 2013 and is currently in
the process for approval by the European Parliament and Council. The update focuses on seven
main areas, namely:
Independence and resources of National Supervisory Authorities (NSAs) Since au-
dits have shown deficiencies in the oversight of Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs),
SES2+ seeks to improve the system by providing the NSAs with more support through
EU-level co-operation and by pooling resources. It also requires more separation of NSAs
from the ANSPs they supervise in order to ensure truly independent oversight, such as is
found for example in the oversight of airlines.
Support services Traditionally, all ATM services have been bundled into one monopoly provider
and designated without use of public procurement rules. SES2+ proposed the application
of normal procurement rules to ensure a transparent selection of the provider offering the
best cost/benefit ratio.
Performance scheme and the Performance Review Body The performance scheme re-
quires some updates to avoid dilution of targets. The Performance Review Body (PRB)
will also be given more independence.
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Functional Airspace Blocks FABs have so far been relatively inflexible constructions, fo-
cused too much on organisational structures instead of operational benefits. SES2+ aims
at making them more flexible, industry led, and more focused on performance. As long as
the performance targets are met, the Commission will not try to micromanage the FABs,
but rather lets the industry and States devise their own solutions.
Network Manager The network manager mainly provides services to other service providers.
EASA, Eurocontrol and the institutional landscape SES2+ aims at clearing some re-
sponsibility overlaps occurred in the past decade by dividing work between the three
European-level organisations (EASA, Commission and Eurocontrol) so that Eurocontrol
will focus on the operational issues (network manager), EASA on technical rule drafting
and oversight authority tasks, and the Commission on economic regulation (performance,
charging, institutional issues).
1.4 Air traffic today, congestion of airspace and growth fore-
casts
In 2014 the European ATM system controlled on average 26 800 flights daily; after the de-
crease between 2011 and 2013, flights in Europe increased again by 1.7% in 2014 with a positive
medium term outlook. According to the latest Eurocontrol Seven Year Forecast (Eurocontrol
2015b), flights are expected to grow by 1.5% in 2015 and to continue with an annual average
growth rate of 2.5% between 2014 and 2021. Currently, European ATM costs an additional e
2-3 billion every year, compared to other similar systems in the world, due to the inefficiencies
in controlling a highly fragmented airspace with an uneven distribution of traffic. In fact five
biggest ANSPs (DFS for Germany, DSNA for France, ENAIRE for Spain, ENAV for Italy and
NATS for the UK) bear 60% of total European gate-to-gate service provision costs and operate
54% of European traffic.
According to Eurocontrol’s Performance Review Report for the year 2014 (Eurocontrol
2015c), after a steady improvement between 2010 and 2013, when the lowest level of enroute
ATFM delay per flight on record was reached (0.53 minutes per flight), enroute ATFM delays
in the Eurocontrol area increased again to 0.61 minutes per flight in 2014 (as shown in Figure
1.12). ATC capacity and staffing related delays increased in 2014. They remain, by far, the
main driver of enroute ATFM delays, followed by weather and “ATC Other” which comprises,
inter alia, ATC industrial actions. The number of flights affected by ATFM enroute delays
increased again from 2.7% to 3.2% in 2014. Overall, 1.6% of flights were delayed by more than
15 minutes due to ATFM regulations, compared to 1.3% in 2013.
The performance deterioration in 2014 was therefore mainly attributed to ATC capacity
issues: while capacity constraints can occur from time to time, some area control centres gener-
ated high delays on a regular basis. In 2014, the most constraining ACCs were Nicosia (due to
failure to implement capacity plans), Warsaw (which had issues with the implementation of a
new integrated system for ATC), Lisbon (reoccurring issues in November), Canarias (capacity
planning and delay classification issues), Athinai/Macedonia (which had insufficient capacity in
summer), Reims (capacity planning issues), Brest and Marseille (due to ATC industrial action).
These together accounted for more than half of all European enroute ATFM delays (54.6%) but
only for 17.8% of total flight hours controlled. Figure 1.13 shows the delay performance of these
ACCs in terms of number of days with significant enroute ATFM delay (more than 1 minute
per flight for more than 30 days in a year).
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Figure 1.12: Average en-route ATFM delay per flight in the Eurocontrol area between 1997 and
2014 (source: Eurocontrol)
Figure 1.13: Overview of most constraining ACCs in 2014 (source: Eurocontrol)
Capacity shortages and associated delays are evident in the current and short-term analysis
of traffic distribution (Sec. 1.4.1) and since long term forecasts of traffic growth (Sec. 1.4.2)
expect traffic to likely grow by 50% in the next twenty years (Eurocontrol 2014d), the level of
congestion is only likely to become more severe.
1.4.1 Short term traffic growth forecasts: 2014-2019
The Network Operations Plan (NOP) is a document developed by Eurocontrol in the context
of the Network Management Functions. The latest available version of the Plan (Eurocon-
trol 2014d) covers the activities planned and required to enhance European network opera-
tional performance over the period 2014-2018/19, and will be updated on a yearly basis or as
deemed necessary. This document addresses the requirements expressed in the EC Regulation
No 677/2011 of 7 July 2011 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of air traffic
management (ATM) network functions and amending Regulation (EU) No 691/2010, which
establishes several ATM network functions to be performed by a Network Manager.
The scope of the NOP covers airspace structure enhancement, ACC capacity enhancement, Air
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Traffic Flow and Capacity Management, Airport efficiency enhancement and network integra-
tion. The Network Operations Plan 2014-2018/19 includes also the main projects resulting from
Functional Airspace Blocks developments. It also gives details of capacity and flight efficiency
enhancement measures planned at network level and by each Area Control Centre, as well as a
description of the airport performance assessment and improvement measures that are planned
at those airports that generate a high level of delay.
Additionally, this document presents forecasts of traffic growth and en-route delay for the
reference period. These forecasts are based on the data presented in another document, Eu-
rocontrol’s Seven Year Forecast. The latest available version of this document was published
in February 2014, covering the period 2014-2020. It indicates that, over the seven year period,
the average annual traffic growth in Europe is expected to be between 1.1% and 3.6% with a
most likely value of 2.5% per year. Traffic is expected to pass the previous peak of 2008 in
2016. Figure 1.14 illustrates the expected traffic growth at ACC level by 2019 compared to
2013 levels. Turkey is expected to be the main driver of traffic growth, followed by Ukraine
and, to a lesser extent, by the Eastern European area.
Figure 1.14: Forecast traffic growth for 2019 compared to 2013 (source: Eurocontrol)
According to the NOP (Eurocontrol 2014d), at European network level, the delay forecast
based on the baseline traffic growth scenario for the period 2014-2019 shows that en-route ATFM
delay will be above the target, set at 0.5 minutes per flight, for each year of the period 2014-2019
(see Table 1.8). The delay forecast is based on capacity plans agreed with all ANSPs during
the period November 2013 April 2014, and on the baseline scenario of the 2014 Eurocontrol
Seven Year Forecast of traffic demand (Eurocontrol 2015b).
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Year Delay target Delay forecast (annual mean) Delay forecast (summer season)
2014 0.5 0.51 0.78
2015 0.5 0.55 0.81
2016 0.5 0.64 0.98
2017 0.5 0.67 1.01
2018 0.5 0.62 0.94
2019 0.5 0.57 0.81
Table 1.8: Delay forecast (min/flight) at network level for the 2014-2018/19 period (source:
Eurocontrol 2014a)
Delays are likely to be above the target at some ACCs in Europe throughout the period,
in Cyprus, France, Greece, Poland, Portugal and Spain. In most cases this is due to inflexible
use of staff, shortage of qualified controllers in some areas and unresolved staff management
issues, despite the plans for capacity increase formulated in response to the capacity require-
ment profiles 2014-2019 (illustrated in the NOP and calculated according to the September 2013
Eurocontrol Seven Year Forecast). In spite of significant efforts to ensure a more effective and
flexible resource utilisation, these ACCs are expected to continue to open less-than-optimum
sector configurations during peak hours.
Figures 1.15 and 1.16 are taken from the 2014 NOP and illustrate, as an example, the
forecast increase in en-route delay at ACC level for 2019 compared with 2013 levels despite the
planned increase in capacity availability for the same period. Capacity increases are planned
on the vast majority of European territory, with the exception of Scandinavian, Italian and
part of Eastern European areas, where current capacity is expected to be sufficient to meet the
demand.
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Figure 1.15: Planned capacity increases for 2019 compared to 2013 (source: Eurocontrol)
Figure 1.16: Forecast en-route delay for 2019 compared to 2013 (source: Eurocontrol)
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1.4.2 Long term traffic growth forecasts: 2035
Eurocontrol’s Challenges of Growth series of studies aims to deliver information to support
long-term planning decisions, analysing what are the challenges of growth for commercial avia-
tion in Europe between now and both 2035 and 2050. Four studies have been completed so far,
in 2001, 2004, 2008 and 2013. The information and forecasts illustrated in the present section
are sourced from the latter (Eurocontrol 2014d).
The five principal challenges identified for European aviation in 2035 and beyond are sum-
marised as:
• The continuing difficulty of delivering airport capacity when, where and at the price it is
needed;
• The difficulty of delivering the required level of performance on a congested network, when
airport delay increases on an average busy day by a factor of 5 or 6 to become a frequent,
major contributor to overall delay;
• Keeping the industry financially viable in an era of slower growth and more interesting
opportunities for investors away from Europe, where aviation will be growing more quickly;
• The amount of emissions from aviation, which are likely to increase even with a slow
traffic growth. Development competitively-priced low-carbon fuels may become a priority
in this regard;
• Building resilience to climate change. A growing number of organisations are making
resilience to climate change a routine part of their business or operational planning. How-
ever, more needs to be done to build local and network climate resilience. Some of the
solutions are relatively low-cost (training and procedures), or happy side-effects of other
investment. An early start should save money in the long run.
For the sake of robustness of the presented forecasts, four potential scenarios for how air
transport in Europe and the factors influencing it might develop have been elaborated in the
study:
• Scenario A: Global Growth (Technological Growth). Strong economic growth in an in-
creasingly globalised World, with technology used successfully to mitigate the effects of
sustainability challenges such as the environment or resource availability.
• Scenario C: Regulated Growth (Most-Likely). Moderate economic growth, with regulation
reconciling the environmental, social and economic demands to address the growing global
sustainability concerns. This scenario has been constructed as the “most- likely” of the
four, most closely following the current trends.
• Scenario C’: Happy Localism. With European economies being more and more fragile,
increasing pressure on costs, stricter environmental constraints, air travel in Europe would
adapt to new global environment but taking an inwards perspective. There would be less
globalisation, more trade inside EU; also slow growth of leisure travel to outside Europe,
however certainly more inside EU; more point-to- point traffic within Europe.
• Scenario D: Fragmenting World. A World of increasing tensions between regions, with
more security threats, higher fuel prices, reduced trade and transport integration and
knock-on effects of weaker economies.
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Scenario IFR Mvts (million) 2035 Traffic Multiple 2035/2012 Avg. Annual Growth 2035/2012 Extra flights/day
A: Global Growth 17.3 1.8 2.6% 21 000
C: Regulated Growth 14.4 1.5 1.8% 13 000
C’: Happy Localism 13.8 1.4 1.6% 12 000
D: Fragmenting World 11.2 1.2 0.7% 5 000
Table 1.9: Summary of the key traffic values expected in the 4 scenarios for Europe by 2035
(source: Eurocontrol)
Each scenario has different input assumptions: economic growth, fuel prices, load factors, hub-
and-spoke versus point-to-point etc. This leads to different volumes of traffic and different
underlying patterns of growth: long- versus short-haul, rates of up-gauging of aircraft and so
on.
In all four scenarios, forecast traffic to 2035 grows more slowly than historical rates (see
Figure 1.17); the most-likely scenario C has 50% more flights in 2035 than in 2012. Some flows
and some parts of Europe are expected to see faster growth, but overall slower growth will make
it harder to deliver increasing cost-effectiveness for air traffic management.
Figure 1.17: Traffic growth patterns forecast to 2035 (source: Eurocontrol)
Each scenario paints a picture of a different future, with different pattern of traffic growth.
The results are shown in Figure 1.17 and Table 1.9 and are:
• Scenario A, presents the most challenging traffic situation for Europe supported by quite
strong economic growth, slower fuel price growth, and a wide range of open skies agreement
(compared to other scenarios). There will be 17.3 million flights in 2035 in Europe,
corresponding to 1.8 times the 2012 traffic levels. The average annual growth of 2.6% is
the highest of the four scenarios. However, relatively rapid growth rates (around 3.5%)
during the first 8 years will then slow down to around 2%. This deceleration is explained
by increasing market maturity and especially capacity constraints at airports.
• In the most-likely scenario (scenario C) there will be 14.4 million flights in Europe in 2035,
1.5 times the 2012 volume. That is an average of 1.8% increase per year, around half the
historic rate from the 1960s to the peak of 2008. Traffic growth will slow down from 2025
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as markets mature, economic growth decelerates and as the capacity limits at airports
increasingly become an issue.
• Scenario C’ follows almost the same pattern in growth as scenario C, partly because it
starts at the same point. However the traffic growth develops less rapidly in scenario C’
from 2020 as a result of slower economic growth, higher fuel prices and higher load factors
(compared to scenario C). The growth rates slacken from 2025, resulting in a difference
of 0.6 million fewer movements in scenario C’ compared to scenario C in 2035.
• Scenario D starts from a low-growth forecast, in which Europe has struggled for much of
the decade to get back into growth. This weak growth is compounded by high oil prices,
fragile economic growth, no population migration, no free trade agreements with extra
European partners, high price of travel etc an accumulation of factors that lowers the
demand not only for international flights but also for intra-European ones. This scenario
has just 11.2 million flights for Europe in 2035, an annual growth rate of 0.7%.
1.5 Route charges modulation as a mean to mitigate airspace
congestion (project SATURN)
The possibility of using pricing mechanisms to redistribute part of the demand for airspace
capacity and therefore making the expected growth in traffic more sustainable was thoroughly
investigated in SESAR WP-E project SATURN (Strategic Allocation of Traffic Using Redis-
tribution in the Network). The current study was developed within this project. The idea of
modulating air navigation charges to reduce airspace congestion in Europe is not entirely new
but the scientific literature on the subject is scarce (the most relevant contributions on this
subject are presented in Section 2.7.2). Project SATURN represents the largest study carried
out to date on this subject.
SATURN was motivated by Article 16 of EC Regulation 391/2013, which states: Member
States [. . . ] may [. . . ] reduce the overall costs of air navigation services and increase their
efficiency, in particular by modulating charges according to the level of congestion of the network
in a specific area or on a specific route at specific times. [. . . ] The modulation of charges shall not
result in any overall change in revenue for the air navigation service provider [. . . ]. This feature
already gives nowadays Member States and hence, ANSPs, the opportunity to use pricing as
an instrument to reduce recurring congestion problems.
The project showed how economic signals could be provided to airspace users and ANSPs
to improve capacity-demand balancing by anticipating part of the flight planning process to the
strategic phase, as opposed to the currently applied measures (like re-sectorisation and ATFM
regulations in the tactical phase). Furthermore the benefits of having a centralised planner
compared with those of decentralised maximisation of self- interests by the ANSPs and/or
airspace users were also investigated.
Different pricing approaches have been investigated within the project, both monetary and
non-monetary (specifically, permit-based); among the monetary based approaches, charges mod-
ulated according to expected traffic peaks (peak-load pricing) or according to the time of flight
plan submission (rewarding predictability). These are summarised in Figure 1.18.
The effects of these three main mechanisms were tested on one full day of European air
traffic, 12 September 2014 (the fourth most trafficked day of 2014 not affected by major non-
ATC related regulations), including additional tests on regional instances. The results showed
that the modulation of en-route charges, as advocated by EC Regulation 391/2013, is indeed
a viable option to redistribute traffic in the European air network. These modulations may
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produce changes in the airlines’ operational costs that may incentivise the rerouting of some
flights, or to request different departure times, to avoid expensive areas or to take advantage
of reduced charges. Results predictably also pointed out the existence of trade-offs between
total delay, satisfaction of network capacity constraints and ANSP operational cost recovery
constraints.
Figure 1.18: SATURN mechanisms and the time-line of their application (source: SATURN
D.6.5)
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Chapter 2
Pricing in network-based industries
The present chapter analyses how the issue of traffic congestion due to capacity scarceness is
dealt with through market-based measures (i.e., pricing) in industries that share some common
characteristics with air transport, one above all, being service-based and operating on a net-
work. The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate which pricing measures could be successfully
applied to the European ATM system, specifically as a mean for modulating en-route charges
and, by doing so, obtaining a more sustainable distribution of traffic by reducing airspace con-
gestion. In the beginning of the chapter, a brief recall on elements of economic theory about
pricing that are relevant to this study is provided (Section 2.1). In Section 2.2 a set of crite-
ria is introduced for classifying pricing techniques applied to the analysed markets according
to a common framework. The subsequent sections are dedicated to illustrating pricing prin-
ciples applied (or described in the scientific literature) to network-based industries other than
air transport, specifically data transmission networks (Section 2.3), electricity wholesale and
distribution (Section 2.4), road and rail transport (Sections 2.5 and 2.6 respectively). The re-
mainder of the chapter (Section 1.2.4) is dedicated to European ATM; first, the current system
of route charges based on country-specific unit rates is explained (Sec. 1.2.4). This charging
system is then analysed according to the classification criteria defined in Section 2.2 and some
considerations are drawn by comparison with the other analysed markets in order to identify
which pricing principles could potentially be applied with success also to the European ATM
system (Section 2.7). Finally, the proposals for alternative pricing schemes available up to date
in the literature are also classified and analysed according to the common laid down framework
(Section 2.7.2).
2.1 Relevant elements of theory of pricing
Network industries are generally priced according to the models and methods of the market
for services. The market is generally composed of several actors, namely an infrastructure
manager/owner, who may also act as a regulator, one or more service providers and consumers.
This structure is more similar to a theoretic monopolistic market model when the infrastructure
manager also acts as a regulator (e.g., state-owned services), or more similar to a competitive
market when these entities are distinct, in which case there is usually more than one infras-
tructure manager or service provider (e.g., de-regulated services). In either case the objective
of the regulator is generally to maximise network efficiency, the objective of service providers is
maximise revenues while minimising costs and the objective of the consumers is to obtain the
service at minimum cost.
When dealing with networks, efficiency and costs are generally related to the level of con-
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gestion of the network itself. Congestion is a negative externality representing an imbalance
between demand and supply (i.e., available network capacity) which deteriorates the quality of
the service by means of delays and hence costs, and if not properly tackled, may lead to denial
of the service for some or all users.
Since users are willing to minimise their cost for using the network (in terms of time and
monetary), and congestion generates externalities, marginal cost pricing is generally regarded
as the way to internalise the cost of congestion. Marginal cost is the variation in the total cost
that arises when the quantity produced is incremented by one unit, that is, it is the cost of
producing one more unit of a good. In network terms, it represents the cost for providing an
additional unit of capacity on a link or path or, equivalently, the externality caused by each
user of the network.
The so-called first-best pricing principle states that a toll equal to the user’s externality (a
Pigovian tax) should be charged on each link in order to obtain the optimal network traffic
flow configuration (see de Palma & Lindsey 2011). This scheme represents theoretical optimal-
ity, where marginal revenues (revenue obtained by the service provider from each users) equal
marginal costs.
However, estimating marginal costs for actual implementation is, in general, difficult. Re-
quired information includes customers’ demand elasticity and cross demand. Customers are
usually very reluctant to reveal their willingness to pay (which is, in general, higher when de-
mand elasticity is low), as it is subject to strategic behaviour. Moreover, if marginal costs are
considered only in short term, they don’t cover the costs of upgrading the infrastructure, poten-
tially affecting the development of the industry (deficit). As a consequence, optimal marginal-
cost pricing schemes are rarely implementable in reality and second-best pricing regimes (i.e.,
models that deliver a solution that is sub-optimal but workable in reality) are generally pre-
ferred for pricing actual networks.
The theory of second best (see R. G. Lipsey 1956) in general states that in a system where
conditions are such that a Pareto optimum exists, if one condition is changed so that it is no
longer at its optimum state (or if one or more condition are subject to uncertainty), a second
best optimum (because the first best optimum cannot be reached) cannot be obtained by simply
re-evaluating the uncertain condition and leaving the others to their first-best values; instead,
the theory of second best states that all the other conditions must be changed from their original
first best optimum states. In general, the direction and magnitude of the changes necessary are
not known.
One relevant example of a second-best pricing scheme is Ramsey pricing (RP). The aim of
RP is deficit coverage, obtained by means of pricing markups to be added to marginal costs pro-
portionally to customers’ elasticities; the price markup should be inverse to the price elasticity of
demand: the more elastic demand for the product, the smaller the price markup. This markup,
generally a percentage on the marginal costs, is inversely proportional to the price elasticity of
the demand of the customers at zero profit (inverse elasticity rule). RP is in general hard to im-
plement: since it builds upon marginal costs, and therefore faces the same information restraints.
Another very common second-best pricing scheme is Peak load pricing (PLP), typically ap-
plied in utilities and public transports. PLP is a simplified case of RP where users are charged
for marginal and capacity costs in an environment where demand peaks (and therefore capacity
shortages) are easy to predict. The resulting pricing scheme is usually divided in fixed time
periods priced differently, namely off-peak, peak time and (possibly) shoulder periods.
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A different approach is represented by Fully Distributed Costs (FDC). FDC take (esti-
mated) marginal costs as a starting point and cover the economic deficit by allocating the
remaining costs proportionally to selected parameters (e.g., utilisation by a certain user, rev-
enue, or marginal costs themselves). Since FDC do not take demand elasticity into account, on
one hand they are easier to implement than Ramsey prices but are in general Pareto-inferior
(i.e., they deliver lower theoretical revenues).
Finally, it is generally argued that all types of congestion charging schemes are, in fact,
discriminatory since they tend to penalise users with lower incomes. Hence, non-monetary
pricing (NMP) schemes have been proposed as an alternative to first-best and second-best
charging schemes in order to grant equal rights to all users. NMP schemes generally charge a
certain amount of freely distributed credits or travel permits for travelling during peak times.
The equity issue is then transferred to the initial endowment of credits or permits among users.
An exhaustive overview of non-monetary pricing schemes proposed for road transport can be
found in Fan & Jiang (2013).
2.2 Classification framework for pricing techniques
In order to better analyse and compare the pricing approaches adopted in, or proposed for,
network based industries, a common framework was necessary. Based on the classifications
proposed in de Groot et al. (2002) and Avlonitis & Indounas (2005), a simplified set of criteria
was built for classifying pricing techniques across network industries, specifically data trans-
mission networks, electricity generation, distribution and retail, road, air and rail transport.
These criteria are illustrated in Table 2.1. Criteria 1 and 2 are market-related and can thus be
discussed across the whole industry; they cover the type of control applied to that industry and
the objective of the pricing strategy. Criteria 3 to 8 are specific to each pricing technique and
cover the type of tariff, time or location-based modulation, presence or absence of user discrim-
ination and other relevant characteristics. All options per criterion are mutually exclusive with
the exception of criterion 8.
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Environment-related
1. Control
a. Fully centralised
b. Fully market-based
c. Market-based with a regulator
2. Pricing strategy objective
a. Revenue/costoriented
b. Resource consumption oriented
c. Both 2.a and 2.b
Pricing-related
3. Type of tariff
a. Flat: a fixed fee gives unrestricted access to the network
b. First-best: based on exact marginal costs i.e., users pay
proportionally to the load they impose to the network
c. Second-best: not based on exact marginal costs, i.e.,
average tariff for all users
d. Multi-part: any combination of the previous
4. Modulation of the tariff
a. Time/space invariant: the network is tariffed in the same
way all the time
b. Time-dependent, space invariant: prices can vary accord-
ing to time
c. Time-invariant, space dependent: prices can vary accord-
ing to location in the network
d. Time/space dependent: the network is tariffed according
to location and time
5. Users classification
a. No differentiation: all users are equal
b. Users are differentiated: e.g., in classes
6. Price setting strategy
a. Customer-perceived value: willingness to pay determines
the price
b. Resource-estimated value
c. Both 6.a and 6.b
7. Payment
a. Monetary
b. Non-monetary: e.g., credits or permits
c. Hybrid monetary/non-monetary
8. Quality of Service (QoS)
a.i. Best effort
a.ii. Guaranteed service
c.iii. Variable
b. Capped service: e.g., capacity-constrained
c. Compensation for denial of service
Table 2.1: Classification framework for pricing techniques
50
2.3 Data networks (telecommunications)
Up to current days, no regulation in Europe imposes separation between infrastructure owner
and operator for telecommunications networks (although a process of liberalisation of telephone
companies did take place across European member states between 1996 and 2006). Hence it
is not uncommon to have a combination of unified infrastructure owners and service providers
as well as virtual operators that rent other companies’ lines and offer competing services. This
holds true for both landline and mobile telecommunications. In general, the industry is config-
ured as a free market where competitors aim at maximising revenues.
In telecommunications, and specifically in the Internet, congestion control through pricing
approaches is a well-explored field of research. Since the network was designed as a best-effort
service, congestion due to bandwidth demand of heavy Internet applications, such as video
streaming services and Voice Over IP, seemed as an actual, inevitable problem. The currently
used IPv4 protocol allows for congestion control only at the single node level and not providing
any form of network-wide congestion control. Since network access is granted to most users
by Internet Service Providers, each controlling its own network, the Internet gained the shape
of a hierarchical interconnection of semi-isolated networks, where connecting points with other
Internet Service Providers’ network can indeed become bottlenecks under heavy traffic.
This problem was thoroughly investigated in scientific literature in the late 1990s and several
solutions were proposed for reducing network congestion by means of an appropriate pricing
policy. Up to that moment, and still nowadays, the most common pricing option for the Inter-
net has been flat pricing. The issue that is most commonly raised with flat pricing is fairness.
In fact it is generally pointed out that flat pricing is unfair since it does not allow any form
of service differentiation, nor does it promote a virtuous behaviour within users by means of
traffic distribution or bandwidth release when not needed. Falkner et al. (2000) give an exten-
sive overview of literature for pricing approaches in best effort services. The most relevant are
described in the following.
Flat pricing Flat pricing (e.g., Anania & Solomon 1997) is a fixed-rate price, and is typically
found with best-effort services such as Internet service provided by an Internet Service
Provider. The user is charged a fixed amount per time unit (e.g., month), irrespective
of usage. This pricing scheme is simple and convenient. Flat pricing makes no assump-
tions about the underlying network technology that is already deployed. Since charges are
unrelated to usage, no measurements are required for billing and accounting. This leads
to social fairness in the sense that no distinction is made between poor and rich users.
Provided that the flat price can be paid, anybody can access the network while receiving
the same service level. However, this scheme does not allow the network to influence the
users’ transmission behaviour when network congestion occurs. Users are deterred from
being adaptive. They have no incentive to alter their transmission behaviour to support
the network operation. Flat pricing is therefore unsuitable for congestion control or traffic
management.
Paris-metro pricing A Paris-Metro Pricing-based network (e.g., Odlyzko 1999) is a set of
logical networks, where the total bandwidth capacity is divided into several subnetworks,
each priced differently according to the offered service. Each logical network operates on
a best-effort basis and is priced differently. Users choose one of these logical networks for
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the transmission of their traffic according to their respective budget, and this implicitly
defines the service level. The main advantage of the scheme is its simplicity. Since each
logical network implements flat pricing, the scheme is compliant with existing technologies.
A technical disadvantage of Paris-Metro Pricing networks is their potential for instability;
during periods of congestion, price-insensitive users may choose a higher-priced network
in expectation of receiving better service. This may lead to congestion in the higher priced
networks and thus cause instability.
Priority pricing Priority pricing (e.g., Cocchi et al. 1993, Gupta et al. 1997) can produce
relative service classes of best-effort service depending on the priority class selected by
the user. Under this policy users can send appropriate signals to the network to facilitate
traffic management, even at short time frames. During periods of congestion, traffic is
transmitted by priority level. Low-priority traffic is delayed or even dropped. The pricing
scheme should deter each user from using the highest priority class as a default. Users are
forced to indicate the value of their traffic by selecting a priority level. During periods of
congestion the network can then carry the traffic by the indicated level. Users are able
to attain a higher relative positioning (with respect to traffic from other users) by paying
an increasing amount. The impact of priority pricing on Quality of Service (QoS) for
a typical user and congestion is studied by Gupta et al. (1997) for the Internet. They
show that if prices are calculated such that congestion is prevented, then the service level
improves.
Smart-market pricing Smart-market pricing (e.g., Mackie-mason & Varian 1995) is similar
in concept to priority pricing but is based on an auction mechanism for priority levels.
In addition to a fixed charge to cover the connection costs and a (possibly small) charge
per packet to cover the incremental cost of sending a packet, Mackie-mason & Varian
(1995) introduce a usage charge when the network is congested. This charge is deter-
mined through an auction. The user associates a price with each packet, carried in the
packet’s header, communicating the user’s willingness to pay for transmission. The net-
work collects and sorts all the bids. It then determines a threshold value and transmits all
the packets whose bid exceeds the threshold value. The threshold value is determined by
the network’s capacity and represents the marginal cost of congestion. Each transmitted
packet is then charged this marginal congestion cost, not the value of the bid. The intro-
duction of an auctioning mechanism leads to non-compliance with existing technologies
and this complicates implementation. This schema has the advantage of encouraging both
network and economic efficiency. The bids carried in each packet could also be used to
facilitate routing decisions. Packets with high bids could be routed over shorter paths,
whereas packets with low bids may be routed through longer paths. On the other hand
however prices may deter poor users from using the service, thus creating a case for gov-
ernment regulation.
The second issue, beyond fairness, that arises commonly in telecommunication networks is
Quality of Service. In telephony it comprises requirements on all the aspects of a connection,
such as service response time, loss, signal-to-noise ratio, cross-talk, echo, interrupts, frequency
response, loudness levels, and so on; in computer networks it denotes the ability of the service
to provide different priority to different applications, users, or data flows, or to guarantee a
certain level of performance to a data flow. The Internet, because of its early design, does not
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provide any QoS mechanisms; it is in fact defined as a best effort network. The necessity of
implementing QoS emerged when multimedia Internet applications began to gain momentum.
A newer, improved version of the Internet Protocol, IPv6 was developed since 1996; it intro-
duces the possibility of negotiating Quality of Service before data transmission. As of today,
no more than 2% of Internet traffic flows on IPv6 but it is expected that many high bandwidth
demanding application will switch to the new standard in the nearby future. A lot of research
was carried out on how to exploit QoS for designing pricing mechanisms that are fairer with
regard to the amount of traffic that each user generates and that are able to keep network
congestion under control. An overview of pricing schemes that offer more potential for use with
guaranteed QoS services is given, again, in Falkner et al. (2000). These are described in the
following.
Responsive pricing Responsive pricing (e.g., Masuda & Whang 1999, Murphy & Murphy
1994) uses dynamic price-setting schemes to encourage users to adapt to congestion, using
prices as the congestion- control mechanism. Similar to smart-market pricing, the charging
mechanism only comes into operation during periods of congestion. Responsive pricing
is based on the realisation that users are adaptive and respond to price signals. In case
of high network utilisation, resources are stressed and the network increases the prices
for the resources. Adaptive users then, by definition, reduce the traffic offered to the
network. Similarly, in case of low network utilisation, the network decreases the price and
the community of adaptive users increases their offered traffic. In this way, adaptive users
do not just increase the network efficiency, but also economic efficiency.
Adaptive users fall into two classes: elastic users and inelastic users. Elastic users cannot
tolerate losses but are able to delay transmission. Inelastic users require strict delay
guarantees, but can tolerate some degree of losses.
The network sets the prices using either a closed-loop or a smart-market approach. In
the former scheme, the network measures its resource utilisation, for example the buffer
occupancy at the user-network interface, and then determines the price per packet. This
ensures a desired level of network utilisation.
Edge pricing Edge pricing (e.g., Shenker et al. 1996, Keon & Anandalingam 2003) provides
a conceptual contribution to shift the focus to locally computed charges based on simple
expected values of congestion and route. An example of such an expected congestion
cost would be time-of-day charges. Basing the charge on the expected distance between
source and destination allows the charge to be applied at the edge of the network, either
at the source or the destination. Prices may be communicated from any place in the
network. Such a pricing scheme is much simpler and facilitates receiver payments. Any
pricing scheme should be flexible enough to enable charges to be billed to either sender
or receiver. This implies that prices need to be determined locally. Receiver-charging is
important for multimedia applications, such as video-on-demand. It is designed to be used
over short to medium time frames to modify user transmissions. It has been associated
with Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) and Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP)
protocols and is therefore proposed with guaranteed QoS in mind.
Expected capacity pricing Expected capacity pricing (e.g., Clark 1997) sets a long-term
price based on expectations of transmissions rather than actual use. This scheme centres
around the user specifying the required expected capacity. The user is then charged ac-
cording to the expected capacity that the network provisions, not on actual usage, based
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on a long- term contract with the network. This indicates the capacity he or she ex-
pects to use when the network is congested. Expected-capacity pricing again seems to
be compatible with ATM or RSVP. This implies support for congestion control or traffic
management by encouraging users to determine the service level and then charging ac-
cordingly. Individual QoS guarantees can therefore be given. One of the main advantages
of expected-capacity pricing is that charging is not related to actual traffic volume, but
rather to expected traffic volume. Measurements are not required, saving significant over-
head for the network.
Note that expected-capacity pricing should be distinguished from resource-based pricing,
where the user is charged according to the measured resource usage. Such schemes are
typically computationally more demanding. A resource-based pricing policy is discussed
in Parris et al. (1992).
Effective bandwidth pricing Effective bandwidth pricing (Jiang & Jordan 1995, Jordan &
Jiang 1995, Kelly et al. 1998) is designed to induce disclosure of traffic characteristics by
the user during a call-admission process; it then charges according to a function defined
in relation to the effective bandwidth of the stream of traffic. This pricing scheme ensures
that the network can deduce the anticipated load generated by a user. The scheme allows
the network to infer the actual (parameterised) function from the user’s declaration. The
user is assumed to act rationally in the sense of wanting to minimise the economic cost of
the connection.
Note that the user is only required to provide the expected value of the traffic stream.
Any additional information about the joint distribution of the mean rate and the peak
rate is not used in the scheme, and it would thus be needless for the user to describe
the distribution’s higher moments, or for the net- work to require such higher moments.
A disadvantage of this scheme is that the functional form of the effective bandwidth is
assumed to be known in advance. This pricing scheme can also be extended to allow for
time-varying prices and to deter the user from splitting the source traffic. A user could
be discouraged from transmitting a single stream over several connections by imposing a
connection charge.
Proportional fairness pricing Proportional fairness pricing (e.g., Gibbens & Kelly 1999,
Kelly et al. 1998), concentrates on matching users’ utilities to the networks available re-
sources. The users optimally choose their prices and the network optimally assigns rates
to the users.
Congestion in this scheme is avoided by allocating resources to the users. During periods
of high demand, each user would get a proportionally smaller amount of bandwidth, for
example, and thus users need to throttle their transmission at the edge of the network.
Note that billing and measurements are not required, since each user is charged according
to the indicated willingness to pay. The network only needs to keep track of the will-
ingness to pay and allocate resources accordingly. This pricing scheme is motivated by
the desire to incorporate the notion of fairness into the allocation of network resources.
In proportional fairness pricing a resource allocation is fair if it is in proportion to the
users willingness to pay. Note that such an allocation of resources guarantees economic
efficiency, since users’ utilities are maximised. It is also fair in the sense that every user
who is willing to pay is allocated some bandwidth.
In recent years (from 2005 on) Internet traffic pricing and congestion issues have lost a
lot of interest as research topics. This is most likely due to the fact that Internet users
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since then have incremented exponentially. This might appear as non-intuitive at first,
but since all new users are paying customers of some Internet Service Providers, the very
same providers had larger incomes and thus were able to make bigger investments on
network upgrades.
At the same time, political events in recent years have largely changed the public opinion
on congestion pricing and class-based or QoS-based pricing for the Internet. The feelings
for the importance of Internet neutrality today are very strong; today, policies that may
inhibit access to certain services to some users because of their willingness to pay are
regarded as discriminatory and potentially a mean for censorship.
Time-Dependent usage Pricing Time-Dependent usage Pricing (TDP) (e.g., Joe-Wong et al.
2011), is a pricing practice borrowed from the electricity industry that is similar to time-
of-day pricing. TDP does not differentiate based on traffic type, protocol, or user class,
and thus sits lower on the radar screen of network neutrality scrutiny. TDP charges a
user based on not just how much bandwidth is consumed but also when it is consumed,
as opposed to time-independent usage pricing (TIP), which only considers monthly con-
sumption amounts. TDP has the potential to even out time- of-the-day fluctuations in
bandwidth consumption. Given the time inelasticity of bandwidth demand in different
demographics and applications, it is not clear how much TDP can reduce Internet Service
Providers’ costs, due to either impatient users or time-sensitive applications. Even TDP’s
feasibility needs examination. Research on integrating traffic measurement, optimal price
determination, and user interface design is necessary for TDP to become feasible. Fur-
thermore, it is unclear if time-dependent prices could be optimised in a computationally
efficient way for near real- time control. Nevertheless, time-dependent pricing today seems
to be the only approach to network congestion pricing that is both technically feasible
and socially acceptable for the users.
Table 2.2 summarises the characteristics of the pricing techniques described in the current
section according to the framework introduced in 2.2. Criteria 1 and 2 (control and pricing
strategy objective) are omitted, being valid for the whole industry and already discussed.
Note that no pricing scheme is space (or location) dependent. This is not due to technical
infeasibility but rather to the fact that routing decisions on the Internet are not necessarily
shortest-route nor user-decision bound. Hence, location dependent pricing may introduce an
unwelcome degree of unpredictability in the price of transmissions.
2.4 Electricity
For most of the last century, electricity was sold in regulated environments in which the retail
price did not vary based on the time it was used. Customers faced a constant price for electricity
regardless of the supply/demand balance in the grid. In reality, of course, the excess demand
at peak times is not allowed to cause blackouts. Instead, capacity is expanded to meet the high
demand that results at peak times. The question then is whether this is a good use of resources.
In the real world, this inefficiency shows up in the form of excess capacity that is under-utilised,
but still must be built in order to accommodate the peak demand. The value customers get
out of this capacity is not great enough to justify the capital investment. With time-varying
pricing of electricity, this excess capacity is not necessary because higher prices at peak times
encourage customers to consume less at those times, either by shifting peak consumption to
off-peak or by simply reducing consumption at peak times.
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Pricing 3. Type of
tariff
4. Mod-
ulation of
tariff
5. Users
classifica-
tion
6. Price
setting
strategy
7. Pay-
ment
8. QoS
Flat p. a. Flat a. T/s inv. a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Best eff.
Paris-Metro p. a. Flat a. T/s inv. b. Classes a. Cust.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Class-
dep.
Priority p. a. Flat b. T.dep /
S.inv
b. Classes c. Both a. Mone-
tary
a. Class-
dep.
Smart market
p.
d. Multi
part
b. T.dep /
S.inv
a. No diff. c. Both a. Mone-
tary
a. Best eff.
Responsive p. c. 2nd best b. T.dep /
S.inv
a. No diff. a. Cust.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Best eff.
Edge p. b. 1st best b. T.dep /
S.inv
a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Best eff.
Expected ca-
pacity p.
c. 2nd best b. T.dep /
S.inv
b. Classes b. Res.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Variable
b. Capped
Effective band-
width p.
b. 1st best a. T/s inv.
extendib.
to b.
a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Best eff.
Proportional
fairness p.
b. 1st best a. T/s inv. b. Classes a. Cust.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Best eff.
b. Capped
Time-
Dependent
usage p.
c. 2nd best b. T.dep /
S.inv
a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Best eff.
Table 2.2: Classification of pricing techniques in data networks
In a deregulated electricity market (such as most European countries and the US) there can be
different operators that handle, and compete for, power generation, transmission, management,
operations and finally retailing. The market is usually differentiated between wholesale, which
include generators, transmitters, managers and impartial regulators, and retail, which includes
all companies that sell electricity to home or business consumers. These two markets generally
have different pricing mechanisms that may not work synchronously. One typical example is
the hourly fluctuation of power cost in the wholesale market, which is not reflected in many
consumer tariffs, like Uniform Pricing, where the unit cost of electricity varies two or three times
per year. This can cause serious imbalance between demand and offer, that can ultimately lead
to massive service disruption like state-wide blackouts.
2.4.1 Wholesale market
Similarly to telecommunications, electricity industry in the EU underwent a process of liberal-
isation between 1996 and 2006 (it was introduced much earlier in the US market; deregulation
started in 1982 with the implementation of Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978).
Currently, each member state in Europe is responsible for the maintenance of its power grid
and acts as a regulator authority (generally through a dedicated public body), and there can be
competing operators for both power generation and distribution (wholesale market) and power
retailing to customers. Wholesale market is therefore configured as a monopsony (multiple pro-
ducers for a single customer) where competitors aim at maximising revenues, while retail is a
free market.
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A wholesale electricity market exists when competing generators offer their electricity output
to retailers. The retailers then re-price the electricity and take it to market. While wholesale
pricing used to be the exclusive domain of large retail suppliers, in recent years increasing mar-
kets are beginning to open up to end-users.
Today in most markets electricity storage costs are prohibitive and production is subject to
rigid short-term capacity constraints. Since demand is highly variable, there will be times when
there is plenty of capacity and the only incremental costs of producing electricity are fuel and
some operating and maintenance costs. At other times, the capacity constraint will be binding,
causing the incremental cost to increase greatly, and wholesale market prices to rise. (Boren-
stein et al. 2002). As a result the wholesale price of electricity varies continuously (generally
every hour or half an hour), reflecting the supply/demand interaction. The end-use customer,
however, sees the retail price, which typically is constant for months at a time and does not
reflect the hour-by-hour variation in the underlying wholesale cost of electricity.
A detailed economical analysis for a self-sustainable wholesale electricity market is explained
in Hogan (1998), where several aspects, from involved actors to transmission constraints and
contracts are taken into consideration. The author identifies several characteristic that a market
should meet in order to flourish, which can be summarised as a “coordinated spot market that
has bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch with nodal prices”. Meeus et al. (2005)
give an exhaustive overview of the structure of the Internal Electricity Market in Europe. They
describe regulation, market architecture, current state of development and improvements that
are needed. Finally, the authors identify two possible stages for the further development of the
market, requiring an increasing degree of coordination and harmonisation. Further insight on
the European market, and a comparison, from the institutional point of view, with flow and
capacity management in air traffic, is given by Duthaler & Finger (2011).
Differently from others network-based infrastructures, such as road transports or telecommu-
nications, equilibrium in a power grid is system-wide, since electricity flows across all available
paths from generator to consumer. Location based congestion in the electricity system may
occur when specific transmission lines approach their capacity to transmit power. In order to
maintain system stability, generation plants are typically re-dispatched (i.e. their power output
is adjusted). Doing so ultimately increases the costs of electricity since the output of less effi-
cient plants must be increased and that of more efficient plants reduced.
In some markets, these costs are internalised in the overall electricity price, while in others
there are explicit location based congestion charges known as locational marginal pricing, LMP
(Black & Larson 2007). A variant of LMP, called Continuous LMP, was proposed in Li (2007).
Such charges roughly correspond to the marginal cost for generating additional electricity and
are calculated by the regulator authority on a regular basis. Power generation is then allot-
ted to generators through an auctioning mechanism. Kahn et al. (2001) compare two pricing
mechanisms for the generated electricity.
Uniform Pricing Under Uniform Pricing, the price of power is set as equal to the LMP
and all generators bid according to the capacity they are able to deliver. Since the cost
of producing electricity rises exponentially when approaching full capacity (i.e., when
approaching congestion), generators must place a bid that takes into consideration the
trade-off between producing more and the increasing generation cost. When the auction
is closed the winners are all paid the same unit price. This pricing technique has drawn a
lot of critiques since it does not prevent generators from collaborating to withdraw power
(i.e., declare they are able to produce less electricity than their actual capacity) in order
for the market price to soar. Kahn et al. (2001) describe a notorious case that happened
in California in 2001.
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Pay-as-bid Considering the fact that the cost of electricity results from power generation and
ancillary services, in a pay-as-bid pricing approach, generators are asked to bid not only
for the amount of electricity they are willing to produce, but also for its price. In other
words, they are asked to estimate their own marginal cost. Advocates of pay-as-bid state
that since all the bids below the highest marginal cost output (necessary for the sum total
of accepted bids to satisfy market demand) will under uniform pricing receive more than
their bid prices. Thus the change in the rules would simply wipe out those mark-ups
(Kahn et al. 2001). Detractors, on the contrary, assert that once bidders are able to
predict the market-clearing price, the savings from the change in the rules for consumers
would prove to be zero. Moreover, they state that small firms would be disadvantaged in
such a market. In fact, under this approach competitors prosper or fail on the basis of
their relative generating efficiencies alone; therefore the small firm would have to mount
the same kind of effort efforts to gather the requisite information and make such forecast
on a continuing hour-by-hour and day-by-day basis, with the same dimensions, as a large
one (Kahn et al. 2001).
Table 2.3 summarises the characteristics of the pricing techniques described in the current
section according to the framework introduced in 2.2. Criteria 1 and 2 (control and pricing
strategy objective) are omitted, being valid on a market-wide scope and already discussed.
Pricing 3. Type of
tariff
4. Mod-
ulation of
tariff
5. Users
classifica-
tion
6. Price
setting
strategy
7. Pay-
ment
8. QoS
Uniform p. b. 1st best a. T/s dep. a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Guaran-
teed
Pay-as-bid p. b. 1st best a. T/s dep. a. No diff. c. Both a. Mone-
tary
a. Guaran-
teed
Table 2.3: Classification of pricing techniques in electricity wholesale
2.4.2 Retail market
Retail market presents several variants of the basic Time Of Usage (TOU) tariff. The difference
lies in how the unit price for KW/h consumption adheres to generation cost. In fact the whole-
sale market has, generally, more price fluctuation than retail. Retail tariffs range from TOU
(unit price adjusted one or two times a year) to Real Time Pricing (unit price adjusted every
few minutes). Surcharges can be added for power consumption during peak times, incentives
can be given for not consuming during peak loads, power hedging is also implementable, either
with or without cash-back for unused amounts and several other variants.
Many programs have been implemented or proposed to make the economic incentives of cus-
tomers more accurately reflect the time-varying wholesale cost, in order to mitigate price
volatility in wholesale electricity spot markets. This approach is usually referred to as Demand-
Response Pricing (Borenstein et al. 2002) or Demand-Side Management (Zarnikau 2010). Black
& Larson (2007) estimate that if congestion costs are proportional to peak demand, they can
be reduced by at least 10% as a result of an 11% reduction in peak demand (percentages are
referred to the US market). Borenstein et al. (2002) give an overview of several such programs
proposed and later implemented in the US market (deregulated across all states). However,
similar pricing proposals are implemented in Europe as well.
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Time of Usage (TOU) Under TOU, the retail price varies in a preset way within certain
blocks of time. The rates for each time block (usually called peak, shoulder, and off-peak)
are adjusted infrequently, typically only two or three times per year. As a result, the
price is the same at a given time of day (on a weekday) throughout the month or season
for which the prices are set. Typically, the weekend and holiday rates are equal to the
off-peak weekday rate.
TOU programs set prices months in advance and therefore logically cannot capture any
of the shorter-term variation in supply/demand balance and in prices in the wholesale
market.
Technology plays a role in this tradeoff: in fact until recent years, the cost of TOU
metering was substantially less than real-time metering and the ability to send real-time
price information to customers was limited. Technology changes like electronic meters
have virtually eliminated these issues.
TOU with Demand Charges Because Time Of Usage rates don’t capture the price variation
within a price block, TOU pricing is often combined with a separate charge for peak usage.
These demand charges are a price per kilowatt for the customer’s highest usage during the
billing period (usually a month). Demand charges are based on the customer’s maximum
usage (during a short, i.e.15 minute interval) regardless of whether that usage occurs at a
time when the system as a whole has a tight supply/demand balance or not. Most of the
meters that register maximum usage for demand charge billing are not capable of storing
information indicating the precise date and time at which that maximum usage occurred.
Some criticism to Demand Charges is pointed out in Borenstein et al. (2002). They
state that the economic incentives that they establish are an imperfect proxy for the real
economic cost imposed on the system. First, demand charges are not synchronised to the
usage on the system as a whole, so they charge as much for a peak usage that occurs at a
lower demand time as at a higher demand time. As a consequence, they give no incentive
for a customer to conserve until usage is near the peak level for the period. Second,
Demand Charges make no adjustment for the supply side of the market, ignoring that
variations in supply availability and prices can be as important as variations in demand
in explaining fluctuating wholesale prices.
Interruptible Electricity Rates (IER) IER are constant nearly all of the time. When the
system operator declares certain potential shortages, however, these customers are called
upon to cease electricity consumption. Despite the name, service to these customers is
generally not actually physically interrupted. Rather, the price that they face increases
dramatically. Thus, the customer on an interruptible program retains an option to con-
tinue to consume after being instructed to discontinue usage, but at a greatly increased
price. If for some reason economic incentives fail to equilibrate supply and demand for
even a brief period, the system operator must have the ability to curtail usage by some
customers. IER contracts offer a certain amount of insurance to customers by telling them
they won’t be called more than a pre-specified number of times during a year.
Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) CPP programs usually start with a TOU rate structure, but
then they add one more rate that applies to critical peak hours, which the utility can
call on short notice. CPP programs typically limit the utility to call no more that 50
or 100 critical peak hours per year. CPP is a clear improvement on TOU with demand
charges, because the additional charges are based on consumption when the system is
actually constrained, rather than when the particular customer’s demand peaks. In fact
the additional charges are based on consumption when the system is actually constrained,
rather than when the particular customer’s demand peaks.
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CPP Programs are the natural evolution of demand charges when more sophisticated me-
tering is available. Charges increase at critical system peaks rather than at the individual
customer’s demand peak, which is much more consistent with the true costs of consump-
tion. CPP still has two economic weaknesses, though they may actually be strengths in
terms of customer acceptance. First, the prices are limited and levels are pre-set for the
critical peak periods, therefore they can’t be calibrated to move with the actual prices in
the wholesale market. Second, the number of critical peak hours that can be called in a
year is limited. As a result, the utility protects customers against seeing very high prices,
even only on marginal purchases, for more than a fixed number of hours.
CPP with Incentive Preserving (IP) Rebates As observed by Letzler (2010), customer
resist signing up for CPP and other programs with dynamic price change, but are in
general more receptive to baseline-rebate programs that create similar incentives by re-
warding customers whose critical-period power use is below a baseline level. Analysing
the psychology behind such behaviour, the author states that the key to success of CPP
programs lies in how the dynamic pricing is presented to the customer. Incentive preserv-
ing rebates transform the presentation of CPP while preserving CPP’s revenue streams
and marginal incentives. IP rebates make critical events into opportunities for customers
to gain by selling each customer rights to a block of power at the regular price during
critical events and rebating the value of unused rights. Setting the right rebate value per
kWh gives customers the right incentives to choose between using their rights (obtained
by paying a monthly fee) and cashing them in.
Demand Reduction Programs (DRP) DRP pay a customer to reduce their consumption
at certain times. They are activated by the system operator when grid conditions meet
certain pre-determined criteria that indicate that the supply/demand balance is likely
to be very tight over some ensuing period of time. The operator then offers to pay
participating customers to cut back their usage.
These programs must first determine a baseline from which demand reduction can be
measured. Once the baseline is set, the price offered for demand reduction determines the
level of economic incentive to reduce demand when the system operator calls. The price
offered is usually pre-determined and does not vary with the tightness of supply.
The fundamental weakness with demand-reduction programs is that there is no reliable
baseline from which to pay for reduction. Baselines are usually set from the past behaviour
of the customer, but, it has been observed (Borenstein et al. 2002), this can lead to
opportunistic behaviour from the customer.
Real Time Pricing (RTP) RTP describes a system that charges different retail electricity
prices for different hours of the day and for different days. Obviously, a longer lag time
between the price announcement and the price implementation will result in prices that
less accurately reflect the actual real-time supply/demand situation in the market (TOU
is an extreme case of such scenario). On the other hand, the longer lag time means that
the prices will be less volatile than the real-time wholesale electricity price but, on the
other hand, lower volatility may appear more reassuring to customers. Designers of RTP
programs face this trade-off between greater advanced price notification and more accu-
rate price signals.
Under the simplest RTP system, the customer is billed the real-time price of electricity
on an hourly basis (or some other frequent interval) for all power the customer consumes
during that hour.
Roozbehani et al. (2012) make a very critical analysis of RTP from a control-oriented
perspective. They state that directly linking price sensitive consumers to the wholesale
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electricity markets fundamentally changes the architecture of the system from an open-
loop system in which demand is an exogenous input, to a closed-loop feedback dynamical
system. The authors assert that in the absence of a well-designed control law, such direct
feedback may lead to increased volatility, decreased robustness to disturbances, and new
fragilities that increase the risk of a systemic failure.
Furthermore, because the real-time or day-ahead price can be quite volatile, many cus-
tomers have balked at such a program for fear that they could find themselves paying
extremely high prices for their consumption during any given hour (Borenstein et al.
2002).
In order to make RTP more appealing to customers, buying options such as hedging-
purchasing some power through a long-term contract, before a period of system stress
is evident - are generally offered in actual RTP implementations. Such measures allow
customers to stabilise their overall bill while still facing the real-time price for incremental
consumption. Two variants of this solution are described in the following.
RTP with customer baseline load (CBL) Many RTP programs assign a baseline consump-
tion that they purchase at the regulated rate during each hour. The price for purchase
of power at the baseline consumption is usually the TOU rate that a customer would
otherwise face. Then the customer pays the real-time price for any consumption above its
baseline level and receives a rebate based on the real-time price if its consumption falls
below its baseline level. In financial terms, the baseline is just a forward contract for a
quantity equal to the customer’s baseline level, which the customer has purchased at a
price set by the regulatory process.
RTP with build-your-own (BYO) baseline In BYO rather than assigning the customer a
baseline level, the customer can purchase a baseline, i.e., a forward contract, to hedge as
much price risk as it wants. The key would be to offer the baseline or forward contract
at a price that equals the best forecast of the future spot price. Then, for incremental
consumption decisions, the customer still faces the real-time price as its cost and thus has
strong incentives to conserve at peak times. The BYO baseline cannot create a perfect
hedge since the customer won’t know in advance exactly what quantity it will consume in
each hour.
Credit-based Pricing (CBP) CBP has been proposed as a viable solution for markets where
consumers are also producers. In areas where renewable sources have gained, or are ex-
pected to gain, a consistent share in the market, proposals such as the one by Sgouridis
& Kennedy (2010) are becoming more and more frequent. In credit-based pricing, the
consumer/producer is issued a certain quantity of a virtual currency that can be spent
solely on the energy market. A limited market can be allowed for such currency, allowing
the users to trade their unused credits. Opportunistic behaviours and credit capitalisation
are avoided by giving the virtual currency a limited lifespan (i.e., credits are issued and
expire every month). The ultimate purpose of a credit-based scheme is for the system
to be self-contained and sustainable on one hand, to instigate price-responsiveness and a
saving-oriented-attitude in the users on the other.
The described pricing schemes are summarised in the following table. Note that due to the
physics of power distribution (i.e., electricity flowing through all available paths from generator
to consumer), no space-dependent pricing is possible in the retail electricity market. Addition-
ally, in these pricing schemes hybrid payment, i.e., monetary and credit payment, is generally
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associated with power production (Credit-based pricing) or power rights release (Critical Peak
Pricing with Incentive Preserving Rebates).
Pricing 3. Type of
t.
4. Modul.
of t.
5. Users
class.
6. Price
s. str.
7. Pay-
ment
8. QoS
Time of Usage
(TOU)
c. 2nd best b. T.dep /
S.inv
a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Guaran-
teed
TOU with De-
mand Charges
d. Multi
part
b. T.dep /
S.inv
a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Guaran-
teed
Interruptible
Electricity
Rates
c. 2nd best b. T.dep /
S.inv
b. Classes a. Cust.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Best eff.
b. Capped
Critical Peak
Pricing (CPP)
d. Multi
part
b. T.dep /
S.inv
a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Guaran-
teed
CPP with
Incentive
Preserving
Rebates
d. Multi
part
b. T.dep /
S.inv
a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
c. Hybrid a. Guaran-
teed
Demand Re-
duction Pro-
grams
c. 2nd best b. T.dep /
S.inv
a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Guaran-
teed
c. Incentive
for not
consuming
Real Time
Pricing (RTP)
c. 2nd best b. T.dep /
S.inv
a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Guaran-
teed
Credit-based
Pricing
c. 2nd best b. T.dep /
S.inv
a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
c. Hybrid a. Guaran-
teed
Table 2.4: Classification of pricing techniques in electricity retail.
2.5 Road transport in Europe
Nowadays, state concession to one or more private (or partially private) firms is the most com-
mon operational paradigm for motorways in Europe (Albalate et al. 2009). In a concession
agreement the State, as concession grantor, entrusts concessionaires with all the responsibilities
and risks relating to the construction and operation of motorways. Currently, no EU framework
for regulating motorway concessions exists. The market is configured as a monopolistic compe-
tition (as concessionaires’ road facilities don’t usually overlap), where revenue maximisation is
constrained by the availability of public free roads.
Pricing roads, in general, involves studying the way traffic is distributed and travellers’
behaviour. The subject of traffic equilibrium (also referred to as traffic assignment) is the de-
scription, through analytical tools, of the stationary distribution of vehicles in a transportation
network. The network is generally represented by a directed graph, users and vehicles as com-
modities travelling between an origin and a destination on the graph. Assuming that travellers
seek to minimise their individual travel cost, equilibrium is reached when no traveller has an
incentive to modify its travel decision (Marcotte & Patriksson 2007). This type of equilibrium is
known as user equilibrium and is formally defined by Wardrop’s first principle (Wardrop 1952).
A second type of equilibrium, known as system optimum and defined by Wardrop’s second
principle represents the situation where the overall travel cost on the network is minimised.
User equilibrium is the configuration we will refer to from now on.
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In general, the traffic assignment problem is a convex optimisation problem with linear con-
straints; congestion is generally taken into account, implying that the travel choice of one user
is influenced by other users’ travel choices. In the particular case where congestion is not
considered, the problem becomes a shortest path problem with multiple users. A complete
mathematical analysis and overview of solving algorithms for the Traffic Assignment problem
can be found in the work by Patriksson (1994); for a more generic introduction on optimisation
problems on transportation networks we refer to the work by Sheffi (1985).
Setting tariffs on a road or a network of roads implies studying the way the traffic would respond
to the new pricing policy. Hence, the interaction between users and regulator (or whoever owns
the roads or is in charge for setting the tariffs) must be taken into consideration. We grouped
the most relevant pricing approaches for the tariff-setting problem into three categories, namely
pure pricing, congestion pricing and hybrid pricing.
2.5.1 Pure pricing
From a mathematical point of view, the tariff-setting problem in a network involves two non-
cooperative groups, tariff-setting agents and tariff-following clients (Bouhtou et al. 2007). Each
arc in the network is owned by (at most) one agent, who can set a tariff for transiting on the arc,
in order to maximise his revenues. The clients wish to route a certain demand for flow capacity
on a path connecting an origin and a destination. A selected route can involve connections
belonging to different agents. It is generally assumed that each client will select a route with
minimum cost. This set-up is also referred to as Stackelberg Pricing Problem (Van Hoesel 2008)
or Network Pricing Problem (Labbe´ et al. 1998).
The tarification problem has a wide range of applications such as tariff setting in freight trans-
portation and highway toll optimisation; see Brotcorne et al. (2000, 2001) and Labbe´ et al.
(1998), respectively. These works formulate the tarification problems as a linear bilevel model.
The upper level relates to the arc owner and fixes the tariffs, the lower level belongs to the
clients who, given the tariffs set by the leader, can determine their best (shortest) path. Bouh-
tou et al. (2007) build upon these works by expanding them with network-reduction methods
and solving algorithms. Van Hoesel (2008) introduces a related network simplification method
based on shortest paths.
2.5.2 Congestion Pricing
Congestion on a transport network occurs when a link or node is carrying more flow than its
capacity is able to accommodate. As a consequence, the quality of service deteriorates, leading
to various disadvantages for the users of the network. These are commonly quantified as delay,
increase in transportation costs and, ultimately, denial of service.
Since users are willing to minimise their travel cost (in terms of time and monetary), and
congestion generates externalities, marginal cost pricing is generally regarded as the way to
internalise the cost of network congestion. Most of the costs of traffic congestion are borne by
travellers collectively but, because individual travellers impose delays on others, they do not pay
the full marginal social cost of their trips and therefore create a negative externality (de Palma
& Lindsey 2011). Such externality is the difference between marginal social cost and marginal
private cost and is generally referred to as user externality. The standard economic prescription
to internalise the costs of a negative externality is a Pigovian tax. This was first formalised
in Pigou (1920) where the author argued for a tax on congestion and thereby launched the
literature on congestion pricing. Most economists have supported congestion pricing although
many have been concerned about the details of implementation (Lindsey 2006). Congestion
pricing has a big advantage over other transportation demand management policies in that it
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encourages travellers to adjust all aspects of their behaviour: number of trips, destination, mode
of transport, time of day, route, and so on, as well as their long-run decisions on where to live,
work and set up business (de Palma & Lindsey 2011).
The first-best pricing principle assumes that a toll equal to the user externality is charged
on each link so that the optimal network traffic flow condition can be obtained. Based on
this marginal-cost pricing principle, Walters (1961) estimated an efficient system of taxation
for a network of highways using actual data of traffic flow and velocity. Subsequent studies of
marginal-cost pricing on networks were made by Dafermos & Sparrow (1971) and several others.
In spite of its perfect theoretical basis, the marginal-cost pricing scheme is of little practical
interest (Zhang & Yang 2004). The problem stems from the fact that it is impractical to charge
users on each network link in view of the operating cost and public acceptance. As a result,
various second-best pricing regimes have been considered.
A detailed overview of these pricing schemes, which are the methods by which congestion pricing
is actually implemented today, can be found in de Palma & Lindsey (2011). A summary is given
in the following section, following their proposed classification.
Types of congestion pricing schemes
Facility-based schemes Facility-based schemes include all tolls that are imposed on roads,
bridges and tunnels. These are the most common form of road pricing although tolls
designed to price congestion have only been implemented on a few facilities. Tolls can be
levied either on all lanes of a facility or on designated toll lanes; tolls can also be levied
either at a single point on a facility or at multiple points with the total amount paid
determined by distance travelled.
Cordons Toll cordons are a form of area-based charging in which vehicles pay a toll to cross a
cordon in the inbound direction, in the outbound direction, or possibly in both directions.
A cordon scheme can encompass multiple cordons, and it can include radial screen lines
to control orbital movements. All existing schemes are single cordons.
Zhang & Yang (2004) state that a systematic way for determination of toll cordons and
toll levels on a general road network is not available in previous literature. Therefore, they
investigate the cordon-based second-best congestion-pricing problems on road networks,
developing models and algorithms for optimal selection of both toll levels and toll locations.
Examples: Norwegian rings (Bergen (1986), Oslo (1990), and Trondheim (1991)), Stock-
holm congestion charge (2002), Milan EcoPass (2008), Singapore Electronic Road Pricing
(1998)
Zonal schemes With a zonal scheme (sometimes called an area charge), vehicles pay a fee
to enter or exit a zone, or to travel within the zone without crossing its boundary. Zone
boundaries can be defined by natural features such as rivers, lakes, oceans, and mountains,
as well as by elements of the built environment such as roads, tunnels, bridges, residential
neighbourhoods, and jurisdictions (states or provinces can define zones).
Examples: London congestion charge (2003)
Distance-based schemes With distance-based schemes, charges vary with distance travelled,
either linearly or nonlinearly. As noted above, some facilities charge on the basis of
distance. Networks of truck-only toll lanes and networks of High-Occupancy-Toll lanes
are under consideration, and tolls on these networks are likely to be distance-based as
well. For schemes that encompass multiple roads or regions the charge rate can depend
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on type of road. Examples: Switzerland, Austria, Germany, the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic.
Degree of time differentiation
Flat tolls Flat tolls are constant over time. Historically, tolls on most facilities were flat be-
cause of technological or administrative difficulties in changing the toll. For some schemes
the toll prevails 24 h a day. For others, such as the London congestion charge, the toll is
levied at a constant rate during daytime on weekdays and not levied at other times.
Time-of-day tolls Time-of-day tolls vary by time of day, day of week, and season according
to a predetermined schedule. The time intervals between toll adjustments vary across
schemes, and in some cases the interval in a given scheme varies by time of day. Examples:
some HOT lane facilities in the US, Singapore’s Electronic Road Pricing, and Stockholm’s
congestion charge.
Responsive tolls Responsive tolls vary in real time (or near real time) as a function of pre-
vailing traffic conditions. Responsive tolls are reactive” in the sense that they are set,
with a short time lag, as a function of current congestion levels.
Lou et al. (2011) develop two approaches for setting tolls on toll lanes. One (a feedback-
control approach) increases the toll if lane occupancy exceeds a target level. The other (a
reactive self-learning approach) learns motorists’ willingness to pay a toll and iteratively
adjusts the toll to maintain free-flow conditions on the tolled lanes while maximising
throughput. Lou et al. (2011) build on Yin & Lou (2009) by using a more realistic
representation of traffic dynamics and an explicit formulation for toll optimisation. A
step beyond reactive pricing is an anticipatory, or predictive, scheme in which tolls are
based on forecast congestion.
Dong et al. (2011) develop an algorithm to implement predictive pricing on a High-
Occupancy Toll lane facility and show that it can anticipate breakdowns in flow and
maintain higher throughput than reactive pricing. Predictive pricing has long been envis-
aged as a tool for traffic management, but the information, communications, and compu-
tational requirements are challenging.
Examples: some High-Occupancy Toll lane facilities where tolls are adjusted to maintain
free-flow speeds; the congestion pricing trial conducted in Cambridge (UK) in the 1990s
in which drivers paid a charge when travel speed dropped below a threshold value. The
scheme applied to all roads within the central city zone.
Other dimensions of differentiation
Differentiation by vehicle type, number of axles, and weight is common practice although these
vehicle characteristics are imperfectly correlated with the congestion externality that a vehicle
imposes since the externality also depends on road characteristics and the mix of users on
the road. Toll differentiation according to speed and other correlates of dangerous driving
behaviour has been precluded in the past by lack of information but is now technologically
feasible. Toll discounts and exemptions for certain categories of vehicles and drivers are also
common. (Examples: discounts for residents in London and Stockholm). A number of toll roads
and High-Occupancy Toll lane facilities also offer quantity discounts in the form of reduced
prices for advance purchase of multiple trips, or discounts based on cumulative usage over an
accounting period (Wang et al. 2012). Quantity discounts are commonly used in transportation
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markets as well as other sectors of the economy, but they are inconsistent with congestion
pricing according to marginal social cost pricing principles (de Palma & Lindsey 2011).
Implementations
For decades congestion pricing remained largely an ivory-tower idea, but interest gradually
spread outside academia and congestion pricing has come into limited practice (de Palma &
Lindsey 2011). The main operating schemes are High-Occupancy Toll lane facilities in the US,
the London congestion charge, the Stockholm cordon charge and Singapore’s Electronic Road
Pricing system. Few benefit-cost analyses of these (or other) congestion pricing systems have
been undertaken. However, the limited evidence suggests that well-designed schemes can yield
significant net economic benefits. For a brief overview of existing congestion pricing systems
see Black & Larson (2007) and de Palma & Lindsey (2011).
In London, drivers pay a fee to enter the central London zone during the hours from 7
a.m. until 6:30 p.m. The fee is static and does not vary by hour or road conditions (Litman
2005). In the first year of implementation, traffic in the central London zone was reduced by
approximately 15%. Even though the program significantly reduced traffic in the central zone,
the majority of the reduction is in the intermediate hours. The evening peak actually increases
and the morning peak reduction is less than the overall reduction. This is the limitation of
having a single fee for all of the commuting hours. The overall system capacity requirement
was not reduced as much as it would be with differential pricing for the two peak hours.
Singapore introduced zonal pricing in 1975 and as increased the sophistication of the system
over time. Singapore now uses electronic charging with 30-minute time increments and loca-
tional differentiation. Also, the transitions from one charging level to another are graduated to
prevent sudden, dramatic changes that can lead to adverse consumer behaviour (such as speed-
ing to avoid a higher priced time period). There are also different prices for cars, motorcycles,
and light and heavy trucks. Congestion prices are reviewed and updated quarterly. The con-
gestion pricing system has enabled average highway and arterial road speeds to be maintained.
(LTA (2006)).
The Stockholm congestion charge is the only cordon scheme designed to manage congestion.
The cordon surrounds the city centre and has 18 control points. Tolls are paid on each inbound
passage up to a daily maximum. Pricing is in effect on weekdays from 6:30 to 18:30. The toll
varies depending on time of day. There is no charge on weekends, holidays, or the day before
holidays (Eliasson et al. 2009).
According to de Palma & Lindsey (2011) several other countries have considered regional
or national road-pricing schemes to internalise congestion and other traffic externalities. How-
ever, despite the apparent success of existing schemes, and plans to establish more, congestion
pricing continues to be a hard sell. Several major proposals have been scuttled by public or
political opposition. The authors point out some relevant examples. Cordon tolling schemes for
Edinburgh and Manchester were rejected by public referenda in 2005 and 2008, respectively. An
online petition to the UK government in early 2007 attracted more than 1.8 million signatures
against road pricing, and effectively put an end to plans for a national scheme in the UK for the
time being. A cordon toll plan for New York City was stopped by the New York state legislature
in April 2008 when it declined to vote on the proposal. And a plan to introduce a national
distance-based charge in the Netherlands has been put on hold after the Dutch government
collapsed in February 2010. These setbacks illustrate the difficulties of designing congestion
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pricing schemes that are both efficient and publicly acceptable.
Summarising, pricing schemes for road transport are, in general, either bound to a specific
place or facility, or travelled-distance based, as illustrated in table 2.5.
Pricing 3. Type of
tariff
4. Mod-
ulation of
tariff
5. Users
classifica-
tion
6. Price
s. str.
7. Pay-
ment
8. QoS
Facility-
based/
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Zonal p.
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a. flat; can
be c. 2nd
best
Space dep.
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Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Best eff.
b. Can be capped
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2nd best or
d. Multi
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Space dep.
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a. No diff. b. Res.
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a. Mone-
tary
a. Best eff.
Table 2.5: Classification of congestion pricing techniques for road transport.
Road pricing schemes are illustrated from both a theoretical and practical point of view
in de Groot et al. (2002). As the authors point out, there is a lot of flexibility in the type
of tariff and modulation of tariff combinations in the road transport industry: nearly all the
possible combinations according to the classification proposed in the present work have been
implemented in reality.
2.5.3 Hybrid (credit-based) pricing
Congestion pricing, from a theoretical point of view, is a perfectly reasonable way to internalise
marginal costs of road transport. Its existing implementations have proved successful in reducing
congestion but, still, as some authors point out, its application raises several equity issues. It is
commonly pointed out that that, under CP, average commuters” are worse off without special
revenue redistribution policies and that CP policies tend to advantage users that have a high
value of travel time while penalising the others Kockelman & Kalmanje (2005) give an exhaustive
overview of the literature on the subject of CP equity.
Moreover, given the general political resistance to congestion charges, some researchers and
planners have turned to quantity instruments to curtail the unrestricted use of private vehicles.
In quantity control, the government determines the travel demand to be served, and then
assigns fixed mobility rights equally to all individual travellers or inhabitants so that fairness
is explicitly demonstrated. The simplest quantity control method is plate-number-based road
space rationing, widely used in many countries nowadays.
A more sophisticated quantity control method, termed the tradable driving permit (also called
right or credit) or the emission cap- and-trade scheme, has been proposed in the transportation
literature (for references and literature review, see Yang & Wang 2011). In a tradable credit
scheme, a policy target is defined in terms of quantity and the associated equilibrium price of
credits is determined by the market through free trading.
Kockelman & Kalmanje (2005) introduce an equitable CP policy called Credit Based Con-
gestion Pricing (CBCP). They describe the policy as follows:
Under a CBCP policy, drivers receive a monthly allowance of monetary travel credits, to
use on the roads. Time- and link-varying prices recognise variable demands and their associ-
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ated negative externalities. Drivers do not pay money out of pocket” unless they exceed their
allowance. Drivers spending less than their limit can use the credits later or exchange them
for cash. For drivers with special, socially desirable travel needs (e.g., welfare-to-work partici-
pants, and single parent low-income household heads), extra credits may be allotted. CBCP has
the potential to be an equitable and effective CP policy since drivers can choose to save credits
or expend allowance based on their travel needs. CBCP is also revenue neutral with monthly
revenues (after discounting for administrative costs) being returned as the next month’s credit
allowances. . . . A CBCP policy has the potential to achieve optimal network use while addressing
the primary impediments to congestion pricing policies, namely equity, welfare, and revenue-
distribution. Following CBCP we can also expect transit use to increase, peak travel to decrease,
and total vehicle emissions to decrease.
Kockelman & Kalmanje (2005) introduce CBCP and illustrate the results of a survey on
public response to it. The survey was taken by a sample of 500 individuals from Austin, TX. In
Gulipalli & Kockelman (2008) hypothetic traffic and travel-welfare impacts of CBCP on Austin
are analysed. In Gulipalli et al. (2011) expert opinions and system cost prediction are presented.
Finally in Kockelman & Lemp (2011) the revenue- generation opportunities and welfare impacts
of flat-tolling schemes, standard CP, and CBCP policies are compared.
Yang & Wang (2011) present a similar tradable credit distribution and charging scheme,
where credits are universal for all tariffed links but link-specific in the amount of credit charge.
The credit scheme works as follows:
1. The government initially issues credits to all eligible travellers.
2. The government predetermines the charge or the consumption rate for each roadway link.
3. Credits can then be traded freely in a competitive market without government interven-
tion.
The scenario is modelled into a convex optimisation problem and the workings of the scheme
are illustrated for a few simple example graphs. The authors demonstrate that if there is an
initial uniform distribution of credits to all registered travellers, the scheme involves at least the
same equity as a strict rationing policy. Furthermore, they state that the scheme is revenue-
neutral, in contrast with conventional CP that involves a financial transfer from motorists to
the government; in fact the scheme confines transfers to within a predefined group of travellers.
In Yang & Wang (2011) fixed and elastic demand scenarios are taken into consideration. In
Wang et al. (2012) the model is expanded by considering heterogeneous users with different
VOTT and the formulation of the model as variational inequalities problem is introduced.
Garcia et al. (2012) introduce a “cap and trade” scheme for congestion control, pointing out
that it may be easier for a central planner to set acceptable limits for aggregate utilisation on
certain critical links (thus, a quantity-based approach) than identifying congestion prices which
requires the accurate estimation of the derivatives of cost or latency functions associated to
each link (the traditional approach to congestion charges). In their proposed schema, the plan-
ner sets constraints for aggregate utilisation on certain critical links in the network. Dynamic
trading of usage rights in a secondary market is expected to identify prices clearing demand
for the utilisation of the constrained links. The authors point out that if prices in a cap and
trade scheme stabilise relatively quickly, a social planner can fine-tune the caps for aggregate
utilisation on critical links. Their model is formulated as a variational inequalities problem
that incorporates price updates, user (re)distribution on the network and travel permits trade.
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Among the most relevant findings in this work is that prices stabilise and flows (or routes)
converge to an equilibrium if the pace at which prices are updated is faster than that at which
users adjust their decisions.
Wu et al. (2012) propose a modelling framework to design more equitable yet efficient con-
gestion pricing and tradable credit schemes. They consider the effect of income on travellers’
choices of trip generation, mode and route on multimodal transportation networks and capture
the distributional impacts of congestion-mitigation policies on different income and geographic
groups. The proposed mathematical program determines a pricing scheme that improves both
the equity and social welfare. As these two objectives are often conflicting, they seek for a
balance between them. Some suggestion is also given for actual algorithmic implementations.
From the numerical examples the authors realise that it becomes difficult to design an equitable
pricing policy unless a shortfall in the total toll revenue is allowed. In contrast, a more equitable
and progressive tradable credit scheme can be obtained. Hence, the numerical examples also
highlight the difference between these two instruments in the mechanism of achieving better
equity.
Tian et al. (2013) examine the efficiency of a revenue-neutral tradable travel credit scheme
for managing bottleneck congestion and modal split in a competitive highway or transit network.
A continuous function represents the heterogeneity in the individuals’ value of time. Each user
is initially endowed with a certain amount of travel credits and can sell or buy additional credits
in a free trading market. Time-dependent credit charge is implemented only for usage of the
road bottleneck. Compared with the traditional time-dependent tolls, the authors prove that
the proposed credit scheme is competent in resolving both the efficiency and equity problem
without government participation, because the credits are freely traded in a competitive market
and the revenue redistribution problem is creatively resolved. Numerical results show that the
optimal-credit scheme is always unique and Pareto-improving if the system optimum is achieved
and the total social cost is reduced for all levels of transit fare considered. This implies that
the credit scheme can make everyone better off and simultaneously reduce the total social cost
by reallocating the departure time and mode choices in an efficient manner.
Non-monetary and hybrid pricing schemes have been proposed in order to overcome the
criticism that is commonly raised against congestion charges (like time-varying facility-based
pricing or non-linear distance-based pricing), especially in road transport. An overview of non-
monetary pricing schemes for this market can be found in Fan & Jiang (2013) and is summarised
in table 2.6.
2.6 Rail transport in Europe
Due to EU regulation 2001/14/EC and subsequent 2001/12/EC, 2001/13/EC and 2001/14/EC
(known as first railway package) each member state had to establish a free market. Hence, on a
national scale, there generally is a Network Manager (NM)/ Infrastructure owner who owns the
rails and one or more competing operators that own the trains and provide transport services
for passengers and freight. NM’s objective is generally revenue-oriented in countries where the
role is taken over by a private company and cost-recovery-oriented where it is state-owned.
Pricing schemes for rail transport are extremely heterogeneous across countries. The main issue
lies in the fact that not all customers use the same set of infrastructure services (e.g., diesel
trains do not consume electricity). Hence, some Network Managers may choose to split the tariff
according to a fixed part that all operators have to pay, plus a variable part that is dependent on
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Table 2.6: Classification of non-monetary pricing schemes for road transport.
the service used; others prefer not to make such a distinction. Detailed descriptions of pricing
schemes applied to rail transport in EU countries can be found in EU (2005) and Peter (2003).
Rail infrastructure has long been a regulated sector. The public influence on the rail net-
work is usually of a severe kind, leading to a public ownership of the infrastructure in nearly
all European countries (Peter 2003). The legislation of the European Commission refuses to
require a specific a organisational structure and ownership of the infrastructure manager (IM).
However, some conditions concerning open access, the price setting and slot allocation proce-
dures have been laid down in directive 2001/14/EC (and subsequent 2001/12/EC, 2001/13/EC
and 2001/14/EC, also known as First Railway Package), but leave some degree of freedom for
the national governments and the respective IMs.
2.6.1 Costs of a rail infrastructure
Railway infrastructure is used as an input for different services. Freight trains and passenger
trains operate on it and further differentiations can be made within these market segments,
as for instance single wagon load transport incurs costs and attracts demand different from
trainload transport. These services - whether they are provided inside an integrated company
or over the borders of two enterprises - partly share the same infrastructure, e.g. the trackbed.
Certain features of the infrastructure might be shared by one or more, but not all, services, thus
generating block-wise variable costs. E.g., only electric trains make use of the power supply
facilities, diesel trains don’t account for the costs generated by the wires etc.
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Other costs, which are entirely common to all operators, cannot be traced to any particular
service or group of services. Thus, the costs of the slot provision depend not only on the traffic
volume, but also on the characteristics of the infrastructure and the superstructure. Rothengat-
ter (2003) formally includes all these costs into a mathematical formulation for a cost function
composed of additively separable parts.
The difficulties of charging systems result from allocating the common costs and the block-
wise variable costs to the operators, as their nature prevents them from being distributed in
an impartial way. Once the block-wise variable costs are identified, the problem is reduced, as
they are to be distributed only between the member of the user group at stake, which is still
difficult. The problem is aggravated by the fact that these costs account for up to 80 - 90% of
the total social costs of the rail infrastructure (Hylen 2001).
The remaining short run marginal costs (SRMC) change with every further movement and
can be attributed directly to a particular operator. Their determination requires detailed cost
studies, which can comprise a variety of elements:
• Operating costs, that can be traced to a particular train movement, e.g. for personnel
and signalling;
• Wear and tear costs for maintenance and renewal of the infrastructure;
• Costs for energy consumption (electricity or diesel);
• Additional timetable planning and administration costs.
If SRMC consider ecological costs, impacts on congestion, on the noise level and accident
costs of other parties, they are referred to as short run marginal social costs.
Scientific attention has also being paid to the capacity costs (Nash & Matthews 2003): since rail
infrastructure managers control access to the network on a planned basis, shortages in capacity
on the rail network manifest themselves in a different form from roads and other unplanned
transport infrastructures. Two effects of increased capacity utilisation - congestion and scarcity
- are usually considered.
Congestion represents the expected delays resulting from the transmission of delays from
one train to another. The introduction of an additional rail service onto the network reduces
the infrastructure manager’s ability to recover from an incident and increases the probability of
delays. This becomes worse at high levels of capacity utilisation, since there is a lack of spare
capacity to recover from any delays (Nash & Matthews 2003). Congestion costs only occur on
track sections with dense traffic, where it is more difficult for the IM to manage reactionary
delays. They consist of the costs of time and energy imposed on other users of the network
(Peter 2003). If the infrastructure investment is done optimally, the revenues from an optimal
congestion charge will cover the deficit that is otherwise incurred (Mohring & Harwitz 1962).
Also, congestion costs, being additional delays to other operators’ trains resulting from higher
capacity utilisation, are borne directly by train operating companies, rather than the infrastruc-
ture manager, so they are not part of the marginal private cost of the infrastructure manager
(EU 2005). But they may directly affect the demand for track access by affecting the quality
of service provided, and also there may be conditions requiring the infrastructure manager to
compensate train operators for delays. In either case there will be a cost, or a loss of revenue,
to the infrastructure manager.
Scarcity represents the inability of a train operator to obtain the path they want, in terms
of departure time, stopping pattern or speed (Nash & Matthews 2003). For example, a train
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operator may identify a demand for a train service from A to B at a particular time and at a
particular speed but may be unable to operate the service because of the presence of other train
operators’ services on that part of the network at that time. This then results in the operator
running its service at a time different to that which it would wish to and/or at a slower speed
than it would wish to; in the extreme, the operator may decide not to, or be unable to, introduce
the service at all. The inability of the train operator to provide the service it estimates will
best meet its customers’ demands represents a cost to society equal to the social value of that
train service (Nash & Matthews 2003). Scarcity costs are external marginal costs and as such
not to be confounded with opportunity costs. Pricing of scarcity ensures that the service with
the highest value gets the slot and is therefore most important for the timetabling and the slot
allocation during operation. It has to be answered as well for the adjustment of schedules in
long-term franchises. The problem is independent of the organisation structure as integrated
railways have to decide as well, how to distribute capacities (freight trains, local trains) in bot-
tlenecks (Peter 2003).
It should also be pointed out that there are two competing philosophies of how to calculate
scarcity costs. In the pure short run, when selling slots on a spot market, it is the cost of
pushing another service off the tracks, or into an inferior slot, that is relevant. In a longer term
track access agreement which grants specific access rights, it may be more appropriate to think
in terms of the costs of providing capacity for those additional slots. These two approaches are
known to economists as short run and long run marginal cost pricing respectively. When capac-
ity is optimally adjusted, and in the absence of indivisibilities, the marginal cost of additional
capacity is equal to the value of the marginal additional train, so the two costs are equal (EU
2005).
2.6.2 Pricing principles
Peter (2003) provides an overview of the pricing principles that are used or been proposed to
build the tariff system in liberalised railway markets.
Short Run Marginal Cost Pricing (SRMC) Marginal costs are the costs which are in-
curred by an additional train run. They include the above mentioned components. Ap-
plying this pricing principle, it is ensured, that every train operator, whose willingness to
pay covers or exceeds the marginal costs, can run their train. Each slot allocation will
lead to a net benefit. As external costs are substantial (Nash & Matthews 2003), they
should be included in the infrastructure charge.
A number of examples shows that the implementation is, at least in a rough way, possible,
although the definition of the components of marginal costs may differ from country to
country. Moreover, it finds acceptance among operators, due to the low costs it generates.
However,if marginal costs are considered only in the short perspective, they don’t cover
the costs of upgrading and new investments in infrastructure, leaving this as a serious
problem for the development of the rail industry as a whole. The IM will not have the
necessary funds for investments, nor will he have the incentives, as new lines would only
increase the deficit in the regime of SRMC-pricing. The problem is enforced by the lack
of incentives for the IM to develop new cost-saving technologies, if he is regulated on the
basis of marginal costs. He has no means to adjust prices to the demand of the oper-
ators, as the prices are set irrespective of this demand. He cannot gain information for
investment decisions through price variations.
Ramsey-Pricing (RP) The aim of Ramsey-pricing is to maximise social welfare under the
constraint of deficit coverage. It considers the fact, that the IM supplies different prod-
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ucts. They can be defined from the demand-side and the supply-side. Rail infrastructure
slots can be differentiated according to different regions, different times and different cus-
tomers. Ramsey-pricing tries to find mark-ups for these products to cover the deficit that
results from SRMC-pricing. The inverse elasticity rule is applied to define these mark-ups.
According to this rule, the mark-up (as a percentage) on the marginal costs is reciprocally
proportional to the price elasticity of the demand of the operators (while the profit is
zero). A rough example in the railway sector is peak-load-pricing. Assuming, that the
elasticity of operators’ demand is lower at peak- times, the infrastructure tariffs can be
raised during these periods.
Ramsey-pricing in the textbook form can hardly be implemented. The information re-
quirements impose a restriction on every trial, notably the need of demand elasticity and
cross demand elasticity for a variety of market segments. Operators are usually very
reluctant to reveal their real willingness to pay, as it is subject to strategic behaviour.
Demand curves are not easy to estimate, because of the interactions with other trains.
The same holds for cost curves. Therefore, a rule of thump should be applied, following
the principle to “charge, what the market can bear”. This is a rough but intuitive imple-
mentation of Ramsey pricing. It has to consider the marginal costs as minimal price and
Ramsey-prices are a second best solution, as they deviate from welfare maximisation. A
set of second best prices is generated for the products of the IM. Prices are higher than
marginal costs and the traffic volume is consequently lower than in a marginal cost pricing
regime. Ramsey prices build upon marginal costs and therefore face the same information
restraints as SRMC-pricing and the same lack of incentives for infrastructure upgrade.
Fully-Distributed Cost Pricing (FDC) FDC take the SRMC as a starting point. They
cover the deficit by allocating the remaining costs according to selected parameters. Usual
parameters are: track-km, revenues, or the SRMC themselves (Rodi, 1996). The decision,
which parameters are to choose, usually doesn’t consider block-wise variable costs and is
therefore purely arbitrary. This makes the implementation of FDC for railway infrastruc-
ture fairly easy and is tempting for decision makers. FDC-pricing is Pareto-inferior to
Ramsey-Pricing, as it doesn’t take the demand elasticity into account. This is of course
assuming, that these elasticity are known. If the common costs of the rail infrastructure
are distributed according to the SRMC or the track-km, slots for feeder-lines and other
parts of the secondary network will become very expensive. If the respective operators
are priced off the network, all remaining services will have to bear a higher share of the
common costs. In this way, particularly the FDC-pricing scheme can cause negative chain
reactions. FDC-pricing usually does not differentiate the demand according to different
train products, regions or times of the day.
Non-linear Tariffs Non-linear tariffs charge different prices per unit for different amounts of
slots. The basic idea is to charge every slot with its marginal costs and to cover the
resulting deficit with a fixed fee, that the operator has to pay for a certain period of
time (entrance fee). A huge variation of non-linear tariffs exists, including block tariffs.
The simplest form is a two-tier tariff, consisting only of one fixed fee (no differentiation
between users) and one variable component. The difficulty is to define the fix part in
such a way that it doesn’t influence the demand of the operators. Therefore, the fixed
component must not be higher than the surplus of the marginal operator.
There are significant problems in meeting this condition, if the demands of the operators
differ. This is for instance the case in a market with a state owned incumbent and
some small competitors. If the deficit covering fee is spread evenly across the operators,
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competitors are likely to be priced off the rails or the fixed fee can indeed establish a market
entry barrier. A possible solution is the adjustment of the fixed fee for each operator or
group of operators, leaving the variable unit-price unchanged. This approach might not
to meet the competition legislation in many countries because of discrimination. If there
are detailed information about the demand curve of each group of operators towards the
fixed part and the variable part, customised tariffs can be assigned. Depending on the
elasticity, they lie between the basic multi part concept (identical fixed and variable parts
for all users) and the Ramsey-prices (no fixed part). As the regulation authority will find
it very difficult to generate the necessary information, a system of self-selecting tariffs
is a variation, which can be used in practice. It leads to a volume discount. It can be
observed in several end consumer markets in network industries, e.g. in the electricity
and the telecommunication sector.
A serious caveat of self-selecting tariffs is its reliance on the operators demand. Users have
to know their consumption pattern when choosing a tariff. If the users are uncertain, the
danger of selecting a wrong tariff is increased with the number of tariffs on offer and a
new tariff might lead to a welfare loss (Train, 1989).
2.6.3 Implementation
The tools available to implement an access charge regime are basically of two types, simple
charges and two-part charges (EU 2005).
Simple charges are directly variable with measures of use: gross tonne-km, net tonne- km,
passenger-km, train-km, kW and kWh of electric traction used, per cent of revenue, etc. These
can be weighted by: speed, axle loadings, types of rolling stock, the specific route (including the
geometry requirements of the route), time of day, and freight commodity, among many others.
Simple charges are probably more effective in collecting marginal (direct) costs, and they may
be more effective in charging for social costs and externalities. They are more distorting in
collecting allocated shares of fixed costs and they may not give effective signals to encourage
the financing of added capacity. If used to collect fixed costs they may no longer give the
right signals to use existing capacity to the full. Simple charges might be most appropriate for
a relatively simple network, with few users and where traffic is not approaching network capacity.
Two-part charging systems have one or more parameters related directly to use, such as
the variable parameters above. In addition, two-part systems have a second component based
on the capacity forecast to be used or on some estimate of the fixed costs of the system to be
recovered. This second component, sometimes called the fixed component, can be based on
scheduled path-km, or scheduled train-km, among other options. The second component can
also be weighted by factors such as path quality, scheduled speed, particular line, time of day,
etc. It is significant that most of the second component factors tend to be passenger service-
driven (particularly by commuter traffic) rather than freight-related: that is most freight users
can adjust their usage to avoid peak time use (and thus do not have to burden capacity) whereas
most passenger traffic must travel at times and at speeds that increase the need for capacity.
Two-part regimes are more efficient at relating use to economic cost, but they raise an issue
of potential discrimination among users. Two-part regimes also tend to be more complex and
expensive to implement.
Two-part systems are often said to have a variable part and a fixed part. This may be somewhat
misleading in the current context, since the so-called fixed part is often related to some measure
of expected system use. In practice, the difference is that the variable part tends to be related
to actual, measured wear and tear usage, whereas the fixed part tends to be related to the
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planned use of capacity. Where this simply reflects elements of marginal cost, in terms of train
planning costs or use of scarce capacity, this cannot be regarded as discriminatory. However, a
heavy loading of costs on to these elements combined with a requirement to reserve paths may
discourage small operators, particularly freight operators, where actual capacity requirements
are particularly uncertain.
2.6.4 Tariff systems currently in use
In Europe, directive 2001/14/EC claims for transparency and requires railway tariff data to be
published. Peter (2003) gives a detailed description of the tariff system of European countries
with the exemptions of Greece and the Republic of Ireland, which had, to that date, not im-
plemented tariff systems. This work, although out-dated, gives a very exhaustive and complete
overview of the relevant tariff parameters for each country, and of how tariff are finally calcu-
lated. Updated data can be found in EU (2005) and Maca´rio et al. (2007).
Laurits R. Christensen Associates (2009) is part of a detailed study of competition in the US rail
industry. Hence, a detailed description of the way the infrastructure is charged is given. Costs
are described, the cost function illustrated and a complete economical analysis is provided.
Carlson & Nolan (2005) give a historical overview of the evolution of regulated market of rail-
ways in Canada and introduce the basic formulation for Regulated Access Pricing, comparing its
Canadian implementation with others from the US, and specifically from the state of New York.
The main characteristics of the pricing approaches described so far for rail transport are
illustrated in table 2.7.
Pricing 3. Type of
tariff
4. Mod-
ulation of
tariff
5. Users
classifica-
tion
6. Price
s. str.
7. Pay-
ment
8. QoS
Simple charges b. 1st best
or c. 2nd
best
Space dep.
either c. or
d.
a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Guaran-
teed
Two-part
charges
d. Multi
part
Space dep.
either c. or
d.
a. No diff. b. Res.
Val.
a. Mone-
tary
a. Guaran-
teed
Table 2.7: Classification of pricing schemes in use for rail transport in Europe
2.6.5 Further relevant research
Harrod (2013) evaluates auctions as a method of pricing and selling train paths on a shared
“open access” network in order to maintain transparency in the contracting process. The author
demonstrates that for multiple random samples of auction pricing for a single track railway line
in the US the infrastructure entity will receive approximately 15.6% less than the true value of
the contracted train paths. This loss of revenue threatens the objective of reducing government
subsidy for the railway network. Hence the question of pricing train paths for open access
railway networks in North America is discussed.
Van den Berg & Verhoef (2014) propose a model for congestion pricing in a road and rail
network with heterogeneous values of time and schedule delay. The authors point out that the
two modes are imperfect substitutes: on the road there is bottleneck congestion; in each train
there is crowding congestion. They model two dimensions of preference heterogeneity that have
opposite effects on the welfare impact of congestion pricing and lead to different distributional
effects.
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2.7 Air transport in Europe
According to the description provided in the previous section, in the current configuration Euro-
pean airspace has one Network Manager (Eurocontrol), who is responsible for collecting en-route
charges and redistributing them to national Air Navigation Services Providers. Charges are set
by national ANSPs with the aim of recovering operational costs of providing air navigation
services to the airlines. From the economic point of view, the current environment is a monop-
olistic competition, where competitors (ANSPs) are differentiated on a location basis (country
boundaries) and competitors’ pricing policies are not taken into account.
Environment
1. Control b. Decentralised control: unit rates are set by ANSPs and collected by
Eurocontrol.
2. Pricing strategy objective a. Objective of cost recovery: en-route charges are collected to recover
operational costs of national ANSP for ATC services.
Pricing
3. Type of tariff c. Consumption-proportional: monthly adjusted unit rates.
4. Modulation of the tariff c. Space dependent and time independent: unit rates vary on a country
bases (although EU reg. 391/2013 art. 16 allows unit rate modulation).
5. Users classification a. No differentiation among customers: all airlines are equal;
6. Price setting strategy b. Prices are set according to resource value: cost of ATC services
7. Payment a. Monetary payment
8. Quality of Service (QoS) a. and b. Guaranteed service, capped by ATC sector capacity by im-
posing ATC delay (but this is applied on Day of Operation).
Table 2.8: Current configuration of the route charges system
The pricing schema described above is conceptually similar to distance-based pricing for
road transport (de Palma & Lindsey 2011) and simple charges for rail transport (Peter 2003).
Edge pricing (telecommunications, see Falkner et al. 2000) is also similar, with the notable
difference of being location independent.
2.7.1 Alternative scenario: centralised control
The present section introduces an environment where prices are set and controlled by a central
authority whose objectives are cost recovery of ANS expenses and reduction of network conges-
tion. This alternative scenario is introduced as background for the centralised pricing models
described in Chapter 3.
This scenario represents a monopolistic environment having a Network Manager, ANSPs as
operators and airlines as customers; this configuration is similar to the the way rail transport
is organised in most European countries.
Let us now consider pricing techniques developed within other network industries that are
compatible with the characteristics delineated for this alternative scenario and let us evaluate
their applicability to European airspace.
Flat pricing and user-class based options should be excluded a priori: the former because
it does not incentive sustainable traffic distribution, the latter because it clashes with the re-
quirement of equity among airlines stated by EU Reg. 391/2013 art. 16: Member States, [. . . ]
may, at national or functional airspace block level and on a non-discriminatory and transparent
basis, modulate air navigation charges. Since pricing is considered at a strategic level, real-time
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Environment
1. Control a. Centralised control: tariffs will be set and collected by a Central
Planner.
2. Pricing strategy objective c. Objective of cost recovery & congestion reduction.
Pricing
3. Type of tariff b. or c. Proportional to travelled distance, sector forecast capacity or
both; either an exact marginal cost or a second-best charging schema is
plausible.
4. Modulation of the tariff c. or d. Always space dependent, could be either time dependent or
invariant.
5. Users classification a. Equity is a priority; hence, user classes among airlines would not be
welcomed.
6. Price setting strategy b. Prices are set according to resource value: cost of ATC services; a
combination of resource and user-perceived value is also acceptable.
7. Payment a. or c. Payment could be either monetary or hybrid.
8. Quality of Service (QoS) a. and b. Guaranteed service, capped by ATC sector capacity (this
could be applied in advance of Day of Operation).
Table 2.9: Centralised control with modulated charges configuration
pricing should also be excluded.
Time dependent usage pricing (telecommunications, see Falkner et al. 2000) and Time of Us-
age (electricity, see Borenstein et al. 2002) are of the peak-load pricing type. Users are charged
proportionally to resource consumption and the tariff varies according to the time at which the
service is provided. Tariffs are set according to congestion level forecasts obtained from histor-
ical data and are adjusted periodically (e.g., once a month). There are no remarkable issues in
making such a pricing scheme also location dependent, as proved by other transport modes that
use time-and-place dependent peak load pricing, so it is a viable option for European airspace
as well. Leal de Matos et al. (2001) investigates the issues and applicability of peak-load pricing
and yield management techniques to European airspace.
Ramsey pricing based mechanisms, such as responsive pricing for telecommunications (Falkner
et al. 2000), and simple charges for rail transport (Peter 2003) set the congestion charge, or the
congestion dependent component of the tariff, as inversely proportional to demand elasticity
of the users. Critical peak pricing for electricity retail (Borenstein et al. 2002) is conceptually
similar but maximum price for peak times is generally capped. It is legitimate to assume that
demand elasticity varies among users also in the air transport industry. For example an airline
operating on a hub-and-spoke paradigm is likely to have a less elastic demand than one oper-
ating on a point-to-point basis due to the constraints imposed by connecting flights.
Critical Peak pricing with Incentive Rebates and Demand Reduction Programs (both from elec-
tricity retail, see Borenstein et al. 2002) are variants of the Ramsey pricing scheme where the
user pays a baseline charge and is offered an incentive for not consuming during peaks and/or
cash-back for consuming less than what is provided by the baseline. From a model point of view,
they are equivalent to Critical Peak pricing, the only difference lying in the way the scheme
is presented in the contract to the customer. For this reason, it is reasonable to discard them
from our analysis.
Time of Usage with demand charges (electricity retail, Borenstein et al. 2002) is a peak-load
pricing scheme where the consumer is charged an additional tax for his own peak usage The
tax is independent of the level of network congestion at that time. Since generation costs in
the electricity industry raise exponentially when imbalances between demand and supply occur,
such a scheme is designed to deter the customer from generating peaks of usage at all. This
type of pricing is therefore tightly related to a peculiar characteristic of electric grids that is
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not shared by airspace and therefore has no meaningful applicability in air traffic.
Bid-price and auction-based mechanisms, such as smart-market pricing for telecommunications
(Falkner et al. 2000) and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity wholesale (Kahn et al. 2001) may
give rise to equity issues, since they favour economically sounder airlines that are likely to pay
more. However, should the auctioning process be carried out without the use of real money, but
rather with freely distributed non-monetary credit, it would be acceptable and still effective for
reducing congestion. Such a system could be combined with the current distance-based en-route
charges so that it would also guarantee ANS operational costs recovery.
As for other non-monetary schemes, both day permits and vehicle miles travelled (Fan &
Jiang 2013) are not suitable for managing congestion in air transport. Day permits would con-
strain airlines in scheduling flights on allowed days only; such a limitation would be unwelcome
by both airlines and their customers, and would raise severe issues on equity. Vehicle miles
travelled is a fair option for reducing pollution through emission charges; in fact it shares some
traits with the already implemented EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), whose aim is to
mitigate the climate impacts of aviation. Such a system, however, charging only on travelled
distance (as with current ANS charges), is ineffective for managing congestion.
The permit system that better fits the needs of air traffic congestion management is time-place
specific allowances (Fan & Jiang 2013). Under such schemes, the capacity of a resource deter-
mines the total quota of available permits. Since permits are defined for use in a specific period,
their validity in time is also clearly defined and limited. In order to enforce capacity constraints
for air routes or sectors, it is therefore sufficient to issue a limited number of permits for each
resource and time period and distributing them with a strategy that grants equity among air-
lines (e.g., first-come-first-served or auctioning with credits).
Credit allowances (Fan & Jiang 2013), represent a very flexible option for dealing with de-
mand/capacity imbalances in air traffic. Credits may be used in different ways, as a currency for
congestion charges or auctions for resources, as previously suggested for bid-price and auction-
based mechanisms. Provided that the initial endowment is fair, a charging system which uses
credits instead of real money may partially mitigate the advantage that larger and economically
sounder airlines may have under several pricing schemes.
2.7.2 Alternative pricing strategies for European ATM from literature
The possibility of modulating ANS charges by modifying the unit rate has been previously
investigated in some scientific literature. The present section illustrates the most relevant con-
tributions.
The seminal work on this subject can be found in Andreatta & Odoni (2001), who first
envisaged that en route charges could be adjusted to reflect the presence of airspace congestion.
The authors conceive a set of differential charges - higher in congested sectors and lower in less
congested ones, which would be set in such a way that the total amount of collected charges
corresponds to the cumulative cost incurred by ANSPs. This work broadly corresponds to the
idea of modulated charges. However, no detailed elaboration of the proposed concept was pre-
sented.
An approach similar to peak-load pricing was proposed in Deschinkel et al. (2002); here, an
assignment of price levels from a pre-determined set to airspace sector/hour pairs is formulated
as a Logit model and solved through a simulated annealing algorithm. Experimental results are
encouraging, however the problem of how to determine the set of price levels in the first place
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is not investigated thoroughly.
In Raffarin (2004) an alternative pricing rule for air navigation charges is proposed, based on
the idea of giving airlines economic incentives to modify their behaviour, so that the resulting
routing choices are optimal from both social and individual points of view. The author points
out the limitations of the pricing rule in use today for air navigation charges in Europe, observ-
ing that it normally penalises larger aircraft, when in fact smaller ones are the ones more likely
to cause congestion, due to the limited number of seats. Starting from this observation, a new
pricing rule is proposed where demand and frequency of flights are re-defined as functions of
customers’ utility; finally, optimal tariffs are identified by equalling marginal utility to marginal
costs. Despite the sound observations on which this pricing model is built, no conclusion can
be drawn on its effectiveness due to the lacking of computational tests.
In accordance with the rationale of Andreatta & Odoni (2001) who envisage that en-route
charges could be adjusted to reflect the presence of airspace congestion, on a small-scale real-
world example, Castelli & Ranieri (2007) demonstrate the cost consequences of the trade-offs
airlines are facing in situations when able to choose between the (ground) ATFM delay and
rerouting. The preliminary results shown in the paper suggest that there is some scope to
improve the global performance of the considered system (aggregate delay) by giving incen-
tives to a relatively minor number of users to reroute from an overloaded to its neighbouring
sector with spare capacity. However, the approach based exclusively on the general unit-rate
modulation (not allowing for negative charges) led to rather high unit rate values, along with
some associated unfair effects, as judged by the authors themselves. An alternative approach,
with targeted unit-rate reduction (limited solely to carriers who decide to reroute) yields more
acceptable unit rate values, but also a consequent loss of income to the ANSP in question, i.e.,
the violation of the full cost recovery principle.
An anticipatory, time-dependent modulation of air navigation charges to bring the traffic
demand more in line with available network capacities is proposed by Jovanovic´ et al. (2014).
The charges are modulated so as to minimise the total cost to airspace users: a System Optimum
assignment is first performed on the network to determine an optimal traffic distribution; then
the network is priced in order to obtain a User Equilibrium (i.e., minimisation of users’ travel
costs) with the same traffic distribution. This paper puts into effect a desirable feature: revenue
neutrality of the pricing scheme, meaning that no additional revenue should be generated by ap-
plying the modulation. This is achieved by introducing a toll for the use of a premium resource
(overloaded network segment), and in providing economically reasonable alternatives for users
who cannot get access to it due to capacity constraints. The collected toll revenues are used to
subsidise the use of alternative, under-utilised network segments. The results of a medium-scale
case study indicate that the use of revenue neutral tolls and rebates on a congested airspace
network may yield a fairly equitable assignment. Furthermore, obtained assignment seems more
efficient compared to current administrative flow management practices, capacity-wise.
Adequate modelling of route charges modulation (through modification of the unit rate)
needs to address the impact on airspace users. That is to say, the obvious impact on the route
choice stage that the modulation would bring along, even in a non-congested setting. In this con-
text, Castelli et al. (2013) propose a bi-level programming pricing model for the maximisation
of ANSP revenues through en route charge modulation. Results from a small-scale real-world
test case suggest that the ANSP’s revenue depends highly on the unit rate value. Therefore,
the unit rate can be an effective instrument for modification of the route choice of flights. It
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follows that this approach can be a starting point to develop a pricing model with modulated
en route charges, with the aim to alleviate route congestion.
The pricing rule proposed by Raffarin (2004) defines demand and frequency of flights as
functions of customers’ utility; optimal tariffs are identified by equalling marginal utility to
marginal costs. In Deschinkel et al. (2002) optimal price levels are identified as a function of
marginal utility variation. Being first-best approaches, both suffer from the implementation dif-
ficulties already pointed out for this type of approaches. Calculating actual values of marginal
costs and utility poses a severe challenge, as airlines are unlikely to reveal strategic data and
estimates may not lead to reliable results. Furthermore, neither work takes into account oper-
ational costs other than en-route charges (which usually amount to up to 10% of the total cost
of a flight).
Hoffman et al. (2013) hints at the possibility of measuring the impact that any flight has on the
overall congestion at a pre-tactical level and assessing adequate tolls accordingly, as a variation
to a base tariff. No model is actually presented in this work, however the proposed scheme is
most likely a real time marginal cost approach and therefore difficult to adapt to the strategic
phase. Real time pricing introduces non-determinism on tolls, which is not a desirable feature
when airlines still have to choose the route of a flight.
Finally, the study prepared for the European Commission by Steer Davies Gleeve (Steer
Davies Gleave 2015), although not containing mathematical models nor simulation results,
provides a valuable overview the applicability of congestion charges to the European airspace.
This study considers several approaches to congestion pricing (proportional charges, a fixed
congestion toll) and several levels at which they could be applied (ANSP level, FAB level)
and analyse how they could be integrated in the current ATM system, how it would affect the
airspace users and which issues might arise from each proposed modulation.
Pricing 1. Con-
trol
2. Objec-
tive
3. Type of
tariff
4. Mod-
ulation of
tariff
5. Users
classifica-
tion
6. Price
setting
strategy
7. Pay-
ment
8. QoS
Castelli et al.
(2013)
a. cent. a. max rev;
rev. neu-
trality also
workab.
c. 2.nd best c. space
dep, time
inv.
a. No diff. c. both a. Mone-
tary
a. Guaranteed
Deschinkel
et al. (2002)
Not spec-
ified. As-
sumed a.
cent.
b. resource
consump-
tion
b. 1st best
(marginal
utility)
d. space /
time dep.
a. No diff. a. Res.
value
a. Mone-
tary
a. Guaranteed
Hoffman et al.
(2013)
a. cent. b. resource
consump-
tion
c. multi-
part (base
tariff + 1st
best cong.
Charge)
d. space /
time dep.
a. No diff. a. Res.
value
a. Mone-
tary
a. Guaranteed
b. can be capped
Jovanovic´ et al.
(2014)
a. cent. c. resource
consump-
tion &
revenue
neutrality
c. 2nd best Space dep.
Compatible
with both
c. and d.
a. No diff a. Res.
value
a. Mon-
etary with
subsidies
a. Guaranteed
Raffarin (2004) a. cent. b. resource
consump-
tion
b. 1.st best c. space
dep, time
inv. (ext.
to d.)
a. No diff. a. Res.
value
a. Mone-
tary
a. Guaranteed
Table 2.10: Classification of pricing rules from scientific literature for European en-route charges.
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Part II
Alternative pricing schemes for the
European airspace
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Chapter 3
Centralised Peak-Load Pricing
From the analysis of pricing methods carried out in Chapter 2, Peak Load Pricing (PLP) stands
out as one of the policies worth evaluating in regard to its applicability to European ATM. The
objective is to obtain a pricing policy that guarantees a more balanced load on network capac-
ity by redistributing part of the traffic that would otherwise converge on high demand-capacity
imbalance risk areas. Such a policy is expected to reduce this imbalance and consequent delay
in the tactical phase by inducing airspace users to apply re-routing and strategic delay.
Peak-load pricing is a pricing mechanism commonly used in transport and utilities. It is a
simplified form of congestion pricing with the fundamental assumptions that peaks in demand
are occurring periodically, in both time and location (and are therefore predictable), and that
demand has some degree of elasticity towards time and/or location of service consumption (and
therefore is sensitive to its price). Under these assumptions the PLP policy is to assign a higher
rate for times and/or locations where a peak in demand is expected, and a lower rate for off-
peak areas and times. By doing so, it is expected that part of the peak demand will deviate
their travel/consumption to a cheaper option. It is therefore essential that peak and off-peak
prices are set adequately so that the pricing policy is effective with regard to both business
sustainability and efficient capacity management. The first can be achieved by imposing that
total revenues are not lower than total marginal costs; the second can be obtained by setting
peak rates greater than the willingness to pay by the users in excess, which will therefore prefer
the cheaper off-peak option (in Borenstein et al. (2002) this principle is exemplified for the elec-
tricity retail market). PLP is widely used also in scheduled transport (public urban transport,
rails, see for example Peter (2003)) and is, in general, transparent and predictable to users,
since peak times and prices are known in advance.
In the context of European ATM, demand peaks in time are generally easy to predict, both
at daily and seasonal level. Daily peaks usually occur in the morning between 7:00 and 10:00
and afternoon between 13:00 and 15:00 (UTC times); seasonal peaks occur close to holidays
and special events, with the last week of June generally being the most trafficked in the year.
As for price sensitivity, very few studies have been carried out on the sensitivity of airlines
to route charges with regard to flight planning. Delgado (2015) carried out one such analysis
on the traffic from September 12, 2014. The research presented in this paper shows that in
the selection of a route by an aircraft operator the cost of the charging zones can be a factor.
This impact is maximised around adjacent areas where differences in price are significant (e.g.,
Italy vs. the western Balcanic area) and alternative routes are similar with regard to other
characteristics (e.g., route length, cruise altitude etc.). Therefore, some degree of sensitivity to
price exists.
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PLP is also compatible with the current unit rate setting guidelines by Eurocontrol and
with EU Regulation No 391/2013 of 3 May 2013 Laying down a common charging scheme for
air navigation services, Article 16, stating that “Member States [. . . ] may [. . . ] reduce the
overall costs of air navigation services and increase their efficiency, in particular by modulating
charges according to the level of congestion of the network in a specific area or on a specific
route at specific times. [. . . ] The modulation of charges shall not result in any overall change
in revenue for the air navigation service provider. Over- or under recoveries shall be passed on
to the following period. The modulation of air navigation charges means a variation of the en
route charge and/or the terminal charge [. . . ]”. This distinctive feature of Regulation 391/2013
provides Member States and therefore ANSPs with an operational instrument to practice de-
mand management which could help in dealing with the recurring demand-capacity imbalance
problems.
This chapter illustrates a centralised approach to PLP (which we will refer to as cPLP),
where a central authority (or Central Planner, CP) is responsible for setting en route charges
on the whole network. cPLP consists of two phases. In the first phase congested airspace sectors
and related peak and off-peak hours are identified. The identification can be done by analysing
past traffic and route choice data (as previously mentioned, air traffic shows seasonal periodicity
throughout the year), or by analysing forecast Origin/Destination (O/D) demand. Specifically,
in either method, the traffic demand is counted for all the sectors, taking into account all the
flights and their routes, along a chosen time horizon (for example one hour). The ratio between
hourly traffic count and nominal hourly capacity gives us the hourly load factor which can be
used to assign the peak or off-peak label to a specific region for a specific hour. cPLP could in
fact be applied at regional (i.e., FAB) level, national (i.e., ANSP) level or local (i.e., ACC or
sector) level, on the whole network or on selected regions only.
In the second phase, CP has to set en route charges on the network, and the airspace users
(AUs) need to route each flight, based on the set charges. These charges should guarantee that
ANSPs are able to recover their operating costs and that AUs are able to perform flights, while
at the same time mitigate the imbalance between demand and available airspace capacity. En
route charges are set by the CP to achieve a network level objective, such as to reduce the
amount of delay on the network. However, there is often a trade-off to consider between the
system level (CP) and the user level (AU) objectives. In general, allowing users to minimise, for
instance, their individual delays (the so-called User Optimum assignment) does not lead to a
solution where the global network delay is also minimised. On the contrary, optimising delay at
system level only (known as System Optimum assignment), would most likely penalise certain
users more than others, which is also not ideal from an equity point of view.
Since in the current system en route charges are set by the States (ANSPs) and the AUs
can only react to them by choosing alternative and cheaper routes, we model the relationship
between the CP and the AUs as a Stackelberg game where a leader (CP) makes his decision first,
with the complete knowledge on how the follower(s) (AUs) would react to it. The Stackelberg
equilibrium can be obtained by means of an optimisation problem formulated as a bilevel linear
programming model (a brief introduction to bilevel models is provided in section 3.1) where the
CP sets the rates for each sector/period and the AUs make their routing choice.
Further constraints can be imposed to define the pricing scheme, ranging from allowing a dif-
ferent price for each sector/hour pair to imposing a single peak/off peak couple of unit rates
per ANSP.
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3.1 Introduction to bilevel programming
Bilevel models represent a sequential game between two decision levels, commonly referred to
as Leader (upper level) and Follower (lower level), where the leader has complete knowledge of
the follower’s strategy, and is therefore able to anticipate it, while the opposite does not hold.
The follower can therefore only react to the leader’s action. This type of model is known as
Stackelberg game (see Von Stackelberg 1952) and its solution is referred to as Stackelberg equi-
librium, as opposed for example to Nash’s equilibrium (introduced in Nash et al. 1950) where
both players have complete knowledge of each other’s strategy.
Formally, a bilevel model is a hierarchical optimisation problem in which part of the con-
straints translate the fact that some of the variables constitute an optimal solution to a second
optimisation problem (Labbe´ & Violin 2013). By denoting x and y respectively the leader’s and
follower’s decision variables vectors, this can be described mathematically as:
min
x,y
F (x, y) (3.1)
s.t. G(x, y) ≤ 0 (3.2)
y ∈ arg min
y
f(x, y) (3.3)
s.t.g(x, y) ≤ 0 (3.4)
Note that the formulation above assumes that if there are multiple optimal solutions for
the lower level problem, the solution that is most profitable for the leader is selected; this is
an optimistic approach, in opposition to a pessimistic approach where the leader chooses the
solution that protects himself against the follower’s worst possible reaction. Both scenarios have
been investigated in literature (for a detailed bibliography on this, see Heilporn 2008).
As mentioned by Labbe´ & Violin (2013), this type of model may represent a decision-maker,
representing the upper level of the problem and whose actions lead to some reaction within a
particular market or entity, corresponding to the lower level of the problem. Transportation
planning is a typical domain in which examples of such hierarchical structures appear: the
upper level corresponds to the network manager or owner seeking to improve the performance
of the network, and the lower level corresponds to network users making their travel choices.
Two common bilevel programming problems that arise in this context and are of interest to
this thesis for sharing several elements with the cPLP model presented in Sec. 3.2, are the
Network Design Problem (NDP, introduced in LeBlanc (1975) and Abdulaal & LeBlanc (1979)
in its discrete and continuous forms, respectively) and the Network Pricing Problem (NPP,
introduced in Labbe´ et al. 1998). In the Network Design Problem, the leader’s objective is to
minimise total cost on the network by choosing the links to activate and the capacity associated.
The second level problem is the so-called network equilibrium problem, where users distribute
onto the network to obtain a final equilibrium configuration where no one can further improve
their objective (the so-called User Optimum configuration, proved to be equivalent to a Nash
Equilibrium). In the Network Pricing Problem, the leader seeks to maximise his or her revenue
by setting prices on a subset of the network, while the followers seek to minimise their travel
cost. The followers’ problem in this case is a shortest path problem, which is a linear-cost case
of the network equilibrium problem.
Further domains where this type of hierarchical relationship appears include management (e.g.,
facility location, environmental regulation, credit allocation, energy policy, hazardous material),
economic planning (social and agricultural policies, electric power pricing, oil production) and
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engineering (optimal design, structures and shape).
Bilevel programs were first introduced in 1973 by Bracken & McGill (1973), while the com-
plete formulation, as described above, was first introduced by Shimizu & Aiyoshi (1981). Gener-
ically non differentiable and non convex, bilevel problems are, by nature, hard. Even the linear
bilevel problem, where the objective functions and the constraints are linear, was proved to be
NP-hard by Jeroslow (1985), while Hansen et al. (1992) proved strong NP-hardness. Vicente
et al. (1994) strengthen these results and prove that merely checking strict or local optimality is
strongly NP-hard. Due to the complexity of bilevel models, solution approaches generally focus
on particular cases where functions have convenient properties, such as linearity or convexity,
in order to exploit their structure to develop efficient solution methods. An annotated bibliog-
raphy containing more than one hundred references on the subject can be found in Vicente &
Calamai (1994), while the books by Shimizu et al. (1997) and Luo et al. (1996) are devoted, in
full or in part, to this subject.
3.2 Centralised Peak-Load Pricing (cPLP) model
This section illustrates the proposed Centralised Peak Load Pricing model: Section 3.2.1 de-
scribes the assumption made, the used notation is presented in Sec. 3.2.2. Sections 3.2.3
and 3.2.4 present the formulation and constraints for the Central Planner problem and for the
Airspace Users respectively, while Sec. 3.2.5 combines the two into a bilevel problem. Section
3.2.6 illustrates the reformulations carried out on the bilevel problem to obtain an equivalent
mixed integer linear formulation.
3.2.1 Modelling assumptions
1. Fixed demand matrix. Fixed number of flights between any airport pair in the network:
the intention of the proposed pricing mechanism is to modify its spatial/temporal pattern
to bring it in line with available capacities, not to scale down the total demand.
2. Heterogeneous demand, in terms of different aircraft types and associated cost coefficients.
3. The infrastructure capacity constraints are known in advance, in terms of airspace sectori-
sation and maximum number of aircraft that can enter sectors per given period of time
(i.e., nominal capacity). Since the mechanism is applied strategically, only nominal sector
and airport capacities are considered, without variations introduced by regulations (which
are caused by weather and other less predictable reasons, tactically).
4. Finite set of possible (reasonable) 4D routes for each Origin/Destination/Aircraft triple:
users can select a route from a set of pre-determined routes (derived from actual traffic).
Duration and profile of each route is assumed to be constant, for each aircraft type (i.e.,
speed profiles are assumed constant for each route/aircraft pair).
5. Users are rational decision makers. All AUs are assumed to choose the least-cost 4D route
available. Flight cost components are attached to each route. AUs’ routing decisions are
therefore sensitive to modulations of en-route charges.
6. Revenue neutrality is established as a desired principle, meaning ANSPs’ revenues are to
be kept as close as possible to their operating costs: the adjustment of charges should not
generate additional revenue (on top of the cost of ANS provision), nor deficit.
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7. Peak times and locations are known in advance. The expected load on a sector, during a
specific time is estimated by analysing initially submitted flight plans.
3.2.2 Model notation
F set of all flights, indexed by f
N set of all ANSPs, indexed by n
B set of all aircraft types, indexed by b
bf aircraft type b used to operate flight f
Wbf weight factor of aircraft type b used by flight f (calculated according to eq. 1.4)
A set of all airports, indexed by a
R set of all routes, indexed by r
Rf set of all routes that can be flown by flight f
S set of all sectors, indexed by s
Sn set of all sectors controlled by ANSP n
Sr set of all sectors crossed by route r
H time periods (hours), indexed by h
M time instants (minutes), indexed by m
MGS maximum ground shift (in minutes) allowed for a flight, i.e., the maximum difference
between requested and allocated departure time (the formula applied is illustrated by eq.
3.7)
Mf possible departure time instants for flight f (i.e., m ∈ [dtf −MGS, dtf +MGS])
Th set of minutes m belonging to time period (hour) h
Q
(h)
s capacity of sector s during time period (hour) h
Q
(h)
a,dep departure capacity of airport a during time period (hour) h
Q
(h)
a,arr arrival capacity of airport a during time period (hour) h
Q
(h)
a,gl total (departures + arrivals) capacity of airport a during time period (hour) h
Ds,r one hundredth of the great-circle distance flown in sector s if route r intersects sector s
(see Sec. 1.2.4); 0 otherwise
es,r estimated entry time since departure of route r in element (sector or airport) s
dtf requested departure time for flight f
atf requested arrival time for flight f
adepf departure airport for flight f
87
adesf destination airport for flight f
Un actual (historical) en-route unit rate for ANSP n (e/service unit)
GS
(m)
f,r global shift for flight f using route r and departing at time m
OC
(m)
f,r airline operational costs for flight f using route r and departing at time m
RC
(m)
f,r modulated en-route charges for flight f using route r and departing at time m
TC
(m)
f,r total cost for operating flight f using route r and departing at time m.
3.2.3 Model formulation: Central Planner (CP) problem (upper level prob-
lem)
Main decision variables: the decision process of the CP is illustrated by an optimisation
problem that identifies optimal rates for the considered airspace such that a user-optimal
assignment of routes to flights will minimise the metric of network inefficiency represented
by the CP objective function.
CPs decision variables are defined as:
RC
(m)
f,r = en-route charges for flight f departing at minute m using route r ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf
(3.5)
While AU’s decision variables are:
x
(m)
f,r =
{
1 if flight f departs at minute m using route r
0 otherwise
∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf
(3.6)
Route charges RC
(m)
f,r can be defined in several ways, and their definition greatly affects
the complexity of the model. The different pricing schemes analysed in this work and the
complexity of the resulting problem are described in Sec. 3.2.7
CP objective function: in general, the objective of the Central Planner is to minimise net-
work inefficiency. Several metrics can be used to define efficiency (or lack thereof). Delay
minimisation is usually a common choice in ATFM models (see for example Bertsimas
et al. 2011) but since the cPLP models deals with strategic planning, the closer equivalent
to tactical delay is in fact global shift minimisation (meant as a measure of temporal
displacement from the intentions stated by the airlines).
The global shift for flight f using route r and departing at time m is defined as the sum
of minutes of later-than-requested departure plus the number of minutes of earlier-than-
requested arrival.
GS
(m)
f,r = max{0,m−dtf}+ max{0, atf − (m+ eadesf ,r)} ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf (3.7)
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A second and third components to be minimised in the CP objective are respectively
the violation of the revenue neutrality constraints,  and the violations of capacity con-
straints α, explained in the following. The complete CP objective function is therefore
the following:
min
x

∑
f∈F,
r∈Rf ,
m∈Mf
GS
(m)
f,r · x(m)f,r +K1 · ||+K2 ·
∑
s∈S,h∈H
α(h)s +K3 ·
∑
a∈A,h∈H
(
α
(h)
a,dep + α
(h)
a,arr + α
(h)
a,gl
)

(3.8)
where K1, K2, K3 are the weights to be assigned to the respective objective components.
Revenue neutrality constraint: the CP should optimise the rates so that ANSPs are guar-
anteed to recover their operational costs for providing air navigation services to AUs,
as established by the cost recovery/determined costs system through which ANSPs are
funded (see Sec.1.1.2). Therefore, the rates chosen by the CP should be revenue-neutral,
meaning that they should not generate additional revenues. By definition, the currently
applied country-based unit rates represent the marginal cost for providing one ANS ser-
vice unit. As illustrated in Sec. 1.2.4, an ANS service unit is defined as the product of
a distance-related term (specifically, one hundredth of the Great Circle Distance between
entry and exit point in the national airspace) and an aircraft-weight-related term (namely,
the square root of one fiftieth of the maximum takeoff weight of the aircraft). The revenue
neutrality constraint therefore states that the revenues levied from the modulated route
charges should not differ (in absolute value) from the revenues that would be obtained
from the historical unit rates by more than a variable term , which is to be minimised in
the CP objective function through the K1 · || term.
∑
f∈F,
r∈Rf ,
m∈Mf
RC
(m)
f,r · x(m)f,r −
∑
n∈N,f∈F,
r∈Rf ,m∈Mf
s∈(Sn∩Sr)
Un ·Ds,r ·Wbf · x(m)f,r =  (3.9)
Sector and airport capacity constraints: under an effective peak load pricing policy, the
number of capacity breaches will be minimum. A breach occurs whenever the number
of aircraft entering a sector or an airport during a certain time period (e.g., one hour)
exceeds the declared capacity for that resource. Capacity constraints are therefore defined
by stating that the number or aircraft entering a resource during a certain hour minus
the declared capacity should not exceed a variable quantity α. These are defined for each
capacitated resource and every hour when the capacity constraint is applied. In the model,
they are represented by the following variables:
α
(h)
s = Number of flights exceeding capacity of sector s during hour h
α
(h)
a,dep = Number of flights exceeding departure capacity of airport a during hour h
α
(h)
a,arr = Number of flights exceeding arrival capacity of airport a during hour h
89
α
(h)
a,gl = Number of flights exceeding global (departure and arrival) capacity of airport a
during hour h
The value of α variables could either be forced to zero (hard capacity constraint) or
penalised in the objective (soft capacity constraint). While hard constraints would be a
better choice in terms of formulation and could be used for cutting planes generation, soft
capacity constraints are more realistic with regard to the application, and are therefore
preferred in this case. In fact they better represent actual ATC practice, where a mild
violation of nominal capacity is tolerated and handled by controllers. The formulation of
the capacity constraints is therefore the following:
∑
f∈F,r∈Rf ,h∈H,m∈Mf |m∈Th
x
(m)
f,r −Q(h)s ≤ α(h)s ∀s ∈ S, h ∈ H (3.10)∑
f∈F |adepf=a,r∈Rf ,
h∈H,m∈Mf |m∈Th,
x
(m)
f,r −Q(h)a,dep ≤ α(h)a,dep ∀a ∈ A, h ∈ H (3.11)
∑
f∈F |adesf=a,r∈Rf ,h∈H,
m∈Mf |(m+ea,r)∈Th;ea,r 6=0
x
(m)
f,r −Q(h)a,arr ≤ α(h)a,arr ∀a ∈ A, h ∈ H (3.12)
∑
f∈F |adepf=a∨adesf=a,r∈Rf ,
h∈H,m∈Mf |(m+ea,r)∈Th,
x
(m)
f,r −Q(h)a,gl ≤ α(h)a,gl ∀a ∈ A, h ∈ H (3.13)
α(h)s ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S, h ∈ H (3.14)
α
(h)
a,dep, α
(h)
a,arr, α
(h)
a,gl ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A, h ∈ H (3.15)
and their violation is penalised in the objective function by the following term:
K2 ·
∑
s∈S,h∈H α
(h)
s +K3 ·
∑
a∈A,h∈H
(
α
(h)
a,dep + α
(h)
a,arr + α
(h)
a,gl
)
3.2.4 Model formulation: Airspace Users’ (AUs) problem (lower level prob-
lem)
The decision process of the AU is modelled as an optimisation problem where each AU aims
at choosing the routes that minimise costs for each of its flights. AUs decision variables are
introduced in eq. 3.6.
Flight operational costs: the cost for operating a flight typically includes route and ter-
minal charges, aircraft fuel and maintenance costs, staff costs. Most airline operators
release an annual report with aggregated cost figures for each category (see for example
Ryanair 2015). Cook & Tanner (2015) identify and calculate the relevant cost coefficients
per minute for fifteen reference aircraft types (estimated to cover 90% of European air
traffic).The following coefficients are defined accordingly to the latter:
camb strategic cost of airborne maintenance for aircraft type b (e/min)
cgmb strategic cost of ground maintenance for aircraft type b (e/min)
cfb strategic cost of fleet utilisation for aircraft type b (e/min)
ccb strategic cost of crew utilisation for aircraft type b (e/min)
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afbb average fuel burn for aircraft type b (Kg/min)
fc fuel cost (e/Kg)
Airborne operations costs include aircraft maintenance, fleet and crew utilisation costs
plus fuel costs. These costs are accounted for the duration of a flight with the chosen
route. Ground operations costs include aircraft maintenance, fleet and crew utilisation
costs. These costs are accounted for every minute of strategic ground shift assigned to a
flight. Note that terminal charges are excluded from this calculation because demand (i.e.,
origin and destination airports) is assumed as fixed. Aggregated strategic cost coefficients
for airborne operations (cab) and ground operations (cgb) are defined as follows:
cab = camb + cfb + ccb + fc · afbb ∀b ∈ B (3.16)
cgb = cgmb + cfb + ccb ∀b ∈ B (3.17)
(3.18)
Operational costs for operating flight f using route r and departing at time m is therefore
given by the ground shift cost coefficient times the ground shift (i.e., minutes of later
departure), plus the airborne cost coefficient, times the route duration.
OC
(m)
f,r = cgb ·
(
GS
(m)
f,r − (eadesf ,r − minr′∈Rf eadesf ,r′)
)
+ cab · eadesf ,r ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf
(3.19)
AU Objective function: the total cost an airline has to endure for operating a flight f using
route r and departing at time m is the sum of operational costs and en-route charges.
Minimising total cost for operating flights is the objective function proper to each airspace
user.
min
x
TC
(m)
f,r · x(m)f,r
= (OC
(m)
f,r +RC
(m)
f,r ) · x(m)f,r
∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf (3.20)
Route uniqueness constraints: for every flight, exactly one route r and one departure time
m are to be chosen. ∑
r∈Rf ,m∈Mf
x
(m)
f,r = 1 ∀f ∈ F (3.21)
3.2.5 Model formulation: bilevel cPLP
The CP problem can be combined with the AU problem into a bilevel formulation represent-
ing a Stackelberg game between the two agents, with the CP acting as leader and the AUs as
followers. In such a configuration, the CP is able to anticipate the followers’ reaction (in terms
of route choice) to his/her pricing strategies and can therefore choose a set of rates that will
optimise his objective by anticipating the associated followers’ optimal route choice.
The formulation of the bilevel optimisation problem is the following:
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min
x

∑
f∈F,
r∈Rf ,
m∈Mf
GS
(m)
f,r · x(m)f,r +K1 · ||+K2 ·
∑
s∈S,h∈H
α(h)s +K3 ·
∑
a∈A,h∈H
(
α
(h)
a,dep + α
(h)
a,arr + α
(h)
a,gl
)

(3.22)
s.t.
∑
f∈F,
r∈Rf ,
m∈Mf
RC
(m)
f,r · x(m)f,r −
∑
n∈N,f∈F,
r∈Rf ,m∈Mf
s∈(Sn∩Sr)
Un ·Ds,r ·Wbf · x(m)f,r =  (3.23)
min
x
∑
f∈F,
r∈Rf ,
m∈Mf
(OC
(m)
f,r +RC
(m)
f,r ) · x(m)f,r (3.24)
∑
f∈F,r∈Rf ,h∈H,m∈Mf |m∈Th
x
(m)
f,r −Q(h)s ≤ α(h)s ∀s ∈ S, h ∈ H
(3.25)∑
f∈F |adepf=a,r∈Rf ,
h∈H,m∈Mf |m∈Th,
x
(m)
f,r −Q(h)a,dep ≤ α(h)a,dep ∀a ∈ A, h ∈ H
(3.26)∑
f∈F |adesf=a,r∈Rf ,h∈H,
m∈Mf |(m+ea,r)∈Th;ea,r 6=0
x
(m)
f,r −Q(h)a,arr ≤ α(h)a,arr ∀a ∈ A, h ∈ H
(3.27)∑
f∈F |adepf=a∨adesf=a,r∈Rf ,
h∈H,m∈Mf |(m+ea,r)∈Th,
x
(m)
f,r −Q(h)a,gl ≤ α(h)a,gl ∀a ∈ A, h ∈ H
(3.28)∑
r∈Rf ,m∈Mf
x
(m)
f,r = 1 ∀f ∈ F
(3.29)
x
(m)
f,r ∈ {0, 1}, RC(m)f,r ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf
(3.30)
α(h)s ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S, h ∈ H
(3.31)
α
(h)
a,dep, α
(h)
a,arr, α
(h)
a,gl ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A, h ∈ H
(3.32)
3.2.6 Linearisation of the bilevel problem
The bilevel cPLP, in the form illustrated in section 3.2.5 can be reformulated into a mixed-integer
problem in two steps: first by reformulating the bilevel problem into a single level problem, then
by substituting bilinear terms (i.e., products of two variables RC ·x) with continuous variables.
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From bilevel to single level cPLP
The second level objective (eq. 3.20) can be reformulated into a set of equivalent constraints.
In fact, since no flight can bear a negative cost, the function is separable with respect to flights,
being thus equivalent to:
min
x
∑
r∈Rf ,
m∈Mf
(
RC
(m)
f,r +OC
(m)
f,r
)
· x(m)f,r ∀f ∈ F (3.33)
The meaning of this objective is that for each flight the chosen route and departure time (i.e.,
x
(m)
f,r s.t. x
(m)
f,r = 1) must be the least costly one among all alternatives available for that flight.
This can be equivalently expressed through a set of constraints by introducing a continuous
variable cf that represents the minimum cost of flight f :
cf ≤
(
RC
(m)
f,r +OC
(m)
f,r
)
∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf (3.34)(
RC
(m)
f,r +OC
(m)
f,r
)
· x(m)f,r = cf ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf (3.35)
Route uniqueness constraints 3.21 impose that for each flight, only one x will be one while
the others will be zero. Therefore, eq. 3.34-3.35 are equivalent to:∑
o∈Rf ,
i∈Mf
(
RC
(i)
f,o +OC
(i)
f,o
)
· x(i)f,o ≤
(
RC
(m)
f,r +OC
(m)
f,r
)
∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf (3.36)
By replacing the AU’s objective function (eq.3.20) with equation 3.36 an equivalent single
level formulation is obtained for the cPLP model.
Linearisation of bilinear terms
The formulation obtained so far is still non linear because of the terms containing the product
of two variables (i.e., RC
(m)
f,r · x(m)f,r . However, since x(m)f,r variables are binary, it is possible to
linearise these terms through variable substitution. Let us introduce a new set of variables y
(m)
f,r ,
defined as follows:
y
(m)
f,r =
{
RC
(m)
f,r · x(m)f,r if x(m)f,r = 1
0 if x
(m)
f,r = 0
∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf
The y
(m)
f,r variables represent the route charges component for the chosen route assignment
and zero for all non-chosen alternatives. This is enforced by adding the following constraints to
the model:
y
(m)
f,r −RC(m)f,r ≤ 0 ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf (3.37)
RC
(m)
f,r − y(m)f,r −N (m)f,r · (1− x(m)f,r ) ≤ 0 ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf (3.38)
y
(m)
f,r −N (m)f,r · x(m)f,r ≤ 0 ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf (3.39)
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Eq. 3.37 imposes equality between y
(m)
f,r and RC
(m)
f,r when y
(m)
f,r is not zero; Eq. 3.38 binds
RC
(m)
f,r and y
(m)
f,r to be equal when x
(m)
f,r is 1; the third constraint (eq. 3.39) forces y
(m)
f,r to be
zero when x
(m)
f,r is zero.
N
(m)
f,r terms are Big-M values.
The resulting single level linear cPLP formulation is the following:
min
x

∑
f∈F,
r∈Rf ,
m∈Mf
GS
(m)
f,r · x(m)f,r +K1 · ||+K2 ·
∑
s∈S,h∈H
α(h)s +K3 ·
∑
a∈A,h∈H
(
α
(h)
a,dep + α
(h)
a,arr + α
(h)
a,gl
)

(3.40)
s.t.
∑
f∈F,
r∈Rf ,
m∈Mf
y
(m)
f,r −
∑
n∈N,f∈F,
r∈Rf ,m∈Mf
s∈(Sn∩Sr)
Un ·Ds,r ·Wbf · x(m)f,r =  (3.41)
∑
o∈Rf ,
i∈Mf
(
y
(i)
f,o +OC
(i)
f,o · x(i)f,o
)
≤ RC(m)f,r +OC(m)f,r ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf (3.42)
y
(m)
f,r −RC(m)f,r ≤ 0 ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf (3.43)
RC
(m)
f,r − y(m)f,r −N (m)f,r · (1− x(m)f,r ) ≤ 0 ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf (3.44)
y
(m)
f,r −N (m)f,r · x(m)f,r ≤ 0 ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf (3.45)∑
f∈F,r∈Rf ,h∈H,m∈Mf |m∈Th
x
(m)
f,r −Q(h)s ≤ α(h)s ∀s ∈ S, h ∈ H (3.46)∑
f∈F |adepf=a,r∈Rf ,
h∈H,m∈Mf |m∈Th,
x
(m)
f,r −Q(h)a,dep ≤ α(h)a,dep ∀a ∈ A, h ∈ H (3.47)
∑
f∈F |adesf=a,r∈Rf ,h∈H,
m∈Mf |(m+ea,r)∈Th;ea,r 6=0
x
(m)
f,r −Q(h)a,arr ≤ α(h)a,arr ∀a ∈ A, h ∈ H (3.48)
∑
f∈F |adepf=a∨adesf=a,r∈Rf ,
h∈H,m∈Mf |(m+ea,r)∈Th,
x
(m)
f,r −Q(h)a,gl ≤ α(h)a,gl ∀a ∈ A, h ∈ H (3.49)
∑
r∈Rf ,m∈Mf
x
(m)
f,r = 1 ∀f ∈ F (3.50)
x
(m)
f,r ∈ {0, 1}, RC(m)f,r ≥ 0, y(m)f,r ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈M (3.51)
α(h)s ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S, h ∈ H (3.52)
α
(h)
a,dep, α
(h)
a,arr, α
(h)
a,gl ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A, h ∈ H (3.53)
3.2.7 Pricing schemes for cPLP
According to the way the en-route charges variables RC
(m)
f,r are defined, different pricing schemes
can be derived. This section illustrates some relevant examples.
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Trajectory-based pricing
In a trajectory-based pricing scheme rates are set on a 4-dimensional route basis, meaning that
a price is assigned to the entire route and the modulation depends on the time chosen for
departure.
In terms of modelling, each RC
(m)
f,r variable is independent of the others and therefore no
further constraint is added to the model.
Segment-based pricing
In a segment-based pricing scheme different rates are set for each airspace sector. En-route
charges for a route are therefore calculated as the sum of the charges associated with the seg-
ment flown in each airspace sector of that route. Modulation depends on the entry time in each
sector, thus, indirectly, on the time chosen for departure.
Let us therefore introduce the P
(h)
s rates as the unit rates applied on sector s during hour h.
Resulting en-route charges for a flight f flying on route r and departing at time m are defined
as follows:
RC
(m)
f,r =
∑
s∈Sr
P
(h|(m+es,r)∈Th)
s ·Ds,r ·Wbf (3.54)
ANSP-based peak load pricing
In an ANSP-based pricing scheme, rates are applied at ANSP level, meaning that all sectors
included in the airspace of a certain ANSP share the same rates. En-route charges modulation
is accomplished by imposing a higher rate when and where traffic peaks are expected (peak rate)
and a lower rate for less trafficked periods and areas (off peak rate). A couple of peak and off
peak rates is therefore defined for each ANSP and their values are assigned to each sector/hour
pair, as follows:
P (h)s =
{
Ppn if h is peak time for sector s
Pon otherwise
∀n ∈ N, s ∈ Snn, h ∈ H (3.55)
Where Ppn and Pon represent, respectively, the peak and off-peak rate for ANSP n. Result-
ing en-route charges for a flight f flying on route r and departing at time m are calculated as
in the general segment-based pricing scheme (eq. 3.54).
A variant of the ANSP based peak load pricing scheme is obtained if the peak and off-peak
rates are parametrised, meaning that one is defined proportionally to the other. In this case
the parametrised set of tariffs is defined as follows:
P (h)s =
{
Pon if h is off-peak time for sector s
δ · Pon if h is peak time for sector s
∀n ∈ N, s ∈ Snn, h ∈ H, δ ≥ 1 (3.56)
where δ is a term greater than 1 denoting the proportionality ratio between the peak and
off-peak rates. Note that in this case either Pon or δ can be decision variables of the problem.
ANSP-based peak load pricing schemes have the desirable feature of being simple and transpar-
ent, being the most similar to the schemes already applied successfully in several other industries
(as illustrated in Chapter 2). Therefore only this type of scheme will be further analysed in the
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remainder of the work, in two variants: a two-modulated-rates per ANSP scheme, referred to as
cPLP-two, obtained by adding eq. 3.54 and 3.55 to the model, and a one-rate per ANSP scheme
referred to as cPLP-one, obtained by adding eq. 3.54 and 3.56 to the model, with variable δ
and a constant value of Pon set equal to the historical unit rate Un.
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Chapter 4
Air traffic data management
Real data availability is a well known issue for research on European aviation. Differently,
for example, from the United States case, where statistics and data sets on airport schedules,
routing, flight delays are freely available for research purposes from the Department of Trans-
port’s and from the Federal Aviation Administration’s websites, no such service is provided
in Europe. Therefore, accordingly to the nature and the specificities of the research carried
on, ad-hoc agreements have to be made with Eurocontrol, ANSPs, airlines or other authorities
to obtain the needed data. Further complications then arise from the technical difficulties in
cleaning and harmonising data obtained from different sources.
Due to these difficulties, scientific literature on European Air Traffic Flow Management, Airport
scheduling and slot assignment often relies on randomly, self-generated data, which unavoid-
ably biases the plausibility of the results obtained with regard to actual implementability of the
proposed solutions.
The present chapter illustrates the process through which the data files used as testing instances
for the pricing models introduced in Chapter 3 (and used throughout the SATURN project)
were built, from real traffic data sets licensed by the Network Manager. The data sources used
are presented in Section 4.1, while Section 4.2 illustrates the cleaning, filtering and harmonising
processes carried out to obtain data files that formalise actual airspace configuration, traffic
and route structure being at the same time computationally viable and adherent to reality. The
support tool built within this process is a relational database with geographic capabilities. The
general structure of this tool is illustrated in Section 4.4, while a detailed documentation of the
database structure and use-case examples are provided in Appendices A and B respectively.
4.1 Data sources
Traffic, network and airspace structure data are obtained from several repositories owned by
Eurocontrol. The different sources and tools used are briefly described in the following.
4.1.1 Eurocontrol Demand Data Repository (DDR2) data sets
As stated in the Network Operations Plan (Eurocontrol 2014d), the Demand Data Repository,
phase 2 (DDR2) was initially created in response to planners who needed access to an integrated
pan-European strategic view of traffic demand and distribution. Access to DDR2 is therefore
restricted to ANSPs and Airline Operators within Europe. The DDR2 provides, through a web
application, an interface that allows generation and download of future traffic forecasts (for
planning purposes) and past traffic (for post-operations analysis of traffic trends and statistics)
data sets. Past traffic demand data is available for any day, for all Europe, from January 2006
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and grouped chronologically according to the Aeronautical Information Regulation And Control
(AIRAC) cycle of reference. AIRAC cycles (as set by ICAO) have 28 days, the starting date
of a cycle is therefore always on a Thursday (e.g. 4th August 2005, 1st September 2005 etc.).
Approximately one week after the end of each AIRAC cycle, once all data has been finalised,
the data files for the 28 days are generated and then published on the DDR2 website.
Figure 4.1 describes the AIRAC data file preparation process.
Figure 4.1: DDR data sources. (source: Eurocontrol)
The data format and conventions used throughout the over 40 file types available through
DDR2 website is briefly described in the DDR2 Reference Manual (for the latest updated
version, see Eurocontrol 2014c).
4.1.2 Eurocontrol NEtwork Strategic Tool (NEST) software
NEST is an airspace design and capacity planning tool that can be used by the Network Manager
and national ANSPs for airspace structure design and development, capacity planning and post
operations analysis, strategic traffic flow organisation, scenario preparation for simulations and
studies at local or network level (Eurocontrol 2014d). The main functionalities of the software
include the following:
• 3-dimensional visualisation of traffic demand and airspace;
• Evaluation of traffic loads;
• Identification of capacity bottlenecks;
• Simulation of future traffic demand;
• Simulation of different routing options;
• Simulation of delays, including network effects;
• Optimisation of configurations and opening scheme;
• Editing of airspace and route network, including free route airspace;
• Evaluation of flight efficiency indicators.
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NEST compatible data are compressed archives with a .nest extension that include airspace/net-
work and traffic data and are available at the end of each AIRAC cycle through the DDR2 data
repository web interface. The 28 days of data stored in an AIRAC data file can contain either
official data validated by Eurocontrol or custom data from an alternative source (Figure 4.2
illustrates the data sources used for .nest archives). It is possible to export data from .nest
archives to other file formats (namely, formatted text files and Microsoft EXCEL spreadsheets)
which offers some degree of compatibility with other software.
Figure 4.2: NEST data sources. (source: Eurocontrol)
In particular, NEST datasets comprise:
1. Airspace data: files containing 2-dimensional coordinates and the corresponding alti-
tudes (expressed as upper and lower Flight Levels) of airblocks, definitions of how ele-
mentary sectors are built from airblocks and how elementary sectors can be collapsed.
Airport, sector and traffic flows capacity figures are also provided. Further data provides
the description of bigger airspace volumes (e.g., ACCs) together with the different sector
configurations used by ACCs, and the start and end time when these configurations are
activated.
2. Network data: files related to the structure of the network, like waypoints and airports
coordinates, route segments, rule files (e.g., for SIDs and STARs), Flight Level constraints.
3. Traffic data: files normally provided by the Network Manager and referred to the fol-
lowing three phases of flight operations:
Initial (M1): the last filed flight plan from the airline;
Regulated (M2): same as the last filed flight plan for non-delayed flights and with a
constant time offset added to the ATFM delayed flights. These offsets correspond to
the CASA-calculated ATFM delay;
Actual (M3): corresponds to the last filed flight plan data updated with available radar
information whenever a flight deviates from its filed flight plan by more than any of
the pre-determined thresholds of five minutes, seven flight levels or 20 NM at any
point from the planned trajectory. This represents the closest estimate available in
NEST data files of the flight trajectories actually handled by ATC controllers on the
day of operations.
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The Extended IFPZ Area is the geographical area used by NEST to define a daily flight
list. This area is based on the operational ECAC Area for which the Network Manager receives
data, but is extended to include additional areas in order to ensure stability of data. The
extended area includes, but are not limited to, Tunisia, Senegal, Egypt, Libya, Israel, Iran,
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, as well as parts of Iceland and from the UK border to Africa and
Cape Verde (Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3: Left: IFPZ Area (left) and ECAC Area (right) (source: NEST)
4.1.3 European airline delay cost reference values report (Cook & Tanner
2015)
This report is designed as a reference document for European delay costs incurred by airlines;
the cost of delay is calculated separately for strategic delays (those accounted for in advance)
and tactical delays (those incurred on the day of operations and not accounted for in advance).
Costs are assigned under three cost scenarios: low, base and high. These scenarios are de-
signed to cover the likely range of costs for European operators. The base cost scenario is, to
the greatest extent possible, designed to reflect the typical case. All calculations are undertaken
for fifteen reference aircraft (that together make up for more than 90% of European air traffic):
B733, B734, B735, B738, B752, A319, A320, A321, A332, AT43, AT72, B744, B763, DH8D and
E190.
The following cost components are considered:
• Fuel: the cost of fuel burned per minute (only for off-gate phases);
• Maintenance: relates to factors such as the mechanical attrition of aircraft waiting at
gates (strategically or tactically) or aircraft accepting longer re-routes in order to obtain
a better departure slot (tactically). Both strategic and tactical at-gate costs are relatively
low (compared to the other phases) because relatively little wear and tear on the airframe
is experienced at-gate and the engines are off for the vast majority of this time.
• Fleet: refers to the full cost of fleet financing, such as depreciation, rentals and leases of
flight equipment. These costs are determined by service hours. Since utilisation has only
a very small effect on these costs, they are wholly allocated to the strategic phase and the
corresponding tactical delay costs are thus taken to be zero.
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• Crew: typical pilot and flight attendant salaries were calculated in 2008 for various Euro-
pean airlines, using their corresponding payment schemes with realistic annual block/flight
duty hours, sectors flown and overnight stopovers. To update the 2008 costs to 2010 val-
ues, pay deals since 2008 for ten European airlines are considered. Pilots salaries generally
increase by size of aircraft. Flight attendants salaries are more consistent across all aircraft
types. Tactically, in certain cases, delays may not generate additional crew costs, and the
low cost scenario is set at zero cost. The high cost scenario is based on overtime rates.
The base cost scenario is based on typical time-based costs. The crew costs commonly
apply to ground and airborne phases.
• Passengers only the costs that impact on airlines business are included in the report.
Hard costs are due to such factors as passenger rebooking, compensation and care. Soft
costs represent revenue losses for the airline and manifest themselves in several ways,
which are generally hard to quantify. For example, due to a delay on one occasion, a
passenger may defect from an unpunctual airline as a result of dissatisfaction (and maybe
later come back). A passenger with a flexible ticket may arrive at an airport and decide to
take a competitors on-time flight instead of a delayed flight, on which they were originally
booked.
The report presents costs of delay by four flight phases (as illustrated by Figure 4.4): at-
gate, taxi, cruise extension and arrival management (tactical only). Block hours are defined as
the time spent off- blocks (aircraft utilisation). Service hours are defined as the total time spent
in service during the operational day.
Figure 4.4: Flight phases and basic definitions (source: Cook 2007)
Figure 4.5 shows which cost types are assessed at each level. Strategic costs and tactical
costs are not independent: reactionary delays depend on the airlines ability to recover from the
delay, due to the amount of schedule buffer, for example. If no buffers were used, the reactionary
costs would increase markedly and the tactical costs would be significantly higher.
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Figure 4.5: Cost types assessed at each level (source: Cook 2007)
4.1.4 Eurocontrol Base of Aircraft DAta (BADA) data repository
The Base of Aircraft Data (BADA) provides a set of ASCII files containing performance and
operating procedure coefficients for 338 different aircraft types. For 117 of these aircraft types,
data is provided directly in files. For the other 221 aircraft types, the data is specified to be
the same as one of the directly supported 117 aircraft types: in this case they are declared
as equivalent to one of the other 117 aircraft model. The coefficients include those used to
calculate thrust, drag and fuel flow and those used to specify nominal cruise, climb and descent
speeds (although, for the purpose of the present thesis, only basic technical data about aircraft,
like maximum takeoff weight and aircraft category, was sourced from BADA). The BADA User
Manual (the latest version available from Eurocontrol’s website is Eurocontrol 2011) describes in
detail how each coefficient is calculated. Access to BADA is given through a license agreement
to Air Navigation Service Providers, research and development organisations, universities and
commercial entities working on Air Traffic Management related projects.
4.1.5 Eurocontrol ATM Cost-Effectiveness (ACE) 2013 Benchmarking Re-
port with 2014-2018 outlook (Eurocontrol 2015a)
This report (updated annually) presents a review and comparison of ATM cost-effectiveness for
37 Air ANSPs in Europe. The benchmarking work is carried out by Eurocontrol’s Performance
Review Commission supported by the Performance Review Unit and is based on information
provided by ANSPs themselves.
ACE 2013 presents information on performance indicators relating to cost-effectiveness and
productivity for the year 2013, and how they changed over time (over the 2009-2013 time
arc). It examines both individual ANSPs and the Pan-European ATM system as a whole.
In addition, it analyses forward-looking information covering the 2014-2018 period based on
information provided by ANSPs in November 2014.
The ACE reports ANSP’s costs figures from ANS provision, which were used to validate the
results obtained from the pricing models developed within the SATURN project. The ACE
report is freely available from Eurocontrol’s website.
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4.1.6 Eurocontrol Slot Coordinator tool
The Slot Coordinator tool is a web-based interface that offers different post-analysis table views
of traffic at slot coordinated airports: flight plans without slot detail, slots without flight plan
detail, slot adherence, aircraft type discrepancy, flight detail list, slot detail list, airport slot
granularity, and airport slot distribution. Two tables are of interest to the current study:
1. Flight detail list table: flights can be filtered according to the set of airports, and the
set of aircraft operators and the specific time frame of interest. The data fields provided
include origin and destination airports, aircraft type and tail number, slot time (slot
assigned to the aircraft operator for that flight, either during the primary slot allocation
process, or in the ad-hoc procedure from the pool of unassigned slots), requested slot time
(slot aircraft operator requested for that flight, either before the primary slot allocation,
or in the ad-hoc procedure), the type of service (e.g., scheduled, non-scheduled, etc.)
2. Airport slot distribution table: this table gives an overview of the arrival and de-
parture slots. For each time interval or slot width, for which the slot coordinator assigns
the slots, the table lists how many arrival (or departure) slots are assigned to each airline
operating to/from that airport. The table gives both the exact slot time assigned and
the slot starting and ending points, as they are not always the same. For example, the
slot width can be 10 minutes. An airline can get a slot at minute 1, that is to say at the
beginning of the slot width, or at minute 5 (in the middle of slot width interval). Different
coordinators use different slot widths, as well as the method for slot assignment (i.e., at
the beginning, or in the middle of slot, or a combination). The slot width is most often
5-10 minutes long, but can be 20 minutes, or even 60 minutes in extreme cases. The slot
width can be assigned to one or more airlines, and can be for different types of operations
(arrival and/or departure).
The Slot Coordinator tool is licensed and accessed under similar terms to the DDR2 data
sets.
4.2 Data selection
This section illustrates how the data about airspace structure, traffic and cost was encoded into
the data instances used for the computational tests of the models described in Chapter 3. For
the vast majority of the tests, September 12, 2014 was chosen as reference day for building the
data instances, being a highly trafficked day (33 810 flights, the fourth most trafficked day of
the year) with no major disruption that affected ATC capacity (i.e., weather, strikes etc). The
original data files, as provided by the Network Manager, were highly heterogeneous in terms of
format, both regarding file structure and data itself (e.g., different coordinates system, different
formats used for dates and time etc.). Some initial effort was therefore put in data harmonisation
and cleaning, since some incoherences were also found in the reported flight trajectories and
trajectory/sectors intersection files (although this appears to be a known issue within these
data sets, see for example Zanin et al. (2014)). Cleaning of traffic data was therefore performed
to filter out all flights that were beyond the scope of the SATURN project (i.e., non-scheduled
IFR, flights, circular flights etc.).
Finally, due to the complexity of the system and modelling requirements it was necessary to
introduce some degree of simplification and to perform data clustering operations (described in
the following Section 4.14).
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4.2.1 Airspace structure data
Sectors
In order to obtain a representation of airspace as realistic as possible, several aspects had to be
taken into consideration:
Sector configurations and openings The configuration of open sectors for each Area Con-
trol Centre can change multiple times per day. Two options were tested with regard to
this: first, a configuration where the maximum available capacity is considered. This can
be justified by the fact that no decision on sectorisation is taken strategically; therefore it
makes sense to consider the maximum capacity that the network is able to sustain. Such
a scenario can be approximated with the configuration that is active at the most trafficked
hour of a day (the 7:00-8:00 AM period is typically a good choice in this regard). The
second option is to define, for each time period (i.e., one hour) the set of sectors that were
actually active at that time. This can be justified by the fact that a realistic airspace con-
figuration is more likely subject to congestion-related issues and therefore is better suited
for testing models that aim at effective traffic redistribution (for these reason this option
was preferred over the less realistic “maximum capacity” to test the pricing models).
Sector capacity Sector capacity is considered with a granularity of one hour, meaning that
some approximations were made for capacities that were defined for an inferior period of
time or whose capacity figure changed during the hour. In these specific cases, a weighted
average was calculated and the resulting figure was applied as maximum capacity for that
hour. For example, a sector active from 8:30 (and previously inactive) on with a declared
capacity of 30 entries per hour would be assigned a capacity of 15 for the 8:00-9:00 period.
Similarly, a sector whose capacity changed from a figure of 20 until 8:30 to 30 from 8:31
on, will be assigned a capacity equal to 25. All sectors that did not have a capacity figure
specified when active were assigned a 999 figure (corresponding, in practice, to an infinite
hourly capacity).
Traffic volumes (TVs) and TV capacities Traffic volumes extend the definition of airspace
sector by means of rules for the exclusion or inclusion of traffic flows. This allows for a
finer-grained and more detailed definition of airspace capacity (e.g., “the maximum num-
ber of flights coming from waypoint W that can enter sector S during hour H is equal to
N.”). In order to keep the set of capacity constraints as compact as possible, instead of
adding new ones for TVs, it was preferred to incorporate TV capacity into sector capacity
constraints, in the following way:
Sectors marked as active with no TV associated: nominal hourly capacity of the
sector is taken;
Sectors with an associated TV with no inclusion/exclusion rules: either nominal
sector or TV capacity is taken, depending on which one is marked as active in the
data;
Sectors with one or more associated TV with inclusion/exclusion rules: either
nominal sector or TV capacity is taken, depending on which one is marked as active
in the data.
Often, only a subset of the flights entering the specified sector is counted by the TV.
For many TVs, applying the TV capacity to constrain the number of total entries in
a sector is not possible because the two sets may largely differ. An example is shown
in Figure 4.6. TV EHTRANS regulates sector EHAACOD, but traffic coming from
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Shanwick oceanic region sectors
EGATLANT EGGXDUIVEL EGGXL60 EGGXM59 EGGXSECORN EGGXUBEGAS
EGBRAND EGGXFIR EGGXLFRR EGGXM60 EGGXU45 EGGXUPOR
EGGX45N EGGXL45 EGGXLPOR EGGXMBEGAS EGGXU55 EGOCEAN
EGGX45N30W EGGXL55 EGGXM45 EGGXMPOR EGGXU56 EGSOYUZ
EGGXALL EGGXL56 EGGXM55 EGGXOCA340 EGGXU57 EGTRAGNY
EGGXBEGAS EGGXL57 EGGXM56 EGGXPOR EGGXU58
EGGXBUF EGGXL58 EGGXM57 EGGXSCO EGGXU59
EGGXCCC EGGXL59 EGGXM58 EGGXSE4945 EGGXU60
Table 4.1: Sectors and traffic volumes belonging to the Shanwick oceanic region
or going to the Netherlands is not included in the TV count. TV capacity is never
exceeded by the traffic in EHAACOD that satisfies the exclusion rule. Without con-
sidering the exclusion rule, the TV capacity would be violated from 03:00 to 21:59.
A total of 51 flights that satisfy the rules enter the TV during the whole day, while
985 flights enter the sector attached to this TV.
Therefore, to obtain a realistic capacity figure for sectors where TV with inclusion/ex-
clusion rules are active, the sector entry count from actual flown data (i.e., M3, radar
data) is compared with the capacity of the TV, to determine the total number of
flights exceeding TV capacity in each hour. The average hourly capacity exceedance
is then summed to the nominal TV capacity, to obtain the adjusted TV capacity to
be used in models.
Figure 4.6: Comparison of traffic volume count and sector entry count (source: NEST)
Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs)
In order to calculate en-route charges correctly, each sector must be associated to the correct
ANSP. The European airspace we consider comprises 41 states, which are memebers of Euro-
control’s CRCO system plus Estonia and Ukraine, for geographic reasons. Normally, the first
two letters of a sector name identify the state to which that sector belongs; there are however
a few exceptions, that have to be considered on a case-by-case basis and hard-coded in the
instance generation process. These are the following:
Shanwick Oceanic region: Shanwick area is an oceanic region comprising a total of 45 sectors
(listed in Table 4.1) whose control is delegated to UK and Ireland by ICAO. This area
is subject to a different charging system than the usual applied to all other Eurocontrol
areas. Specifically, flights are subject to a single rate for entering the region instead of a
distance-proportional charge.
Santa Maria oceanic region: Santa Maria is an oceanic region belonging to the Eurocontrol
area whose control is delegated to Portugal. Sectors belonging to this region normally
have names starting with “AZ”, which identifies the Azores ACC, which has a unit rate
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different from the one applied to Portuguese airspace (names starting with “LP”). There
are however two sectors belonging to the Santa Maria region whose names start with
“LP” (LPPOALL and LPPOFIR) that need to be identified in order to assign them to
the correct charging region.
Figure 4.7: Shanwick (green) and Santa Maria (blue) oceanic regions (source: NEST)
Gran Canaria ACC: the Canary Island region is controlled by Enaire, the Spanish ANSP,
but has a different unit rate from the one applied to continental Spain. When evaluating
ANSP revenue from en-route charges then, both charges levied from Spanish airspace
(sector names starting with “LE”) and from the Gran Canaria ACC (sector names starting
with “GC”) should be considered for Enaire.
Bosnian airspace: between November 2014 and November 2015, the ANSP from Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bhansa, is progressively taking over control over its national airspace (sector
names starting with “LQ”). Due to delays in establishing a proper system of air traffic
control in Bosnia, control was previously delegated to the Serbian and Croatian ANSPs,
with quotas of 55% of upper airspace and 45% of upper plus 100% of lower respectively
(Barta & Kazda 2014). Since it was not possible to retrieve exact information on which
sectors were controlled by which of the two ANSPs, this issue was discarded and in the
process of data instances generation it is assumed that Bhansa controls the entire set of
sectors that constitute Bosnian airspace.
Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre (MUAC): Eurocontrol’s Maastricht Upper Area
Control Centre (MUAC), located at Maastricht Aachen Airport, provides air traffic control
for traffic above 24,500 ft over Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and north-west
Germany. This area covers the Brussels UIR, the Hannover UIR and the Amsterdam
FIR. The lower airspace (from level 0 to 24,500 feet) over this area is managed by Belgo-
control, Deutsche Flugsicherung and Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland respectively. Sectors
controlled by MUAC have names that start with “EDYY”.
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Airports and airport capacities
Although this study focuses on en-route capacity management, ignoring airports and associated
capacity constraints altogether would lead to completely unrealistic results. Therefore it was
preferred to keep allowed departure and arrival times fixed within the assigned slots whenever
possible, and to include airport capacity constraints in the pricing models.
Airports can have associated traffic volumes, just as sectors, but differently from these latter,
they can have up to three distinct constraints on hourly capacity, namely for departure, arrival
and global movements (departures plus arrivals).
From an analysis of actual traffic it emerged that for some airports the capacity figures specified
in the data are systematically broken. Moreover, it turned out that these capacity constraints
could never be satisfied by actual traffic figures, even imposing very high values for strategic
shift.
Table 4.2 lists the airports where this discrepancy between capacity data and actual traffic
occurs: the capacity figures reported by the NEST software are compared with the maximum
movement counts in radar data. (Movement counts are taken for September 12th, 2014). Lon-
don Gatwick (EGKK) has a departure count that is constantly above capacity. Nice Cote DAzur
(LFMN) has a total capacity that is even lower than departure and arrival capacity at peak
hours, and therefore it appears an incorrect value that is largely exceeded. Dusseldorf (EDDL)
has a similar issue with total capacity, which is equal to arrival capacity. At Istanbul Ataturk
(LTBA) total, departure, and arrival capacity is constantly exceeded over the day. Finally, at
Bergamo Orio al Serio (LIME) departure capacity can be largely exceeded by performed depar-
tures (8 vs 18).
Airport Total capacity Departure capacity Arrival capacity
NEST Max count NEST Max count NEST Max count
EGKK 999 56 24 36 30 30
LFMN 22 44 14-27 20 28 24
EDDL 33 52 999 32 33 33
LTBA 58 70 29 38 29 38
LIME 24 24 8 18 16 12
Table 4.2: Declared capacities and maximum hourly movement counts on 12 September 2014
It was therefore necessary to adjust the capacity figures from the data for these airports. The
following rationales were applied: since London Gatwick (EGKK), Nice Cote dAzur (LFMN),
and Dusseldorf (EDDL) are coordinated airports, meaning that they have airport slots assigned,
capacity information was corrected with slot figures. Since London Gatwick (EGKK) has a dif-
ferent number of allowed arrivals/departures for each hour, we used maximum values for sum-
mer 2014. Istanbul Ataturk (LTBA) and Bergamo Orio al Serio (LIME) are non-coordinated
airports, therefore needing alternative solutions. For Istanbul Ataturk (LTBA), since the max-
imum number of actual departures is 70, this value is set as total capacity. Departure and
arrival capacities are then set to half this value to equally distribute them. For Bergamo Orio al
Serio (LIME), since no limit seems to be applied on departure capacity in reality, the departure
capacity constraint was simply removed. Table 4.3 summarises these corrections.
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Airport Total capacity Departure capacity Arrival capacity
EGKK 55 35 35
LFMN 40 24 20
EDDL 47 36 33
LTBA 70 35 35
LIME 24 999 16
Table 4.3: Corrected capacities applied
4.2.2 Traffic data
Airlines and airline categories
Matching each flight to the corresponding airline and therefore airline type allows to associate
different cost profiles to different flights. This allows to make more realistic assumptions regard-
ing flight costs (e.g., it is reasonable to assume that operational costs for a flight operated by
a full service carrier airline are different from those endured by a low cost carrier) and also to
differentiate the traffic in terms of costs, otherwise, if estimated operational costs are the same
for all flights, it is like assuming that all traffic is operated by one single airline.
It is not always clear in the DDR2 dataset as to which airline is operating the flight. Traffic
(EXP2) files contain multiple data fields with airline information (although not all are popu-
lated): the callsign, the company, the operating company and the aircraft registration number
for which the operator can be checked (although there are potential further complications when
codeshare flights are considered).
The University of Westminster, within the project SATURN, developed in-house algorithms
to assign airlines to flights, with Table 4.4 providing a range of examples. Many cases are
straightforward, such as the first example, where field contents concur. In cases where the
operating airline is known (examples two and three), often the operating airline is a subsidiary
whereas the callsign airline is a more useful indicator. Similarly, the operating airline may be
operating via a wet lease contract (ACMI), hence the callsign airline is more appropriate (ex-
ample four). Clarifying the airline also helps to determine flights for exclusion, such as military
and cargo operators. The fifth example shows a typical passenger aircraft (B752) that is in fact
operating a military flight.
Callsign Registr. Aircraft
type
Callsign
(first 3
chr.)
Company Operat.
com-
pany
Assigned
airline
Comments
BAW58L GCIVC B744 BAW BAW BAW BAW All fields show British Airways (BAW)
AUA26 OELPD B772 AUA AUA TYR AUA Marketed as Austrian Airlines (AUA),
operated by Tyrolean Airways/Aus-
trian Arrows (TYR, a subsidiary)
AF303RV missing CRJX AF3 AFR BZH AFR Marketed as Air France (AFR), oper-
ated by Brit Air/HOP! (BZH, a sub-
sidiary)
BER334U DANFE AT72 BER BER ATV BER Marketed as Air Berlin (BER), oper-
ated by Avanti Air (ATV, an ACMI
airline)
SAM106 980001 B752 SAM missing DOD DOD USAF Air Mobility Operations (DOD)
Table 4.4: Assigning airline name to flights
Each airline is assigned one of four categories that broadly describe their primary type of
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operation: full-service, regional, low-cost carrier (LCC) or charter (seeTable 4.5). Airlines pro-
viding services covering more than one category (e.g. charter airlines offering full scheduled
services; regional services provided by full-service carriers) are assigned the most appropriate
type. All remaining uncategorised airlines are assigned to the regional category since this has a
fairly cost-neutral effect on the model. Other non-commercial IFR passenger operators such as
all-cargo, military transport and private/business aviation are flagged for exclusion, being out
of scope for strategic traffic management (as discussed in more detail in the following section
about flight filtering).
Airline type Description
CHT Charter
FSC Full-service
LCC Low-cost carrier
REG Regional and all remaining uncategorised
operators
XXX Non-passenger operator, including
all-cargo, military transport and pri-
vate/business aviation (flagged for
exclusion)
Table 4.5: Assigning airline type to flights
Flights filtering
The DDR2 traffic dataset includes all IFR flights, however not all were in scope for the project,
and were therefore excluded from the data files. Exclusions are based on the following criteria
(note that some flights may be excluded for multiple reasons):
• Operator types: all-cargo, military, etc. (e.g. AirBridge Cargo, German Air Force) and
unknown operators (i.e. coded ZZZ);
• Aircraft types: all-cargo, military, helicopter, etc. (e.g. A124, C130, EC45) aircraft;
• Individual airframes: all-cargo, military, etc. identified by their registration numbers (e.g.
HSHRH a Royal Thai Air Force B734, FGIUC an Air France B744 freighter);
• Circular flights: departure airport (ADEP) is the same as destination airport (ADES);
• Unknown airports: either airport (ADEP or ADES) is coded as ZZZZ (i.e. includes Air
Filed Flight Plans).
This filtering resulted in 29 539 flights (out of the total 33 810) for the reference day chosen,
12 September 2014. 28 355 of these were passenger flights that were also assigned fine-tuned cost
profiles by the University of Westminster within the scope of project SATURN. Cost profiles
were assigned as illustrated in Table 4.6.
The 14 ECAC airports (plus the two non-ECAC Moscow airports) listed in Table 4.7, which
had over 25 million passengers in 2014, were considered as “hub” airports.
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Airline type Cost scenario Flights
Charter base 1806
Charter to hub base 356
Full Service Carrier base 8904
Full Service Carrier to hub high 5063
Low Cost Carrier low 7080
Low Cost Carrier to hub low 1584
Regional Carrier base 3061
Regional Carrier to hub high 501
Table 4.6: Cost profile assignment to passenger IFR flights on Sep 12, 2014
ICAO Code Airport Name
EGLL London/Heathrow
LFPG Paris Charles De Gaulle
EDDF Frankfurt Main
LTBA Istanbul-Atatu¨rk
EHAM Amsterdam/Schiphol
LEMD Madrid Barajas
EDDM Mu¨nchen
LIRF Roma/Fiumicino
EGKK London/Gatwick
LEBL Barcelona
LFPO Paris Orly
LTAI Antalya
EKCH Copenhagen Kastrup
LSZH Zu¨rich
Table 4.7: Hub airports
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4.3 Data clustering
The present section illustrates the clustering operations carried out on some classes of data
to make them suitable to the modelling requirements. Specifically, clustering was operated
on the aircraft model used to perform the flights and on 4-dimensional trajectories. The first
operation was necessary for estimating flight operational costs (since reference values were
available only for the 15 reference aircraft from the Cook & Tanner (2015) study, see Sec.
4.3.3). Route clustering was necessary to narrow the number of options available for each
origin/destination pair down to a reduced number of routing alternatives which significantly
differ one from another.
4.3.1 Aircraft clustering
The purpose of aircraft clustering is to ease the assessment of operational strategic costs for
each flight by associating each aircraft found in traffic files to the estimated costs for the fifteen
most-used aircraft from the Cook & Tanner (2015) report. The report states that the square
root of the maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) of the aircraft can be taken as a sound proxy for
two aircraft having similar size and operational costs.
All aircraft used in traffic data from the reference period are therefore grouped into fifteen
clusters that use the aircraft types from Cook & Tanner (2015) as centroids. Since the number of
clusters to expect is known a priori, the K-means algorithm is the preferred clustering algorithm,
with the square root of aircraft MTOW as clustering criterion.
The K-means algorithm works as follows. Suppose to have n sample vectors x1, x2, . . . , xn that
should be grouped into k clusters (with k given, k ≤ n). Let µi be the mean of cluster i. Then,
xj belongs to cluster i if the squared distance ||xj − µi||2 is the minimum over all i. In other
words, the objective of K-means is to minimise the distances between vectors xj and cluster
centroids µi:
min
n∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
||xj − µi||2 (4.1)
Basic algorithm steps are described in the following and illustrated in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: K-means algorithm steps. Source: Wikipedia
Table 4.8 exemplifies some cluster affiliation resulting from the application of the K-means
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algorithm to the square root of aircraft MTOW keeping the fifteen reference aircraft as cluster
centroids.
Reference Aircraft
(ICAO designator)
Reference MTOW
(source: NEST)
Other aircraft in the same cluster
ICAO designator (MTOW)
A319 68.98 B737 (67.88)
A320 74.48 MD83 (72.03); MD88 (72.6); MD90 (73.96)
A321 86.47 B722 (86.27)
A332 229.51 B788 (227.9), B773 (299.37), IL96 (251.33)
AT43 16.83 AT44 (17.8); AT45 (18.6)
AT72 22.15 AT75 (22.8); E135 (22); E145 (21.02)
B733 61.6 B736 (59.29); MD87 (62.36)
B734 65.63 A318 (63.6); MD81 (63.95)
B735 56.55 B732 (53.5), YK42 (56.77)
B738 76.47 B721 (77.27); B739 (78.79)
B744 392.09 A346 (370.78), A388 (548.83)
B752 111.17 B720 (99)
B763 181.81 A332 (229.51); B764 (204.3)
DH8D 29.14 E170 (36.77), B461 (37.49)
E190 49.07 B462 (41.66), RJ1H (45.14)
Table 4.8: Aircraft clustering results (example)
In the actual implementation, the final cluster centroids were desired not to significantly
deviate from the initial set (since cost data were available only for the initial fifteen). There-
fore, the algorithm was stopped after the first iteration, i.e., before centroids were recalculated.
Furthermore, all aircraft with MTOW inferior to 10T were excluded from the clustering, since
the operational costs of the smallest of the fifteen, the ATR-43 (AT43), would not have been
realistic for these. These aircraft were grouped into a sixteenth cluster denominated OTHR.
Aircraft clustering could be further improved by subdividing aircraft by category (i.e., tur-
boprop, heavy jet etc.). At the moment, for example, clustering on the square root of MTOW
only groups medium business jets and turboprops in the same cluster. However, these two
aircraft types are known to have very different operational costs in reality. They also have
different speed and altitude capabilities turboprops can fly up to FL250, while business jets
can fly above FL400 and this might induce non-realistic solutions in route choice models. Air-
craft categories and additional data could be sourced from Eurocontrol BADA (Base of Aircraft
Data) for improving aircraft clustering.
4.3.2 Route clustering
The use of custom-defined navigation points is quite common in actual air traffic data. While on
one hand this allows for greater flexibility in flight planning, on the other hand it can cause issues
when trying to identify the available routes between an origin-destination pair. This situation
is illustrated by the example described in Figure 4.9. This example shows traffic data from
November 18th, 2013 between Paris Orly (LFPO) and Toulouse-Blagnac (LFBO). Two clearly
distinct routes can be identified. However, looking at route segments data (Figure 4.10 shows
a detailed visualisation obtained in a Geographic Information System, GIS, software), several
almost-overlapping routes become visible. Notice that although this example is 2-dimensional,
it still applies when altitude is considered.
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Figure 4.9: Flights from LFPO to LFBO (scale 1:1440439 dec. deg.)
Figure 4.10: Flights from LFPO to LFBO (detail, scale 1:624 dec. deg.)
This is a key issue for using this data to test optimisation models, since these overlapping
routes are mostly equivalent in terms of sector entries, flight time, flown distance, and route
charges. The rationale for clustering routes is therefore to reduce the complexity of data in-
stances by grouping routes that are geographically close. By doing so, only significantly different
routing alternatives are considered.
A metric that is commonly used in literature for measuring the distance between two routes
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is the so-called Hausdorff Distance. Given two sets S1, S2 ∈ R3 (i.e., the points belonging to
route 1 and route 2, respectively), their Hausdorff distance is defined as:
dH(S1, S2) = max
{
sup
p1∈S1
d(p1, S2), sup
p2∈S2
d(p2, S1)
}
(4.2)
That is, the Hausdorff distance is the maximum of the distance between all elements of S1
and set S2 and the distance between all elements of S2 and set S1. A distance matrix can be
built by calculating the Hausdorff distance between all routes connecting an origin-destination
pair. Such a matrix can be given as input to a clustering algorithm that will put into the same
cluster all routes whose distance is lower than a threshold value T . Not knowing in advance
how many clusters will be obtained, we relied on a hierarchical clustering algorithm instead of
the K-means algorithm used for the clustering of aircraft.
Hierarchical clustering is typically carried out in two phases:
1. Linkage: a distance tree is obtained from the distance matrix of a given origin-destination
pair. The final height of the tree represents the maximum distance between two elements
of the original set, i.e., the maximum distance between two routes. The result can be
visualised as a dendrogram plot, see Figure 4.11;
2. Clustering: the threshold value T is used for sorting the elements into clusters. Graph-
ically, it represents the height at which the dendrogram is cut: all elements (i.e., routes)
that are still attached to the same sub-tree after the cut belong to the same cluster.
Figure 4.11: Dendrogram of routes between Kevlavik Int. (BIKF) and London Gatwick
(EGKK). Routes are listed on the horizontal axis, relative distance (measured in hundreds
of kilometres on the vertical axis).
Hierarchical clustering is performed on every origin-destination pair, excluding reserved
ICAO codes ZZZZ (i.e., no ICAO code exists for that airport) and AFIL (i.e., flight plan re-
ceived from an airborne flight).
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In the current implementation, a total of 102 504 routes for two weeks of traffic (from
September 1st to September 14th, 2014) were obtained. A cut threshold of 0.3 (i.e., routes that
are less than 0.3 degrees far from each other are grouped into the same cluster; at the latitude
of the ECAC area this corresponds to 20-25 Km approximately) on 3-dimensional geographic
representation of routes was used. From previous clustering experiments on larger data sets (up
to 3 weeks) and different cut threshold values (0.5 and 0.1), it could be noticed that the number
of routes stabilised around 110,000 from a 2-week dataset on, with the added routes being mostly
oceanic (hence, heavily dependent on weather changes). Route clustering, in combination with
aircraft clustering, allows for further useful data aggregations to be performed, such as:
• Average flight time in sectors (per route/aircraft cluster pair);
• Average entry time in sector after flight departure (per route/aircraft cluster pair);
• Average entry flight level in sector (per route/aircraft cluster pair);
• Average strategic route costs (per route/aircraft cluster pair).
4.3.3 Cost coefficients
The present section illustrates the coefficients used to assess the operational costs of flights:
national unit rates for estimating en-route charges and ground and airborne shift cost coefficients
for the respective components of each 4-dimensional trajectory.
Unit rates
The country-specific unit rates used for calculating route charges and to estimate ANSP revenue
in the pricing models were the values applied in September 2014, sourced from Eurocontrol’s
website (with the exception of Estonia and Ukraine, that were included for geographic reasons
and whose unit rates were sourced from the respective ANSPs’ website) and illustrated in Table
4.9.
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Country ICAO code Unit rate (e) Country ICAO code Unit rate (e)
Portugal S M AZ 10.6 France LF 65.92
Belg.-Luxembourg EB 72.19 Greece LG 34.68
Germany ED 77.47 Hungary LH 40.14
Estonia EE 23.97 Italy LI 78.98
Finland EF 52.21 Slovenia LJ 67.61
United Kingdom EG 88.54 Czech Republic LK 43.26
Netherlands EH 66.62 Malta LM 27.76
Ireland EI 30.77 Austria LO 73.54
Denmark EK 71.43 Portugal Lisboa LP 38.89
Norway EN 52.24 Bosnia Herzeg. LQ 51.46
Poland EP 35.33 Romania LR 38.34
Sweden ES 69.71 Switzerland LS 100.41
Latvia EV 28.59 Turkey LT 32.12
Lithuania EY 45.92 Moldova LU 38.05
Spain Canarias GC 58.51 FYROM LW 60.1
Albania LA 45.58 Serb.-Montenegro-KFOR LY 46.83
Bulgaria LB 37.53 Slovak Republic LZ 61.08
Cyprus LC 38.56 Armenia UD 34.24
Croatia LD 43.11 Georgia UG 24.85
Spain Continent. LE 71.84 Ukraine UK 45.56
Table 4.9: Route charges unit rates from September 2014 (Source: Eurocontrol)
Aircraft ground and airborne shift costs coefficients
In order to estimate the operational costs of flights, the reference values illustrated in Cook
& Tanner (2015) were adopted and applied to the clustered aircraft and routes. The report
provides per-minute coefficients for the costs of fuel, aircraft maintenance, staff and fleet, for
each of the reference aircraft and according to three cost profiles, (low, base and high, see Sec.
4.1.3).
The reference values for strategic delay were used to calculate the cost of ground shift (summing
up the components for fleet, crew and maintenance and multiplying by the amount of minutes of
ground shift assigned to the flight), while the values given for tactical delay were applied for the
airborne portion of the flight (summing up fuel, crew and maintenance costs and multiplying by
the duration of the airborne portion of the flight). The profile was assigned on a per-flight basis
where these data were available (see Sec.4.2.2); where this was not the case, the Low profile was
assigned as default.
The applied coefficients are illustrated in Table 4.10.
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Reference aircraft Weight factor Cost profile
Ground shift
cost coef. (e/min)
Airborne shift
cost coef. (e/min)
A319 1.154
L 7.42 39.97
B 12.91 57.17
H 22.35 80.7
A320 1.213
L 8.06 41.32
B 14.26 58
H 24.99 84.84
A321 1.315
L 9.96 49.29
B 16.96 68.92
H 29.09 96.31
A332 2.142
L 16.07 88.92
B 28.15 120.29
H 52.54 174.5
AT43 0.58
L 2.18 9.69
B 3.87 15.02
H 6.7 22.42
AT72 0.665
L 3.14 13.81
B 5.51 21.25
H 9.7 31.59
B733 1.099
L 4.53 38.1
B 8.58 53.28
H 15.01 72.98
B734 1.145
L 4.98 39.15
B 9.58 54.88
H 16.94 75.68
B735 1.051
L 4.14 35.31
B 8.14 49.16
H 14.51 67.4
B738 1.205
L 8.53 43.12
B 15.97 60.81
H 28.68 88.82
B744 2.802
L 14.3 148.12
B 24.65 182.46
H 44.76 233.75
B752 1.464
L 6.71 51.88
B 11.75 70.12
H 19.95 94.07
B763 1.901
L 12.07 76.72
B 21.45 103.78
H 41.13 151.16
DH8D 0.763
L 5.2 18.49
B 8.71 27.24
H 15.23 40.22
E190 0.991
L 7 31.93
B 12.34 45.79
H 21.99 65.81
OTHR 0.522
L 1.97 8.72
B 3.49 13.52
H 6.03 20.18
Table 4.10: Cost coefficients for reference aircraft (Source: Cook, 2015)
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4.4 Development of a bespoke geographic database for air traf-
fic data
NEST is a network analysis and design tool exclusively meant to support non-automated tasks.
Currently, it cannot be interfaced to other software for either data input or output, and it offers
no option for simulating different pricing rules or policies. It is a valuable tool for analysing spe-
cific issues or items and for producing related reports but is of little use for both testing pricing
models and for automated knowledge discovery tasks. In order to overcome such limitations a
geographical database was built from DDR2 and NEST generated data as a support tool for the
SATURN project. The rationale for building such a database, which only uses openly available
software, was threefold.
1. Due to the heterogeneity in file format of NEST exported and/or DDR2 files, it is easier
to obtain the data instances needed for the tests by querying a database than by parsing
multiple input files per model.
2. Data analysis or statistics tasks can be performed with a high level of automation.
Tasks such as ranking the busiest days or sectors over a whole year, for example, can
be performed automatically with a single query. The same tasks require manual count
or other operations if carried out within NEST. The geographical extension allows all
operations concerning geography and intersections to be easily performed, similarly to
NEST, with perhaps a higher level of flexibility.
3. The expected output from SATURN project was evidence that the proposed models can
improve traffic distribution within the European airspace. Therefore both statistics and
data visualisations need to be provided. Again, NEST is a valuable tool for visuali-
sations and reporting but may not be the most straightforward solution for visualising
models output. Within this context, Geographic Information System (GIS) software like
QGIS 2, using coordinate system WGS-84 and map projection EPSG:4326 (Figure 4.12),
proved to be a simpler and more flexible solution for visualising the output of the pricing
models tested. Most GIS software can directly access and retrieve data from geographical
databases and can access data from other software via application programming interfaces
(APIs) functions, thus resulting in a very flexible solution.
Such a database was built from DDR2 data, except for unit rate values that were downloaded
from Eurocontrol’s CRCO website. Due to the heterogeneity of formats in the input files, each
file type was parsed through a different script written in the Python programming language
that extracted relevant data and inserted it into the database. The database is currently made
of 26 tables, plus four views (permanent stored queries that behave like virtual tables, i.e. can
be queried like other tables). All tables and views are presented here as grouped into Airspace-
related, Network-related, Traffic-related and post-processed categories for description purpose
only.
4.4.1 Database tables and data sources
The general structure of the bespoke database and original data sources are illustrated in the
current section. A detailed documentation of each table and data fields is provided in Appendix
A; furthermore, some database usage examples are presented in Appendix B.
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Figure 4.12: Viewing flight data in QGIS 2
Airspace-related tables
This set includes all tables that are related to sector structure, characteristics, configurations
and openings (Table 4.11).
DB table name Data source file Origin Origin
sector areas Airspace.spc and
Sectors.gsl
NEST Name, type (ES,CS, FIR etc.) and coor-
dinates of airspace blocks
crco areas view on sector areas
table
sector areas
table
National airspaces belonging to CRCO
area
sector structure Airspace.spc and
Airblock.gar
NEST Describes sector hierarchical relationships
e.g. ES sector X is part of CS sector Y
sector capacity Capacity.ncap NEST Nominal hourly sector capacities
sector regulations RegPlan.nreg NEST Tactical variations on sector capacity
acc configurations Configuration.cfg NEST Describes different possible sector config-
urations
acc configurations openings OpeningScheme.cos NEST Activation time of configurations
military openings AIRAC .mot files NEST Opening times of military sectors
unit rates ur.txt files Eurocontrol
website
Monthly adjusted CRCO unit rates per
country
Table 4.11: Airspace-related tables
Network-related tables
This set includes data on airports and navpoints such as geographical coordinates, regulations
and existing segments (Table 4.12).
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DB table name Data source file Origin Description
points .nnpt and .narp files NEST Navpoint and airport names and coordi-
nates
navpoints View on points table points table Navpoint names and coordinates
airports View on points table points table Airport names and coordinates
airport capacity .ncap NEST Nominal hourly airport capacities
airport regulations RegPlan.nreg NEST Tactical variations of airport capacities
segments .ase NEST Existing links between couples of points
Table 4.12: Network-related tables
Traffic-related tables
This set comprises of all tables related to traffic, such as flight times, routes, and aircraft type
(Table 4.13).
DB table name Data source file Origin Description
traffic .exp2 M1 and .so6
M1 files
NEST General flight data i.e. departure and des-
tination airports and times, route coordi-
nates
traffic det SO6 M1 NEST Segment-by-segment flight data
aircraft Helicopter.txt Air-
craftWeight.txt
NEST Aircraft name, type and weight
Table 4.13: Traffic-related tables
Clustered data tables
These tables are dedicated to processed data, more specifically, to the data obtained from the
clustering operations (Sec. 4.14) or other elaborations on data from other tables. The column
“Data origin” in Table 4.14 therefore indicates the table(s) from which the clustered data was
sourced, rather than a specific DDR2 file.
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DB table name Data origin (table names) Description
aircraft clus traffic, aircraft Aircraft name and corre-
sponding aircraft cluster
name
flights traffic, aircraft clus, routes Aircraft cluster and route
cluster originally chosen by
each flight.
routes flights, aircraft clus route name and associated
origin and destination airport.
routes det flights, intersections, air-
craft clus, routes
Route cluster/sectors inter-
sections and corresponding
average entry time, flight
time, entry flight level with
each aircraft cluster.
routes navpoints flights, traffic det, air-
craft clus, routes
Route cluster/waypoint in-
tersections and corresponding
average arrival time and flight
level with each aircraft clus-
ter.
tv rules capacities traffic volumes, tv flows,
tv flows det, sector capacity,
intersections actual
Adjusted hourly capacity val-
ues for Traffic Volumes with
inconsistent original figures
(as explained in Sec. 4.2.1).
Table 4.14: Clustered data tables
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Chapter 5
Computational experiments
This chapter illustrates the solving approaches attempted to tackle the cPLP model presented
in Chapter 3. The data instances used for the tests presented here are the same used also for
the project SATURN. Since the objective of the project was to test the effectiveness of different
pricing models on data instances obtained from actual traffic, these data instances are of a much
larger size than those commonly presented in literature for testing bilevel models.
While the data preparation was a challenging task by itself, as described in Chapter 4, cPLP
resolution was also not straightforward. The reformulation carried out to linearise the model
presented in Chapter 3 (equations 3.40-3.53) introduces four constraints for each combination
of viable route and departure time per flight (plus one for the integrality of the x
(m)
f,r variables).
The variables are in a high number themselves and therefore the size of the problem grows at
a very fast rate. This is a well known issue with bilevel problems; in fact specific literature
generally presents experiments run on data instances with at most one hundred users, which
is at least an order of magnitude smaller than the testing instances of air traffic prepared for
SATURN (this is further discussed in Sec.5.2).
While exact resolution of entire days of traffic on the whole network (around 30 000 flights,
that produce a problem with approximately 700 000 integer and binary variables and almost
3 millions constraints) is clearly out of reach for exact resolution via standard optimisation
techniques like branch and bound, tests have been successfully run on regional-size instances,
specifically up to 5 000 flights on a single state.
A precise analysis of the computational complexity of the cPLP problem falls beyond the
purpose of this work. However, all the pricing schemes illustrated in section 3.2.7 make the
cPLP a hard to solve combinatorial optimisation problem, even when tested on a reduced scale,
for example at regional level. The only exception is provided by the cPLP-one scheme applied
to a single state, where only one rate has to be set for the whole problem. This is consistent
with the Network Pricing Problem, that is proved to be NP-Hard for all variants that require
more than one price to be set in the whole problem. On the contrary, the one rate variants
are solvable in polynomial time. One relevant example is illustrated in Castelli et al. (2013),
where the bilevel Network Pricing Problem is applied to find the optimal unit rate value that
maximises revenues for one ANSP. In this work the authors prove that the single rate case NPP
is equivalent to the single-tolled arc NPP presented in Labbe´ et al. (1998), which was proved
to have polynomial complexity, and adapt the efficient solving algorithm to the ANSP revenue
maximisation case.
For all the cPLP variants different from regional cPLP-one, no efficient solving procedure
exists even for the one-state case and the problem is computationally hard to solve, to the point
that the branch and bound algorithm was not even able to find any integer solution on regional
instances with one hour of traffic (approximately 600 flights) after two hours of execution.
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To tackle these complex variants, some improvements were done on the model formulation
and some simple heuristics were implemented to provide good starting solutions to the branch
and bound algorithm. These allowed the solver to apply better cuts to the problem and find
further solutions, but was still unable to solve to optimality the majority of the data instances
within a reasonable time. This is also described in detail in Sec.5.2.
However, the simple case proved to be useful for gaining further insights on the problem.
These are described in the the remainder of the chapter, organised as follows: Section 5.1 is
dedicated to the calibration of the weights of the objective function components (values of K1,
K2 and K3 parameters in eq. 3.8). Section 5.3 analyses in detail the results obtained from
applying the cPLP variants with one and two modulated rates on an 8 hour traffic instance.
Heavy demand-capacity imbalances occur in this traffic sample, which specifically includes the
traffic flying from, to or through French airspace between 6:00 and 14:00 (UTC time) on the
reference day, September 12, 2014. Finally, Section 5.4 briefly illustrates the results obtained
by a colleague within the project SATURN by solving a variant of the cPLP via a software
for multiobjective optimisation that implements resolution via a Genetic Algorithm heuristic.
This method does not solve the problem to optimality, but can provide many solutions that
are equivalently good, from an optimisation point of view, and therefore represents a valuable
tool for pointing out recurring patterns or tradeoffs among the solutions. This solving approach
was applied to larger data instances than the ones used for the tests presented here, and the
results obtained for the entire September 12 day on the whole European network are presented.
Most observations drawn from these results confirm what pointed out for the regional case.
Additionally, this approach allows to assess the effectiveness of the cPLP policy at European
level, which is not possible when only one state is considered.
With the exception of Section 5.4, all tests presented in this chapter were run on a Intel
i7 dual core laptop computer with 8 GB of RAM, running the Xpress solver version 7.8 64 bit
(optimiser version 27.01.02). The algorithms were coded in the Mosel language, proprietary to
the optimiser, version 3.8 64 bit.
5.1 Objective parameters setting
Several parameters are present in the cPLP model illustrated in Chapter 3, whose values have
to be set prior to resolution. The most important ones are the peak threshold, that is, the
percentage of capacity occupancy above which a sector is considered to be in a traffic peak, and
the relative weights of the three objective function components (total shift, capacity violations
and revenue neutrality violation, see eq. 3.8). These are used to weight quantities that are
not directly comparable with one another, namely minutes, flights and money. It is therefore
necessary to scale these quantities in order to represent a realistic tradeoff among them; at
the same time, the weights should be chosen so that they do not cause numerical issues in the
computational experiments.
Performing a rigorous parameter calibration falls far beyond the exploratory purpose of the
present work; nevertheless, some tests were carried out through a more intuitive, although sim-
plistic, approach, with the objective of exploring whether a stable (and realistic) configuration
for the problem parameters exist and possibly gaining useful insights on further aspects of the
model.
To this purpose, four medium scale traffic samples with known demand-capacity imbalances
are used as testing instances. These samples represent eight hours of traffic in French airspace,
specifically all flights departing, arriving or flying through France between 6:00 and 14:00 UTC
from Monday, September 8, 2014 until Friday, September 12, 2014 (excluding Sep. 11 due to
issues with incomplete data). The main characteristics of these traffic samples are summarised
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Instance Number of flights Peak threshold = 0.5 Peak threshold = 0.7
% of peak sectors n. of peak sectors % of peak sectors n. of peak sectors
12-Sep-14 4695 14 172 9 110
10-Sep-14 4476 9 110 6 74
09-Sep-14 4502 8 101 6 76
08-Sep-14 4663 9 110 6 74
Table 5.1: Characteristics of the testing instances
in Table 5.1. A simple unit rate modulation scheme is applied to this sample, where a congestion
charge is added to the historical unit rate, that is, the cPLP-one scheme (see Sec. 3.2.7) for
flying through peak sector-hour pairs (i.e., where and when demand-capacity imbalance might
occur). Two values for the peak threshold were tested, namely 0.5 and 0.7, meaning that sectors
with 50% (respectively, 70%) and above of occupied capacity in historic data are assigned the
peak rate.
As previously mentioned, this pricing scheme is a particularly easy to solve case of cPLP;
in fact, having only one price to calculate, the problem is solved in a few seconds even for data
instances with several thousands of flights. The results shown in this section are obtained from
a modified version of the H3 heuristic (illustrated in the following, Sec. 5.2.2), where all integer
values of the peak rate between 66 and 166 (i.e., rounded value of the historical unit rate, 65.92e
with an increment up to 100e) were tested to obtain the corresponding value of the objective
function.
The following Section 5.1.1 illustrate the variation in optimal solutions obtained from vari-
ating the revenue neutrality weight K1 in 3.8; similarly, Section 5.1.2 shows how the choice
of the sector violation weight affects the optimal solution obtained from the model. The air-
port capacity violation weight K3 has been set to a value of one to better study the impact of
route charges modulation on en route traffic redistribution with an even condition of airport-
operations-related issues.
5.1.1 Shift and revenue neutrality violation (K1 parameter)
A variation of a few Euros in a unit rate causes ANSP revenue variation in the order of the
hundred thousands over a few hours. Therefore the revenue neutrality violation value ( in the
cPLP model, see eq. 3.9) should be scaled to a order of magnitude that allows the model to
find different rate values that improve the baseline solution (where all rates are set as equal to
the historical value, and therefore the revenue neutrality is equal to zero by definition). To do
so, the violation  is scaled by a weight K1 in the Central Planner’s objective function (eq. 3.8).
Different values of the K1 parameter were tested, specifically negative powers of ten ranging
from 1.00E−07 to 1.00E−02. The sector violation weight (K2) was set to 60 and the airport
capacity violation parameter (K3) to 1. The results are illustrated in Table 5.2 for the Septem-
ber 12, 2014 data instance, for peak threshold set to 50% and 70% of nominal capacity (results
tables for the other days are provided in Appendix C Sec. C.1.1). Additionally, Figures 5.1,
5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the results in terms of variation of objective function value associated
to the optimal solution found for each tested value of K1 in the four analysed traffic samples.
The results show that values of K1 ≥ 1.00E−2 make the revenue neutrality component in
the objective function predominant on the other two and do not allow any price modulation;
this can be observed since for this value of K1 and above the optimal cPLP solution is equal
to the baseline one for all instances. In one case (September 10) this happens already with
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12-Sep-14
Baseline solution
K1 value Objective value Shift (min.)
N. of sector
cap. violations
N. of airport
cap. violations
Rev. neut.
violation (e)
Unit rate (e)
1.00E-07 19468.2 6374 218 6 8.18E+07 65.92
1.00E-06 19541.8 6374 218 6 8.18E+07 65.92
1.00E-05 19460 6374 218 6 0 65.92
1.00E-04 19460 6374 218 6 0 65.92
1.00E-03 19460 6374 218 6 0 65.92
1.00E-02 19460 6374 218 6 0 65.92
cPLP-one solution, peak threshold = 50%
K1 value Objective value Shift (min.)
N. of sector
cap. violations
N. of airport
cap. violations
Rev. neut.
violation (e)
Peak rate (e)
1.00E-07 17309.9 8956 139 5 8.93E+07 95.92
1.00E-06 17390.3 8956 139 5 8.93E+07 95.92
1.00E-05 17309.3 8956 139 5 825894 95.92
1.00E-04 17383.6 8956 139 5 825894 95.92
1.00E-03 18126.9 8956 139 5 825894 95.92
1.00E-02 19460 6374 218 6 0 65.92
cPLP-one solution, peak threshold = 70%
K1 value
Objective
value
Shift (min.)
N. of sector
cap. violations
N. of airport
cap. violations
Rev. neut.
violation (e)
Peak rate (e)
1.00E-07 16968.5 8314 144 6 8.45E+07 92.92
1.00E-06 17044.5 8314 144 6 8.45E+07 92.92
1.00E-05 16965.1 8314 144 6 512413 92.92
1.00E-04 17011.2 8314 144 6 512413 92.92
1.00E-03 17472.4 8314 144 6 512413 92.92
1.00E-02 19460 6374 218 6 0 65.92
Table 5.2: Solution variation for different values of the K1 parameter; results for France data
instances for September 12, 2014
K1 = 1.00E
−3. At the other side of the tested range, with K1 = 1.00E−6 and below, quite
predictably, numerical instability problems appear in all tested instances, even in the baseline
solutions (where the revenue neutrality violation term, that should always be equal to zero, is
not zero). With values of K1 between K1 = 1.00E
−5 and K1 = 1.00E−4 on the contrary the
solutions appear to be both flexible (i.e., optimal solutions have price modulations) and stable
(i.e., no evident numerical issues arise).
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Figure 5.1: Objective value variations for different values of the K1 parameter with the Septem-
ber 12 data instance
Figure 5.2: Objective value variations for different values of the K1 parameter with the Septem-
ber 10 data instance
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Figure 5.3: Objective value variations for different values of the K1 parameter with the Septem-
ber 9 data instance
Figure 5.4: Objective value variations for different values of the K1 parameter with the Septem-
ber 8 data instance
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5.1.2 Shift and capacity violations (K2 parameter)
This section investigates the issue of shift-to-capacity ratio, that is, how a variation in the
K2 parameter in the cPLP model formulation affects the solution and whether the solution
stabilises from a certain value of K2 on.
In this experiment, the revenue neutrality component in the model objective (K1 parameter
in eq. 3.8) is discarded by assigning a very low value to its weight (K1 = 10
−5). The four days
traffic sample is solved with values of the K2 parameter ranging from 1 to 100 and corresponding
optimal solution values are compared. Note that this variation affects sectors only. For airport
capacity (K3 parameter) the violations have a parameter value equal to 1.
Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 illustrate the variation obtained with a peak threshold of 50% of the
nominal sector capacity in the three components of the objective function: peak rate, global
shift and number of sector capacity violations. Figures 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10 show the same results
obtained by setting a peak threshold of 70%. The tabular version of these results is provided
in Appendix C, Sec. C.1
Results from the tests with the 50% peak threshold clearly show that the solution stabilises
with values of K2 ≥ 60. This trend does not show in the experiments with peak threshold
set to 70%. This is probably due to the fact that the higher threshold reduces the number of
sector-hours in peak and therefore values higher than 100 are necessary for the K2 parameter in
order to reach a stable tradeoff with the shift component. It is also worth observing that in all
experiments the optimal value of the peak rate, despite being set an upper bound of 165.92e
(100e more than the historical value of the French unit rate, 65.92e), takes much lower values,
namely between 69 and 96 in the 50% peak threshold case (see Figure 5.5) and between 66 and
103e in the 70% case (see Figure 5.8).
129
Figure 5.5: Comparison of solution variation in peak rates for different values of the K2 param-
eter over four days of traffic on France with peak threshold set to 50% of nominal capacity
Figure 5.6: Comparison of solution variation in total shift for different values of the K2 param-
eter over four days of traffic on France with peak threshold set to 50% of nominal capacity
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Figure 5.7: Comparison of solution variation in violated sector capacities for different values of
the K2 parameter over four days of traffic on France with peak threshold set to 50% of nominal
capacity
Figure 5.8: Comparison of solution variation in peak rates for different values of the K2 param-
eter over four days of traffic on France with peak threshold set to 70% of nominal capacity
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of solution variation in total shift for different values of the K2 param-
eter over four days of traffic on France with peak threshold set to 70% of nominal capacity
Figure 5.10: Comparison of solution variation in violated sector capacities for different values of
the K2 parameter over four days of traffic on France with peak threshold set to 70% of nominal
capacity
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5.2 cPLP model resolution
As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, bilevel problems are, in general, difficult to solve, due to
the high number of variables and constraints resulting from the linearisation process. Literature
on Network Design Problem and Network Pricing Problem, two well studied bilevel problems
that share several characteristics with the cPLP presented here, although lacking the temporal
dimension (i.e., followers’ variables only consider alternative routes instead of routes and time
shift), typically report tests run on networks with no more than a hundred users (see for ex-
ample Violin 2014, Heilporn 2008). Literature on Air Traffic Flow Management models, on the
other hand, that share with the cPLP the same definition for the airspace users’ variables (i.e.,
alternative routes and departure times are considered) but lack the bilevel structure, usually
presents result obtained from regional size tests (i.e., one state) with a few thousands flight (for
example, data instances used in Bertsimas et al. (2011) are randomly generated instances of
around six thousands flights).
The European airspace network comprises 40 national airspaces (countries belonging to the
CRCO system plus Estonia and Ukraine for geographic reasons) with an average of 600 airspace
sectors active every hour out of the average 1200 activated during the day. One day of traffic
typically sums up to around 30 000 flights, including national, international and intercontinental
traffic. Solving the ANSP-based cPLP (the variant with a peak and an off-peak rate per country)
through a commercial solver software generates a problem with around 200 000 constraints and
35 000 integer and binary variables for one hour of traffic; the whole-day September 12 data
instance produces a problem with 2 847 848 constraints and 702 701 binary and integer variables.
Therefore, testing the bilevel cPLP on instances obtained from real traffic data posed several
challenges: the problem size is remarkable even for relatively small data samples; at the same
time testing traffic samples with a few tens of flights hardly allows to draw realistic consider-
ations on the effectiveness of the proposed pricing policy. In addition, the data itself posed a
further challenge: many routing alternatives have very similar costs. This is well illustrated by
Figure 5.11, that shows the shape of the ANSP-based cPLP objective function for fixed values
of the off peak rate and increasing values of the peak rate (i.e., the cPLP-one scheme). The
values are obtained from regional traffic samples of 4 000 - 5 000 flights for four days (the same
used in Sec. 5.1, with parameters set to K1 = 1.00E
−5, K2 = 60 and K3 = 1). At macro-
scopic level, these functions clearly have a convex shape and have a minimum, but they are not
smooth and present a lot of local minima. Furthermore, all curves present a wide region of very
similar solutions: September 12, that was the fourth most trafficked day of 2014 (and for which
differentiated costs profiles per flights are available, see Sec. 4.2.2, which was not the case for
the other days) exhibits a steeper curve, but the other, less trafficked days show a wide region
where the objective function is almost flat.
This multitude of solutions with very close objective function values heavily affects the ef-
ficiency of the branch and bound algorithm implemented by the solver, which is not able to
efficiently prune the solution tree with any of the tested pricing strategy, with the exception of
the simplest case of a single rate on for one state. Fine tuning some parameters of the opti-
miser, such as tree exploration strategy or adding more of the default cuts did not bring any
major change. Preliminary tests showed that the plain implementation of the cPLP model as
formulated in Chapter 3 is not able to find a first integer solution on data instances of one hour
of traffic even letting the execution run for as long as six hours.
Several improvements were attempted to speed up the resolution. Section 5.2.1 illustrates
some bounds applied to variables and simple improvements to the model formulation. Section
5.2.2 describes some simple heuristics that were implemented to find good initial integer solu-
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Figure 5.11: Objective function values for different values of the peak rate; the orange line
represents the value of the historical unit rate (cPLP one rate modulation instances)
tions to speed up the branch and bound resolution. A further improvement that was attempted
was the implementation of valid inequalities known as Strengthened Shortest Path Inequalities
(SSPI), introduced in Heilporn (2008) for the Network Pricing Problem. These inequalities
provide very good cuts for the NPP, but proved to be rather ineffective for the cPLP.
5.2.1 Problem bounds
In order to speed up solving time, some bounds and simple reformulations were added to the
problem to reduce the size of the feasible region. The values applied to the bounds can be
considered realistic with regard to the application.
Bounds for the capacity violations variables The model has a constraint stating that each
flight can only choose one route and one departure time (eq.3.21); in the relaxed version of
the problem, this constraint implies that the sum of the values of all x variables related to
the same flight will always be equal to one. Therefore, if the number of flights that might
enter in a sector or airport during one hour is inferior to the declared capacity for that
resource, the corresponding violation variable (α
(h)
s or α
(h)
a ) is bounded to zero, otherwise
to the difference between the capacity and potential entries.
Operational costs coefficients Airspace users aim at minimising the costs of flights, ex-
pressed in the cPLP as the sum of operational costs (OC
(m)
f,r ) and route charges (RC
(m)
f,r ).
The operational costs term does not contain any variable and can therefore be pre-
calculated; for each flight, the minimum OC
(m)
f,r term, that is, the fixed cost of the cheapest
route and departure time option for that flight, can be subtracted from either side of the
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minimum cost constraint (eq. 3.36). This leads to an equivalent, yet tighter formulation
for the constraint.
Tight Big-M values and bounds on rate variables Literature suggests that in general,
using Big-M values in constraints leads to loose formulations that are not handled well by
solvers. Big-M terms should therefore be set to the smallest possible value that allows the
constraints to hold. Finding tight values for Big-M terms can therefore help in speeding
up resolution due to an improved formulation of the problem (see for example Dewez et al.
2008, for the Network Pricing Problem case). In pricing problems where upper bounds to
costs or charges exist, this is a straightforward choice. In the cPLP, Big-M values appear in
the linearisation constraints that bind the y
(m)
f,r variables to the value of the route charges
or to zero (eq. 3.38 and 3.39). In the model, the only existing bound to the charges is
loosely implied by the revenue neutrality constraint (eq. 3.9). Since preliminary tests
on small instances also showed that this constraint alone was not enough to guarantee
that the model would provide realistic solutions, further bounds were added: first to the
charges,by imposing that the modulated rates should not exceed the historical unit rate
by more than 100e; then, to the overall route charges for each flight, should not exceed
two times the amount that would be charged using the historical unit rates. This latter
value is an upper bound to the route charges per flight, and is therefore assigned to the
Big-M terms in the constraints (N
(m)
f,r ).
5.2.2 Heuristics
Additionally to bounds on variables, some simple heuristics were also implemented, to provide
the solver with feasible integer solutions and good cutoff bound values to speed up the resolution.
Running these heuristics on branch and bound nodes was initially attempted, but the execution
resulted infeasible in the majority of cases. It was therefore preferred to use these heuristics
only for providing starting solutions to the branch and bound.
H0 (baseline solution) A first integer solution is obtained by setting:
P (h)s = Urn ∀s ∈ Sn, n ∈ N,h ∈ H
that is, the rate variables equal to the unit rates of the corresponding ANSP, and solving
for the x
(m)
f,r variables only. This is the solution obtained with no price modulation, where
the problem is reduced to only assigning the users to their minimum cost route and
departure time. Since this reduces the bilinear terms of the cPLP (product of variables
P
(h)
s ·x(m)f,r ) to the product of constants and binary variables, the complexity of the problem
is reduced and resolution time is very fast (less than three minutes for a data instance of
one day of traffic and less than one second for one hour of traffic).
This solution is expected to be systematically worse than those obtained from the other
heuristics. However, it provides a baseline for evaluating results obtained from price
modulation since it allows to compare traffic distribution with and without modulation,
keeping all other problem assumptions and conditions equal. Therefore in the following
tests it is always provided as a reference.
H1 (integer solution from root node relaxation) In the solution of the relaxation of the
cPLP (i.e., the problem solved without the integrality constraints on the x
(m)
f,r , α
(h)
s and
α
(h)
a ) variables) typically less than 10% of the x
(m)
f,r variables take a fractional value. Start-
ing from this observation, the following simple heuristic was developed, to obtain a feasible
integer solution from the almost-integer values from the relaxation:
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Step 1. LR: Solve the relaxed cPLP to obtain the corresponding x
(m)
f,r,LR and P
(h)
s,LR val-
ues;
Step 2. MI1: Solve the mixed integer cPLP after setting the rates equal to the P
(h)
s,LR
values:
P (h)s = P
(h)
s,LR ∀s ∈ S, h ∈ H
and obtain the corresponding x
(m)
IP1,f,r values;
Step 3. MI2: To further improve the M1 solution, solve again the mixed integer cPLP,
this time setting only the x
(m)
f,r variables that had the same (integer) value in both
LR and MI1 solutions:
x
(m)
f,r = x
(m)
IP1,f,r ⇐⇒ x(m)IP1,f,r = x(m)f,r,LR ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf
and obtain the corresponding x
(m)
f,r,MI2 and P
(h)
s,MI2 values. Depending on the size of
the problem, this phase could take a long time to solve. It should therefore be given
a time limit, beyond which the execution terminates and the best solution so far (or
the MI1 solution, in case none was found in MI2) is accepted.
Note that α
(h)
s and α
(h)
a variables are not considered by the algorithm since their values
represent flights that violate capacity limits. Their values therefore depend on the values
of x
(m)
f,r .
H2-A (decomposition) This heuristic extends the H0 heuristic by iteratively solving the
problem with one set of variables at the time, alternating between the route assignment
variables x
(m)
f,r and the rates P
(h)
s . As already explained for H0, this drastically reduces
the complexity of the problem and therefore resolution is very fast. The drawback of this
algorithm is its tendency to get stuck in local minima; as a consequence, the solutions
provided are generally not of very high quality.
The algorithm steps are the following:
Step 1. Initialisation Solve for:
P (h)s = Urn ∀s ∈ Sn, n ∈ N,h ∈ H
and obtain the corresponding x
(m)
f,r,B assignment.
Step 2. Iteration A Solve for:
x
(m)
f,r = x
(m)
f,r,B ∀f ∈ F, r ∈ Rf ,m ∈Mf
and obtain the corresponding P
(h)
s,A rates.
Step 3. Iteration B solve for:
P (h)s = P
(h)
s,A ∀s ∈ S, h ∈ H
and obtain a new x
(m)
f,r,B assignment.
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Step 4. Termination Iterate Steps 2. and 3. until the stopping criterion is met. Return
the best solution obtained.
H2-B (rolling horizon) A rolling horizon approach was also attempted, where, starting from
the baseline solution (H0 heuristic), only a subset of the x
(m)
f,r variables is solved at each
iteration together with the rates P
(h)
s , trying to improve the objective function. A time-
based approach, that is, choosing the subset of flights to solve based on flight departure
time (e.g., all flights departing between 8:00 and 8:30) did not prove to be effective,
meaning that in the preliminary tests rates almost never deviated from the initialisation
values (the historical unit rates).
On the contrary, a geography-based approach, that is, solving one state at the time, was
able to improve the baseline solution. Like the decomposition heuristic H2, this one also
has the tendency to stop in local minima.
The algorithm steps are the following:
Step 1. Initialisation Solve for P
(h)
s = Urn to obtain the baseline solution; Sort ANSPs
in decreasing order for entering flights;
Step 2. Iterations For each ANSP in the ranking obtained in Step 1, starting from the
one with the highest number of entering flights, do the following:
1. Solve for the peak rate;
2. Solve for the off peak rate;
Step 3. Termination When it is not possible to further improve the solution by iterat-
ing over ANSPs, terminate the algorithm and accept the best solution obtained so
far.
H2 (H2-A and H2-B combined) An improved heuristic was obtained by combining the de-
composition heuristic H2-A and the geography-based H2-B by solving them in a iterative
sequence, changing from one to the other whenever the one that is being executed gets
blocked in a local minimum. This approach proved successful, meaning that better solu-
tions were obtained than those from H2-A and H2-B alone.
The algorithm steps are the following:
Step 1. Initialisation Solve for P
(h)
s = Urn to obtain the baseline solution;
Step 2. H2-A Improve the baseline solution through heuristic H2-A until a local mini-
mum is found (i.e., iterations are not able to improve the solution any further);
Step 3. H2-B Run heuristic H2-B on the solution obtained from Step 2, optimising one
per country at a time until a new minimum is found;
Step 4. Termination If the stopping criterion is met, terminate the algorithm and ac-
cept the best solution obtained so far; otherwise iterate again from Step 2.
H3 (solving procedure for regional cPLP-one) This simple algorithm provides very quickly
a solution that is close to optimality for a single rate. It was implemented for solving the
cPLP-one scheme on a single state, but provides a feasible integer solution also for the
other cPLP pricing schemes. Clearly, it is not expected to provide good quality solutions
for non-regional instances.
The algorithm steps are the following:
Step 1. Initialisation Set incr = 1, maxIncr = 100, maxGrow = 5 and bestObj =∞,
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Step 2. Iterations Solve for:
P (h)s =
{
Un if h is off-peak time for sector s
Un + incr if h is peak time for sector s
∀n ∈ N, s ∈ Snn, h ∈ H, δ ≥ 1
and obtain the objective function value for the iteration, iterObj. The objective
value of the previous iteration is stored in olditerObj.
If iterObj ≤ bestObj, update the value of bestObj and set growCnt to zero:
bestObj = iterObj
growCnt = 0
If iterObj > olditerObj, increment growCnt of 1:
growCnt = growCnt+ 1
Finally, at the end of the iteration, increment incr of 1:
incr = incr + 1
Step 3. Termination If incr > maxIncr or growCnt > maxGrow or the problem
is infeasible, terminate the algorithm and accept the best solution obtained so far;
otherwise iterate again from Step 2.
The algorithm terminates whenever the set bound for the rate is reached or when the
value of the objective function has increased for five consecutive iterations or in case the
problem becomes infeasible.
The solution obtained from this heuristic, provided to the solver for reoptimisation, allows
to obtain the optimal solution values for the one-stare cPLP-one instances in a few branch
and bound iterations. Tested instances with one hour of traffic were normally solved in
around two minutes (one for H3, one for branch and bound); instances with eight hours
of traffic (such as the one presented in Sec. 5.3) were normally solved in five to eight
minutes. The solutions proved to be of good quality for regional cPLP-two as well.
Table 5.3 and 5.4 provide results from a test of cPLP-two (i.e., two rates per ANSP) run
on 24 data files to compare the heuristics described. For each algorithm, the objective function
value of the best solution found is presented (Table 5.3), together with run time (Table 5.4).
Objective values are meant for comparison within the same instance: the lower the value, the
better. Different instances have completely different solutions so no comparison should be made
among objective values of different instances. The baseline solution (obtained from H0) and the
best solution found by the optimiser, initialised with the solutions provided by the heuristics and
with a time limit of 10 000 seconds for the execution, are also provided for comparison. Instead
of running time, the optimality gap value is shown in this latter case. The data instances are
regional-scale files corresponding to one hour of traffic on France from September 12 and 10,
2014, with approximately 500 to 700 flights each. Due to the reduced size of the traffic sample,
capacities were scaled by a factor of 0.5 (i.e., they were halved) to simulate demand-capacity
imbalance. The other parameters were set to the following values: K1 ≥ 1.00E−4, K2 = 60 and
K3 = 1.
Results clearly show that even these small size traffic samples are hard to solve, with very
high values of gap for all instances representing heavily trafficked hours, even after almost three
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Objective value
Instance name Number of flights H0 H1 H3 H5 B&B
12 Sep 2014, LF, 7:00 587 3438.93 2698.15 2835.96 2566.18 2153.38
12 Sep 2014, LF, 8:00 704 10994.20 8373.95 6785.85 5833.72 6715.59
12 Sep 2014, LF, 9:00 667 12546.30 8582.25 6573.42 5832.32 5686.01
12 Sep 2014, LF, 10:00 624 4422.00 2942.27 2069.43 2112.38 1561.44
12 Sep 2014, LF, 11:00 634 4328.00 3678.63 2720.66 2801.41 2716.67
12 Sep 2014, LF, 12:00 553 2287.00 2227.01 2062.77 2197.10 1997.56
12 Sep 2014, LF, 13:00 621 4918.43 4618.38 2996.98 2660.28 2567.44
12 Sep 2014, LF, 14:00 570 2923.29 2923.29 1952.1 2126.14 1932.12
12 Sep 2014, LF, 15:00 598 5670.75 5134.10 2437.51 3564.75 2494.77
12 Sep 2014, LF, 16:00 633 5860.81 5534.10 3421.80 3410.82 3258.91
12 Sep 2014, LF,17:00 517 1527.65 1496.09 1038.11 1464.65 943.54
12 Sep 2014, LF, 18:00 520 3028.63 3088.10 2248.50 2367.63 2064.77
10 Sep 2014, LF, 7:00 580 4087.31 3186.21 2980.48 3083.1 2980.48
10 Sep 2014, LF, 8:00 646 4875.2 4180.28 3438.64 3411.2 3150.03
12 Sep 2014, LF, 9:00 639 6721.33 4761.12 2869.85 3397.3 3291.2
10 Sep 2014, LF, 10:00 584 3625.67 3823.78 2810.78 2513.17 2378.44
10 Sep 2014, LF, 11:00 603 3320.56 3285.16 2263.55 2110.19 2083.6
10 Sep 2014, LF, 12:00 534 2103.87 1759.03 1455.99 1584.1 1314.74
10 Sep 2014, LF, 13:00 583 2264.98 2126.51 1495.44 1784.07 1495.44
10 Sep 2014, LF, 14:00 559 2511.51 1910.56 1745.27 2319.12 1582.76
10 Sep 2014, LF, 15:00 545 2749.17 2126.49 1386.09 2275.07 1381.98
10 Sep 2014, LF, 16:00 531 2041.26 1671.05 1391.22 1691.09 1381.04
10 Sep 2014, LF,17:00 487 2243.02 1857.23 1270.71 1727.09 1194.38
10 Sep 2014, LF, 18:00 474 2316.49 1715.56 1550.77 1524.82 1582.76
Table 5.3: Comparison of heuristics results - objective function values
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Solving time (seconds) B&B Gap at
10 000 secondsInstance name Number of flights H0 H1 H3 H5
12 Sep 2014, LF, 7:00 587 0.73 3.60 32.28 63.21 1%
12 Sep 2014, LF, 8:00 704 1.02 8.44 70.14 82.53 52%
12 Sep 2014, LF, 9:00 667 0.98 6.89 339.83 82.74 57%
12 Sep 2014, LF, 10:00 624 1.21 31.72 273.89 87.01 35%
12 Sep 2014, LF, 11:00 634 1.13 26.19 99.79 90.52 61%
12 Sep 2014, LF, 12:00 553 1.04 13.29 150.99 72.94 1%
12 Sep 2014, LF, 13:00 621 0.92 9.70 295.13 76.21 48%
12 Sep 2014, LF, 14:00 570 0.63 8.09 176.60 49.37 46%
12 Sep 2014, LF, 15:00 598 0.79 5.07 96.96 67.45 35%
12 Sep 2014, LF, 16:00 633 0.74 3.72 85.66 50.52 48%
12 Sep 2014, LF,17:00 517 0.81 4.38 149.84 49.06 8%
12 Sep 2014, LF, 18:00 520 0.57 3.17 140.25 51.30 15%
10 Sep 2014, LF, 7:00 580 0.88 11.06 176.50 90.60 16%
10 Sep 2014, LF, 8:00 646 1.25 12.41 292.61 62.13 18%
12 Sep 2014, LF, 9:00 639 1.04 10.60 62.13 84.39 46%
10 Sep 2014, LF, 10:00 584 0.94 10.26 255.24 82.12 35%
10 Sep 2014, LF, 11:00 603 1.04 15.41 73.93 65.14 21%
10 Sep 2014, LF, 12:00 534 0.87 14.55 155.94 44.04 1%
10 Sep 2014, LF, 13:00 583 0.85 14.67 199.17 70.59 1%
10 Sep 2014, LF, 14:00 559 0.66 4.95 217.06 57.73 4%
10 Sep 2014, LF, 15:00 545 0.65 8.08 123.97 59.06 1%
10 Sep 2014, LF, 16:00 531 0.62 7.00 228.81 53.85 1%
10 Sep 2014, LF,17:00 487 0.75 6.02 133.08 52.00 1%
10 Sep 2014, LF, 18:00 474 0.68 4.49 197.06 50.78 1%
Table 5.4: Comparison of heuristics results - solving time and B&B gap
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hours of execution. It also appears that none of the tested heuristics is able to provide a solution
close to optimality. In general the best solution is always provided by either H2 or H3 and both
have reasonable execution time, considering the size of the problem. In some cases however,
when provided to the branch and bound resolution, the heuristic solutions were reoptimised
by fixing the values of the integer variables and the resulting solution value was much worse
than the original heuristic one (see for example the case of 12 Sep 2014, LF, 8:00). Poor results
from H1, which is based on the solution of the linear relaxation of the problem, confirm that
the relaxation of the problem is, indeed, bad and therefore suggest that further improvements
should be attempted to the formulation.
5.3 Resolution of a regional instance
The present section compares cPLP results obtained from the 8-hour regional instance from
September 12, 2014 (see Table 5.1), comprising all traffic departed between 6:00 and 14:00
(UTC time) that crossed, departed from or arrived into French airspace (icao code: LF), which
amounts to 4695 flights in total. This traffic sample represents the peak hours of the state that
had the highest level of congestion registered in the day, in terms of airspace sectors whose
capacity was breached and is therefore a valid testing instance for assessing the effectiveness of
the proposed cPLP policy.
The airspace configuration in use at each hour comprises 90 to 100 active airspace sectors
including terminal manoeuvring areas at major airports (see Figure 5.12 and Table 5.8).
Figure 5.12: Active sectors in French airspace at 10:00 UTC on Sep.12, 2014
The traffic distribution, according to historical data on actually flown routes for this traffic
sample, presents the highest traffic peaks between 9:00 and 12:00.
Approximately 90% of the active sectors in this sample have a declared nominal capacity
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(the remainder are considered as unconstrained). Note that although the results presented in
the following only concern French airspace, capacity constraints on all active European sectors
are considered in the problem resolution.
The peak threshold here is set to 50% of nominal capacity, and the remaining parameters
of the models are set as follows: K1 = 10
−5 for revenue neutrality violation, K2 = 60 for sector
capacity violation and K3 = 1 for airport capacity violation.
Concerning departure time options, in the presented test each flight has a possible departure
time shift of up to 30 minutes before and 30 minutes after the requested departure time for that
specific flight by the AU. The shift is divided in 10-minute long slots, meaning that a flight with
requested departure time set at 6:00 will be assigned one of the following departure times by
the model: [5:30; 5:40; 5:50; 6:00; 6:10; 6:20; 6:30]. It is assumed that a 10-minute granularity
is precise enough to describe a process that is to be applied in the strategic phase of flight
planning.
The problem size with this configuration has 575 216 rows and 134 661 integer and binary
variables. The following pricing schemes were tested, against historical data and the baseline
solution:
cPLP with one modulated charge (cPLP-one) The modulation is applied to the peak
rate only, while the off peak rate is kept equal to the historical unit rate value (65.92 e).
As already mentioned, having only one rate to solve for the entire problem makes this a
particularly easy to solve case of cPLP, since adapting the efficient solving procedure from
Castelli et al. (2013) to this case is straightforward.
cPLP with two modulated charges (cPLP-two) The modulation is applied to both peak
and off peak rate. Even if with two tariff variables only, this variant of the problem is
highly complex to solve due to its combinatorial nature. The heuristics presented in Sec.
5.2 were not able to provide good enough solutions to allow the solver to speed up the
branch and bound resolution and solve this instance of the problem within reasonable
time limits (more than twenty hours are necessary for the solver to terminate the branch
and bound execution).
At the current state, even resolution by enumeration appears to be more efficient (for
the two rates case): this has also been done for comparison purpose by testing iteratively
all integer combinations of peak and off peak values ranging between 1e and the set
limit of 165e (100 e higher than the historical unit rate value, 65.92e). With this
configuration, and assuming a peak rate no lower than the off peak rate, approximately
11 000 combinations have to be tested, so the procedure took several hours (approximately
10, but this time could be easily reduced by parallelising the procedure). The best solution
obtained through this method is close enough to optimality (3.43% in this test) and was
provided to the solver to initialise the branch and bound algorithm. The test carried out
in this way allowed to solve the instance within the set limit of 1% gap.
A summary of the solution values obtained from these pricing schemes are described in Table
5.6.
Concerning route and departure time assignment to flights, the solutions obtained are eval-
uated according to the performance indicators described in the following. Obtained indicators
values are summarised in Table 5.6, while a comparison of the different solutions in in terms of
rerouted and shifted flights between each couple of pricing schemes is provided in Table 5.7.
En-route charges: sum of the route charges imposed on the flights, used to cover the costs of
ANS provision; calculated according to eq. 3.54 and 3.56 for cPLP-one, to eq. 3.54 and
3.55 for cPLP-two; measured in e per flight;
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Pricing scheme Baseline cPLP-one cPLP-two
Peak rate (e) 65.92 95.95 95.78
Off peak rate (e) 65.92 65.92 88.15
Shift (minutes) 6374 8956 6847
N. of sector cap. viol. 218 139 143
N. of airport cap. viol. 6 5 5
Revenue neutrality viol. (e) 0 825894 904066
Solving time 6 seconds 320 seconds 11 hours
Table 5.5: Comparison of the obtained solutions
Indicator (avg. per flight) Historical data Baseline cPLP-one cPLP-two
En-route charges (e) 1563.56 1390.64 1613.88 1615.75
Operational costs (e) 7496.94 7252.65 7258.84 7255.18
Departure shift (minutes /10) 0.00 1.53 2.11 1.64
Arrival shift (minutes /10) 0.00 2.08 2.64 2.20
Horizontal flight efficiency 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11
Temporal flight efficiency 3.92 0.89 0.94 0.92
Table 5.6: Performance indicators values obtained from the different solutions
Operational costs: sum of the costs for operating the aircraft for the assigned route duration
plus the ground shift component; calculated according to eq.3.19, measured in e per flight;
Departure shift: absolute difference between the requested and assigned departure time.
Measured in minutes per flight;
Arrival shift absolute difference between the arrival time obtained by departing at requested
arrival time using the shortest route and the assigned arrival time. Measured in minutes
per flight;
Horizontal flight efficiency: difference between the origin-destination en-route distance of
assigned routes, and the great circle distance between the origin and destination, expressed
as a percentage of the great circle distance;
Temporal flight efficiency: difference between the duration of the shortest route and the
duration of the assigned route; measured in minutes per flight.
Results show that the proposed modulation of en-route charges does not impact flight costs
in a significative way. Compared to historical data, the cPLP pricing schemes have lower av-
erage operational costs and lower average route charges. Compared to the baseline solution,
however, despite practically equivalent operational costs, the modulated schemes have higher
en route charges. This was quite predictable in the cPLP-one case (since charges are greater or
equal to the historical unit rate applied in the baseline), less so for cPLP-two. The remaining
indicators show that the baseline solution dominates the modulated charging schemes where
temporal efficiency is concerned, even if the cPLP-two values appear to be very close. Values
of average horizontal flight efficiency are equivalent in baseline, cPLP-one and cPLP-two (in
fact, as shown in Table 5.7, the route assignment in the three solutions differs for no more than
a couple hundred flights between one and another) and slightly improved in comparison with
historical data.
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Difference in number of flights with rerouting
Historical Baseline cPLP-one cPLP-two
Historical 0 2698 2695 2701
Baseline - 0 201 184
cPLP-one - - 0 74
cPLP-two - - - 0
Difference in number of flights with shift
Historical Baseline cPLP-one cPLP-two
Historical 0 466 632 495
Baseline - 0 249 89
cPLP-one - - 0 195
cPLP-two - - - 0
Difference in number of flights with shift and rerouting
Historical Baseline cPLP-one cPLP-two
Historical 0 279 364 300
Baseline - 0 57 40
cPLP-one - - 0 28
cPLP-two - - - 0
Table 5.7: Comparison of rerouted and shifted flights among the obtained solutions
The obtained distribution of traffic load over airspace sectors is illustrated in the charts
of Figures 5.13-5.16 for the four most trafficked hours. The complete tabular version of these
results, for all the hours of the tested traffic sample can be found in Appendix C Sec. C.2. Here
the hourly load, defined as the ratio between the number of flights entering a sector during a
certain hour and its declared nominal capacity is used as a metric for evaluating the obtained
solution.
The effects of traffic redistribution, in terms of number of sectors that are in peak in the
historical data and baseline solution, compared to the figures obtained after running cPLP-one
and cPLP-two on the traffic sample, are illustrated in Table 5.8. Finally, Figures 5.17-5.20 fur-
ther illustrate the geographical distribution of traffic load over French upper airspace obtained
from the different solutions (Fig. 5.18 for the baseline, 5.19 for cPLP-one, 5.20 for cPLP-two)
and historical data (Fig. 5.17).
Both price modulation schemes prove to be effective in improving traffic load over airspace
sectors. Obtained sector loads figures in the cPLP route assignments are systematically lower
than historical data, and improved compared to the baseline, although not by astonishing
values. The number of sectors with more than 100% load (i.e., sectors with violated capacity)
also decreases in all hours with cPLP, as the traffic moves across less utilised sectors. This
is particularly evident in Figure 5.16, which represents sector traffic load between 11:00 and
12:00. Here the number of sectors with more than 100% load is halved in both cPLP solutions
compared to the baseline, while the number of sectors with 33%-66% traffic load increases.
What is more common however having traffic shifted from the capacity breached sectors to the
heavily loaded ones (66%-99% load). This is probably due to geographic reasons, since high
demand-capacity imbalances tend to involve areas wider than a single sector, especially within
the same country. The entity of this improvement however is maybe better appreciated when
considering the number of individual capacity breaches (number of sector capacity violations
in Table 5.6), which amounts to 218 in the baseline solution and is reduced to 139 and 143 in
cPLP-one and cPLP-two solutions respectively.
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Figure 5.13: Sectors load on French airspace obtained from the different solutions between 8:00
and 9:00 UTC
Figure 5.14: Sectors load on French airspace obtained from the different solutions between 9:00
and 10:00 UTC
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Figure 5.15: Sectors load on French airspace obtained from the different solutions between 10:00
and 11:00 UTC
Figure 5.16: Sectors load on French airspace obtained from the different solutions between 11:00
and 12:00 UTC
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Time N. of active sectors N. of peak sectors (>50% load)
Historical data Baseline cPLP - one cPLP - two
6:00-6:59 90 55 4 6 4
7:00-7:59 95 61 39 31 37
8:00-8:59 100 71 57 53 55
9:00-9:59 99 81 73 72 73
10:00-10:59 100 73 73 72 73
11:00-11:59 95 79 74 71 70
12:00-12:59 95 70 54 52 50
13:00-13:59 97 68 59 55 57
14:00-14:59 94 73 34 35 34
15:00-15:59 94 66 0 1 0
Table 5.8: Number of peak sectors in historical data, baseline solution and after applying cPLP
A final word for comparing the two tested modulation schemes between them: it is hard
to assess which one provides a better solution, at least from the test on this traffic sample:
cPLP-one often shows a better traffic distribution (in terms of lower values of violated sector
capacities) and revenue neutrality value; cPLP-two, in turn has a total shift more than 20%
lower than cPLP-one (see Table 5.6), but obtained by raising not only the Peak rate, but the
off peak too (meaning, some excess traffic is re-routed to neighbouring countries).
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Figure 5.17: Sectors with heavy traffic load (lighter colour: 67% to 99%, darker colour: above
100%) in historical data at 10:00 UTC, Sep.12, 2014
Figure 5.18: Sectors with heavy traffic load (lighter colour: 67% to 99%, darker colour: above
100%) in the baseline solution at 10:00 UTC, Sep.12, 2014
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Figure 5.19: Sectors with heavy traffic load (lighter colour: 67% to 99%, darker colour: above
100%) in the cPLP one solution at 10:00 UTC, Sep.12, 2014
Figure 5.20: Sectors with heavy traffic load (lighter colour: 67% to 99%, darker colour: above
100%) in the cPLP-two solution at 10:00 UTC, Sep.12, 2014
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5.4 Further results from the project SATURN
The current section illustrates some results obtained by a colleague within the project SATURN
(as illustrated in deliverables D.4.2 and D.6.5 SATURN 2015a,b) that tackled cPLP resolution
through a different approach from the one illustrated in the present work, specifically an imple-
mentation in the multiobjective optimisation software modeFrontier. This software performs
optimisation through Genetic Algorithms (GA) and was able to solve much larger data in-
stances, including the entire September 12, 2014 data instance (approximately 29 000 flights)
on the whole European network.
In general, Genetic Algorithms belong to a class of solution methods known as evolutionary
metaheuristic. This is a class of stochastic algorithms whose steps are loosely inspired by
the principles of evolution and natural selection. In a GA groups of candidate solutions are
generated, selected, variated and evolved throughout the iterations according to the following
outline:
Genetic Algorithm
1. Initialisation Generate a random population of n candidate solutions for the problem
(individuals or chromosomes);
2. Fitness Evaluate the quality of each individual according to a defined fitness function;
3. Selection Select two individuals (parents) from the population according to their
fitness (the better fitness, the bigger chance to be selected);
4. Crossover With a crossover probability cross over the parents to form new individuals
(offspring). If no crossover is performed, the offspring are copies of the parents;
5. Mutation With a mutation probability mutate offspring at each locus (position in
the solution);
6. Accepting Place new offspring in a new population;
7. Test If the end condition is satisfied, stop, and return the best solution in current
population; otherwise repeat from step 2;
The stochastic element is fundamental in GAs to avoid the creation of a number of almost
identical sub-optimal individuals. Being heuristic methods, there is no guarantee that the final
solution will be the optimal one, but they are able to explore the solution search space and
eventually converge to a solution in a reasonable amount of time even for very large problems.
To tackle the cPLP, in its two-charges modulation variant, the model was implemented in an
in-house extension of the modeFrontier software called the MOGASI algorithm (see Costanzo
et al. 2014). Specifically, the implemented variant of cPLP is a multiobjective optimisation
problem, that is, the three components of the cPLP model are treated as independent objective
functions; the solving procedure delineates the Pareto front with the optimal solutions obtained
from the different possible combinations of the objectives (i.e., referring to the formulation used
so far, equivalent to trying all possible combinations of the K1, K2 and K3 parameters). The
solving procedure applies the genetic algorithm to the peak and off peak rates: for a candidate
assignment of rates, the corresponding optimal routing choices for the for the flights are calcu-
lated, and these latter are used to compute the corresponding objective value and therefore the
fitness of that particular set of tariffs.
The pricing variables are defined as:
Ppn = Urn + δp,n∀n ∈ N (5.1)
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Ppn = Urn + δo,n∀n ∈ N (5.2)
where δp,n and δo,n are respectively peak and off-peak variations on the historical unit rate.
An additional constraint is set on the revenue neutrality violation term n stating that the
total percentage variation over all ANSPs should not exceed 20%:∑
n∈N
|n| ≤ 0.2 (5.3)
Finally, the maximum allowed average capacity breach is also bounded not to exceed 25%
of the total capacitated sectors and airports:
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The solving program was run on the daily instance file for September 12, 2014. This file
comprises 29 539 flights and capacity constraints for all sectors and airports. It lacks however
traffic volumes capacities (that were implemented in a later phase of SATURN and account
for more than 50% of actual capacity constraints), and therefore the resulting solutions have
a much lower shift and number of capacity breaches in proportion to the results illustrated in
Section 5.3 for the French airspace alone.
The solving program ran for approximately 36 hours, during which approximately 100 000
solutions, of which 30 000 feasible, were generated. Among all the feasible ones, the scatter chart
in Figure 5.21 displays a collection of selected Pareto solutions (green squares) in terms of two
of the three objectives, specifically the capacity violations (y axis) and the total shift (x axis).
The red square represents the baseline solution computed with the historical unit rates. The
GA is able to identify, for both objectives, a number of equally good alternatives that dominate
the baseline solution. Furthermore, the plot confirms the same negative correlation pointed
out in Section 5.1 between the objectives: shifting flights can significantly reduce capacity
violations and solutions alternative to the baseline always represent a tradeoff between these
two components.
Figure 5.22 graphically compares the objectives values for the four Pareto solutions selected
in Figure 5.21 in terms of total shift, average capacity violation, revenue neutrality violation
and number of violated capacities. The blue line is later referred to as S1, the green line as S2,
the light blue as S3 and the purple line S4. None of these solutions have optimal values in all
objectives. Instead, they all represent equally valid trade-offs between requirements, achieved
by redistributing air traffic in different ways. The red line (S0) represents the baseline solution.
It exhibits a medium Total Shift while the revenue neutrality is equal to zero by definition.
The solution represented by the light blue line (S3) can be considered the best tradeoff among
objectives, under several aspects: the revenue neutrality violation is no worse than the other
non-baseline solutions and both total shift and capacity violations indicators are better than or
nearly equal to the baseline values.
Figure 5.23 shows peak and off-peak rates for the four selected solutions only in the case at
least one of them deviates by more than four e from the September 2014 unit rate. For some
states, such as Belgium and Luxembourg (EB), Finland (EF), and Slovenia (LJ), both peak
and off-peak rates appear to be higher than historical rates in all solutions. In other cases, such
as for Spain (LE), the opposite occurs, with all other intermediate alternatives being possible:
for example The Netherlands (EH), where off peak rates are always lower, and peak rates are
always higher, than the historical tariff.
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Figure 5.21: Pareto front for Total Global Shift vs. Capacity Violation (Source: SATURN
Deliverable 6.5)
Figure 5.22: Tradeoffs among the baseline solution (red line) and five Pareto-solutions (Source:
SATURN Deliverable 6.5)
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Figure 5.23: Peak and off-peak rates for selected ANSPs (Source: SATURN Deliverable 6.5)
N. of flights with different routes
S0 S1 S2 S3 S4
S0 0 858 550 258 541
S1 - 0 525 642 1236
S2 - - 0 320 936
S3 - - - 0 644
S4 - - - - 0
N. of flights with different shift
S0 S1 S2 S3 S4
S0 0 1000 685 308 643
S1 - 0 629 744 1420
S2 - - 0 412 1114
S3 - - - 0 740
S4 - - - - 0
Table 5.9: Number of flights that use different routes and number of flights that have different
total shifts per solutions pair (Source: SATURN Deliverable 6.5)
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Table 5.9 compares the different solutions in terms of number of flights that fly different
routes and number of flights that have different shifts. It shows that on average less than 5%
of flights was shifted or re-routed. This figure would likely increase if traffic volume capacities
were also considered in the resolution, but the current proportion is not incoherent with the
proportions obtained from the 8 hour regional example presented in Section 5.3 (Table 5.7),
which considers peak hours on one of the regions with the highest demand-capacity imbalances
in Europe.
The results from this test suggest that it is possible to improve the baseline solution at
European level through a very limited spatial and/or temporal redistribution of traffic. This
however confirms the previously stated observation that such improvements come at a price:
in areas with an high demand-capacity imbalance there might not be viable alternative routes
through airspace with spare capacity, therefore reducing capacity breaches inevitably increases
the total amount of shift and vice versa. What could be a suitable and realistic trade-off between
the two is an issue left open for discussion.
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Conclusion
This thesis investigated the possibility of mitigating demand-capacity imbalances in the Euro-
pean ATM system by providing signals to airspace users through the modulation of en-route
charges in the strategic level of flight planning, months in advance of the day of operations.
The aim of this approach is to redistribute traffic in excess by inducing rerouting or shifts in
the schedule. Previous research on this topic is extremely scarce, with only a handful of works
available in literature. Therefore, most research carried out within the SESAR WP-E project
SATURN (within which this thesis was developed) has been exploratory, spreading across dif-
ferent disciplines and facing several issues that do not commonly affect more mature fields of
research, where established methodologies and practices exist. This exploratory character is a
prominent trait also of this thesis, which borrows principles and techniques from sectors as dif-
ferent as economics, computer science, data engineering and operations research. It represents
a seminal work and, as such, it clearly has some limitations. For example, the optimisation
model presented, which represents the application of a centralised peak load pricing policy at
European level by a central authority and the reaction of airspace users that route their flights
accordingly, is fully deterministic and presents some simplistic assumptions. In this sense, the
model could be improved by taking some degree of uncertainty in consideration. This, together
with improvements to the proposed formulation, suggests compelling directions for future re-
search. Additionally, the interaction of ANSPs among themselves, that is, investigating peak
load pricing in a decentralised approach, would also represent an interesting development of this
work.
In any case, data availability currently constitutes a major limitation to research on Euro-
pean air traffic. The sources available have very restrictive licensing agreements and the data
itself requires a significative effort in cleaning, combination and harmonisation before becoming
suitable for testing mathematical models. Data preparation and management represented a
major challenge for the work presented here and for the SATURN project, and having finally
been able to test these models on data instances obtained from real traffic represents a signifi-
cant achievement that currently has no predecessor in scientific literature on European ATFM
models.
To the best of our knowledge, in this sense, this work represents an interesting contribution
also in regard to bilevel problems applications. The tests presented here were run on traffic
samples that are at least ten times larger than the data instances commonly presented in bilevel
literature. Data files with a hundred users are normally considered hard to solve; the regional
example presented here has almost 4 700 flights and it has been solved to near optimality for a
non trivial case with two rates for one ANSP.
A final word goes to the quality of the results obtained, in the project, but also illustrated
in this thesis: they are realistic with regard to the application, and suggest that the proposed
methodology works. They confirm that a mild modulation of air navigation charges could indeed
help in redistributing air traffic in Europe in a more sustainable way for future growth.
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Appendix A
Database for air traffic data
The present appendix illustrates the structure of the bespoke database (DB) developed for
storing and analysing air traffic data. The main rationale for developing the database was
to overcome the limitation of the NEST software (as explained in Sec. 4.1.2 and 4.4) and to
provide an easier access to its air traffic data sets. The DB was mainly used as a support tool
for performing data analysis and for building the necessary data instance files to test the models
illustrated in Chapter 3.
A.1 Database structure
The database has two user-defined schemas: the public schema, where the original data is
stored and the saturn units schema where data obtained from elaborations or data analysis
from the public schema is stored.
A.1.1 The public schema
The public schema contains the following tables, sourced as illustrated in Table 4.11:
Airspace-related tables
Table name Data source file Origin
acc configurations Configuration.cfg NEST
acc configurations openings OpeningScheme.cos NEST
crco areas view on sector areas table
military openings AIRAC .mot files NEST
sector areas Airspace.spc and Sectors.gsl NEST
sector capacity Capacity.ncap, Activation.nact NEST
sector regulations RegPlan.nreg NEST
sector structure Airspace.spc and Airblock.gar NEST
traffic volumes TrafficVolume.ntfv NEST
tv flows flow.nflw NEST
tv flows det flow.nflw NEST
unit rates ur.txt files EUROCONTROL website
Table A.1: Data sources for airspace-related tables
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The tables listed above are described in detail in the following.
acc configurations table This table contains data about existing sector opening configura-
tions for Area Control Centres (ACCs).
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
acc string ICAO designator for this ACC
conf string ACC configuration name
sector string Sectors belonging to this ACC configuration
airac smallint Reference Aeronautical Information Regulation
And Control (AIRAC) cycle
Table A.2: acc configurations table
acc configurations openings table This table contains information on opening times and
dates for Area Control Centres configurations.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
acc string ICAO designator for this ACC
date date (DD:MM:YY) Day of validity for this configuration setting
start time time (HH:MM:SS) start time for this configuration setting
end time time (HH:MM:SS) end time for this configuration setting
conf string name of the ACC configuration
airac smallint Reference Aeronautical Information Regulation
And Control (AIRAC) cycle
Table A.3: acc configurations openings table
military openings table This table contains information on opening times and dates for
military airspace sectors.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
icao string ICAO designator for this sector
start date date (DD:MM:YY) start date for this configuration setting
end date date (DD:MM:YY) end date for this configuration setting
start time time (HH:MM:SS) start time for this configuration setting
end time time (HH:MM:SS) end time for this configuration setting
top fl integer upper vertical boundary for contained airspace
(if applicable)
bottom fl integer lower vertical boundary for contained airspace
(if applicable)
type string EX (=opening time from Entry to Exit) or E (=
opening time at Entry, no restriction at Exit)
airac smallint Reference Aeronautical Information Regulation
And Control (AIRAC) cycle
Table A.4: military openings table
sector areas table This table contains identification and geographic data for airspace sec-
tors.
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Field Name in DB Data Type Info
icao string ICAO designator for this airspace
long name string Extended name for this airspace, if applicable
type string type of airspace (AB, ES, CS etc.)
airac smallint Reference Aeronautical Information Regulation
And Control (AIRAC) cycle
geog MultiPolygon Area of this airspace
Table A.5: sector areas table
The crco areas view on the sector areas table contains only national airspaces belonging
to the Central Route Charges Office (CRCO) area, that is, countries that delegate EUROCON-
TROL for collecting air navigation charges.
sector capacity table This table contains information on hourly capacities for air sectors
and traffic volumes (TVs), that is, the maximum number of entries allowed per hour in the
corresponding airspace. If the capacity belongs to a sector, the tv field contains the code “AS”
(“airspace”). If the capacity is associated to a traffic volume, the field icao contains the name
of the air sector associated to that traffic volume.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
icao string ICAO designator for this sector
date date (DD:MM:YY) day of validity for this capacity
start time time (HH:MM:SS) start time of validity for this capacity
end time time (HH:MM:SS) end time of validity for this capacity
capacity integer capacity of the sector
tv string reference traffic volume
active Boolean constraint activation for this AIRAC
Table A.6: sector capacity table
sector regulations table This table contains information on Air Traffic Control (ATC)
regulations (i.e., tactical adjustments) applied to sectors’ capacities on the specified date and
time.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
reg id string ID of the regulation
icao string ICAO designator for this sector
tv string Traffic volume for this regulation (if present)
start date date (DD:MM:YY) start day of validity for this capacity
end date date (DD:MM:YY) end day of validity for this capacity
start time time (HH:MM:SS) start time of validity for this capacity
end time time (HH:MM:SS) end time of validity for this capacity
sww integer Slot window width in minutes
ssw integer Slot slice width in minutes
reason char[1] Reason for the regulation (see Notes for details)
capacity integer capacity of the sector
Table A.7: sector regulations table
The reason field contains information on why each regulation was applied. The following
single letter codes are used:
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Code Corresponding reason
C ATC CAPACITY
G AERODROME CAPACITY
W WEATHER
T EQUIPMENT (ATC)
E EQUIPMENT (NOT ATC)
I INDUSTRIAL ACTION
M MILITARY ACTIVITY
R ATC ROUTING
S ATC STAFFING
V ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
D DE-ICING
P SPECIAL EVENT
O OTHER REASON
U UNKNOWN REASON
Table A.8: Codes used for indicating motivations for ATC capacity regulations
sector structure table This table contains information on the hierarchical structure of
airspace sectors, specifying which airspace is part of which sector. Both airspace icao and
sector icao fields refer to the airspace portions defined in the sector areas table.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
airspace icao string ICAO designator for container airspace
sector icao string ICAO designator for contained airspace
top fl integer top vertical boundary for contained airspace (if
applicable)
bottom fl integer bottom vertical boundary for contained airspace
(if applicable)
airac smallint Reference Aeronautical Information Regulation
And Control (AIRAC) cycle
Table A.9: sector structure table
The hierarchical relations between types of airspace portions (referring to the codes used for
the type field in the sector areas table are the following:
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Type of airspace Code Component Code
Elementary sector ES Airblock AB
Collapsed sector CS Elementary sector ES
Sector cluster CLUS Elementary sector ES
ATC Unit Airspace AUA
Sector cluster
Elementary sector
CLUS
ES
ATC Unit Airspace Group AUAG ATC Unit Airspace AUA
Military collapsed sector CRSA Elementary collapsed sector ERSA
Area Control Centre ACC
Sector cluster
Elementary sector
CLUS
ES
Flight Information Region FIR Area Control Centre ACC
National airspace NAS Flight Information Region FIR
Large region (typically a continent) AREA National airspace NAS
Table A.10: Airspace sectors hierarchy
traffic volumes table This table contains the definitions of Traffic Volumes (TV) for the
considered Aeronautical Information Regulation And Control (AIRAC) cycle.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
tv name string Designator for this Traffic Volume (TV)
ref location string ICAO designator for this airspace/airport/nav-
point
ref location type string N = navpoint; A = arp; AS = airport set; S =
sector; ACC = acc
min fl smallint Lower altitude for this TV. Empty if
ref location type = A
max fl smallint Upper altitude for this TV. Empty if
ref location type = A
role string[1] If ref location type= A, role can be: D = depar-
ture, A = arrival, G = global; empty otherwise
airac smallint Reference Aeronautical Information Regulation
And Control (AIRAC) cycle
Table A.11: traffic volumes table
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tv flows table This table specifies which Traffic Volume Flows (TVF) rules are included or
excluded from each Traffic Volume (TV) definition for the considered Aeronautical Information
Regulation And Control (AIRAC) cycle.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
tv string Designator for this Traffic Volume (TV)
flow string Designator for this Traffic Volume Flow (TVF)
included excluded string Defines whether TVF should be included or ex-
cluded from the TV; IN = included ; EX = ex-
cluded
airac smallint Reference Aeronautical Information Regulation
And Control cycle
Table A.12: tv flows table
tv flows det table This table contains the definitions for Traffic Volume Flows (TVF) rules
for the considered Aeronautical Information Regulation And Control (AIRAC) cycle.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
flow string Designator for this Traffic Volume Flow (TVF)
rule
from to string Type of flow: FROM or TO
ref location string ICAO designator for this airspace/airport/nav-
point
ref location type string N = navpoint; A = arp; AS = airport set; S =
sector; ACC = acc
airac smallint Reference Aeronautical Information Regulation
And Control cycle
Table A.13: tv flows det table
unit rates table This table contains the monthly-adjusted unit rates for air navigation
charges for each Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) belonging to the CRCO area.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
icao string ICAO designator for this country
ur money unit rate for this country (in Euro)
month integer month of validity for this unit rate
year integer year of validity for this unit rate
Table A.14: unit rates table
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Network-related tables
Table name Data source file Origin
airports View on points table
airport capacity .ncap, .nact NEST
airport regulations RegPlan.nreg NEST
navpoints View on points table
points .nnpt and .narp files NEST
segments .ase SAAM dataset
Table A.15: Data sources for network-related tables
The tables listed above are described in detail in the following.
airport capacity table This table contains information on hourly capacities for airports,
that is, the maximum number of departures, arrivals or total movements (as specified by the
type field) allowed per hour in the specified aerodrome.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
icao string[4] ICAO designator for this airport
tv string traffic volume for this capacity
date date year of validity for this capacity
start time time (HH:MM:SS) start time for this capacity
end time time (HH:MM:SS) end time for this capacity
capacity integer capacity of this airport
role char[1] role of constraint: A = Arrival, D= Departure,
G = Global
active boolean constraint activation for this AIRAC
Table A.16: airport capacity table
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airport regulations table This table contains information on Air Traffic Control (ATC)
regulations (i.e., tactical adjustments) applied to airports’ capacities on the specified date and
time. The reason field contains information on why each regulation was applied. The letter
codes are the same used for sector regulations (see A.8).
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
reg id string ID of the regulation
icao string[4] ICAO designator for this airport
tv string Traffic volume for this regulation (if present)
start date date (DD:MM:YY) start day of validity for this capacity
end date date (DD:MM:YY) end day of validity for this capacity
start time time (HH:MM:SS) start time of validity for this capacity
end time time (HH:MM:SS) end time of validity for this capacity
sww integer Slot window width in minutes
ssw integer Slot slice width in minutes
reason char[1] Reason for the regulation (see Notes for details)
capacity integer capacity of the sector
role char[1] role of constraint: A = Arrival, D= Departure,
G = Global
Table A.17: airport regulations table
points table This table contains names and geographic coordinates for airports and naviga-
tion points. The field type specifies to which of either category each entry belongs. Two views
are defined on this table, airports and navpoints to collect only entities belonging to either
category.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
icao string [5] ICAO designator for this navpoint/airport
long name string Extended name for this nav./airport, if applica-
ble
type string type of point (nav= navpoint, apt= airport)
geog Point Coordinates for this navpoint/airport
iata string IATA name of the airport if type=“apt”, empty
otherwise
slot width smallint airport departure slot width in minutes if
type=“apt”, empty otherwise
Table A.18: points table
segments table This table contains data on network segments, that is, couples of navigation
points used for defining routes and average flying time between them.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
orig string [5] beginning of the segment
dest string [5] end of the segment
avg travel time time interval avg time for this segment (avg from traffic data)
type integer type of segment (e.g. ,CDR)
geog LineString Coordinates of this segment
Table A.19: segments table
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Traffic-related tables
Table name Data source file Origin
aircraft Helicopter.txt AircraftWeight.txt NEST
intersections .t5 M1 files SAAM/NEST
traffic .exp2 M1 and .so6 M1 files SAAM/NEST
traffic det SO6 M1 SAAM/NEST
Table A.20: Data sources for traffic-related tables
The tables listed above are described in detail in the following.
aircraft table This table contains relevant data about aircraft, that is, identifier, type and
maximum takeoff weight (MTOW).
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
name string ICAO designator for aircraft
type string type of aircraft (heli = helicopter)
weight float nominal MTOW in metric tonnes
Table A.21: aircraft table
intersections table This table contains data about intersections between planned routes
(M1) and airspace sectors. All sectors are considered, including national airspaces and collapsed
sectors, even sectors that were not included in the actual active configurations.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
uuid string CALLSIGN-ADEP-ADES-EOBD-EOBT
sector string sector name
entry date date (DD:MM:YY) sector entry date
exit date date (DD:MM:YY) sector exit date
entry time time (HH:MM:SS) sector entry time
exit time time (HH:MM:SS) sector exit time
before sec opening boolean Y if flight was in sector before it was opened
after sec closure boolean N if flight was in sector when it was closed
entry fl smallint entry flight level
exit fl smallint exit flight level
distance float total distance flown in sector
entry start pt string start point of entry segment
entry end pt string end point of entry segment
exit start pt string start point of exit segment
exit end pt string end point of exit segment
entry distance float flown distance on entry segment
exit distance float flown distance on exit segment
Table A.22: intersections table
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traffic table This table contains general information about flights, like identifiers, departure
and arrival dates and times and geographic representation of the route.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
adep string [4] ICAO designator for departure airport
ades string [4] ICAO designator for arrival airport
aircraft string [4] ICAO designator for aircraft
rfl smallint Requested Flight Level
dep date date (DD:MM:YY) Actual departure date
dep time time (HH:MM:SS) Actual departure time
arr date date (DD:MM:YY) Arrival date (= end date of last flight segment
in so6)
arr time time (HH:MM:SS) Arrival time (= end time of last flight segment
in so6)
callsign string Call sign, up to 7 chars
airline string ICAO designator for airline
uuid string CALLSIGN-ADEP-ADES-EOBD-EOBT
planned dep date date (DD:MM:YY) Planned departure date
planned dep time time (HH:MM:SS) Planned departure time (should be the expected
time shown at the airport)
type string type of flight (NB! Empty in DDR2 data sets)
most pen reg string ID of most penalizing regulation
saamid integer SAAM ID of the flight
atfm delay smallint Assigned ATFM delay
continued integer SAAM ID of the following flight using the same
aircraft
dep slot time (HH:MM:SS) Beginning time of departure airport slot
arr slot time (HH:MM:SS) Beginning time of arrival airport slot
geog LineString Coordinates of the route
geog3d 3D LineString 3D Coordinates of the route
Table A.23: traffic table
traffic det table This table contains detailed information about initially planned (M1)
routes, specifically, the sequence of air navigation points and corresponding arrival time and
flight level.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
uuid string CALLSIGN-ADEP-ADES-EOBD-EOBT
seq integer n-th segment of this flight
start pt string name of first point of the segment
end pt string name of last point of the segment
start time time (HH:MM:SS) segment enter time
end time time (HH:MM:SS) segment exit time
start date date (DD:MM:YY) segment enter date
end date date (DD:MM:YY) segment exit date
start fl integer segment enter flight level
end fl integer segment exit flight level
status integer 0 = climb 1= descent 2 = cruise
length float length of the segment
Table A.24: traffic det table
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A.1.2 The saturn units schema
In order to test the developed optimisation models, some further elaboration was necessary on
the data. As illustrated in 4.14, some clustering operations were performed in order to identify
distinct routes within a certain distance and to estimate average flight time and operational
costs for different types of aircraft on different routes. Additionally, as illustrated in 4.2.1, some
elaborations were carried out on capacity data for traffic volumes in order to obtain realistic
capacity figures to use for testing the models.
Results of these elaborations were stored in a separate schema, named saturn units, to keep
the original DDR2 data stored in the public schema separate from data derived from further
elaborations.
The tables in the saturn units schema and their content are described in the following:
Table name Data origin
aircraft clus public.aircraft
flights
public.traffic
public.traffic det
routes public.intersections
routes det public.intersections
routes navpoints
public.traffic det
public.intersections
tv rules capacities
public.intersections actual
public.traffic volumes
public.tv flows
public.tv flows det
Table A.25: tables in saturn units schema
aircraft clus table This table contains clustering information for aircraft. Each aircraft
identifier is assigned to one of thirteen clusters according to closeness of its maximum takeoff
weight to the twelve defined in Cook and Tanner (2011), plus one cluster for small aircraft with
MTOW < 10T that are used as references for estimating operational costs.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
aircraft string aircraft identifier from table public.aircraft
cluster string cluster to which this aircraft is assigned
Table A.26: aircraft clus table
Aircraft cluster names are the following: A319, A320, A321, A332, AT43, AT72, B733,
B734, B735, B738, B744, B752, B763, DH8D, E190, OTHR.
flights table This table contains information on route and aircraft cluster associated with
the original initial flight plan (M1) of each flight.
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Field Name in DB Data Type Info
route id string route unique identifier
uuid string flight unique identifier from public.traffic table
aircraft clus string cluster to which the original aircraft of flight
identified by uuid belongs
Table A.27: flights table
routes table This table contains basic information on route clusters and their geographic
data representation.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
route id string route unique identifier
origin string ICAO identifier of departure airport
dest string ICAO identifier of arrival airport
geog geography coordinates of the route
Table A.28: routes table
routes det table This table contains detailed information on sector intersections for route
clusters, namely average entry flight level, entry and fly-through time for all aircraft clusters
for each route cluster.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
route id string route unique identifier
seq integer sequence number of sectors within this route
sector string sector name
* time time interval average flight time in sector for aircraft cluster
*
* entry time time interval average entry time in sector after departure for
aircraft cluster *
* entry fl real average entry flight in sector for aircraft cluster
*
Table A.29: routes det table
The asterisk (*) at the beginning of field names implies that that field name starts with the
aircraft cluster name, meaning there is one such fields for each of the thirteen clusters used for
aircraft type.
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routes navpoints table This table contains detailed information on navigation point se-
quence for route clusters, namely average entry flight level and arrival time for all aircraft
clusters for each route cluster.
Field Name in DB Data Type Info
route id string route unique identifier
navpoint string ICAO identifier of navigation point
* entry time time interval average arrival time from departure to this nav-
point using this route for aircraft cluster *
* entry fl real average arrival flight level to this navpoint using
this route for aircraft cluster *
Table A.30: routes navpoints table
As for the routes det table, the asterisk (*) in the field name implies the aircraft cluster
name, meaning there is one such fields for each of the thirteen clusters used for aircraft type.
tv rules capacities table This table contains adjusted capacities for traffic volumes, calcu-
lated from actual radar intersection data (from M3 T5 files, stored in the intersections actual
table).
Field Name in DB Data type Info
tv name string Name of the TV
ref location string Name of the sector regulated by the TV
acc string Name of the ACC to which the sector belongs
hour smallint Hour of application of the adjusted capacity;
e.g., 18 = from 18:00 to 18:59
capacity smallint Adjusted capacity to apply to the sector
date date Date on which capacity should be applied
Table A.31: tv rules capacities table
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Appendix B
Database use examples
This chapter presents some examples of the capabilities of the bespoke database. Each of the
following four examples presents a different query that is unlikely to be easily performed in
NEST. All examples are based on DDR2 data for the set of 25159 flights that operated on
Thursday 14th November 2013. Queries were run on an i7 dual core at 1.7 GHz and with 8 GB
of Ram and computational times are shown.
Example 1: transit through a specified airspace
Find all flights that departed on 14th November 2013 that transited Greek airspace.
SQL code for the query:
1 select *
2 from traffic
3 where dep_date = ’2013-11-14’
4 and ST_Intersects(
5 geog,
6 (select geog
7 from sector_areas
8 where icao = ’LG’)
9 )
Listing 1: SQL query for example 1: transit through a specified airspace
1118 flights are selected and this result is obtained in 34 869 ms, as shown by the tabular
output in PgAdmin3 database management graphic interface (Figure B.1):
The same output format is obtained when executing the query within user-made programs.
Most programming languages provide software libraries for easy handling of data retrieved from
a database: Figure B.2) shows the visualisation of the output from the query in QGIS 2.
The same data can be obtained in NEST through the Statistics dialogue box (Figure B.3,
left), but a considerable amount of manual selection is required to set the query up. Alter-
natively, the same selection can be performed via the Traffic Queries dialogue, which allows
map visualisation and result export in .so6 format, but requires a .so6 file as input (Figure B.3,
right).
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Figure B.1: Query output in tabular form for Database Example 1
Figure B.2: Visualisation of the query output for Database Example 1
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Figure B.3: Query output for Database Example 1 available in NEST Statistics dialogue box
(left) and Traffic Queries dialogue box (right)
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Example 2: exclusion of CDR routes
Find all flights that departed on 14th November 2013 that did not fly any CDR routes.
SQL code for the query:
1 select *
2 from traffic
3 where uuid not in (
4 select distinct uuid
5 from traffic_det
6 where (start_pt, end_pt) in (
7 select orig, dest
8 from segments
9 where type in (20, 21, 22, 23, 40, 41, 42, 43, 60,
10 61, 62, 63, 80, 81, 82, 83, 100, 101, 102, 103,
11 120, 121, 122, 123)
12 )
13 and start_date = ’2013-11-14’)
14 and dep_date = ’2013-11-14’
Listing 2: SQL query for example 2: exclusion of CDR routes
The meaning of the numeric codes for segment type are explained in the DDR2 Manual,
under the reference for .ASE segment files (Eurocontrol 2014c, Section 10.3.7):
0=NO, 1=NORMAL, 2=ARRIVAL, 3=DEPARTURE (permanent rte segment)
20=NO, 21=NORMAL, 22=ARRIVAL, 23=DEPARTURE (CDR Generic)
40=NO, 41=NORMAL, 42=ARRIVAL, 43=DEPARTURE (CDR 1)
60=NO, 61=NORMAL, 62=ARRIVAL, 63=DEPARTURE (CDR 2)
80=NO, 81=NORMAL, 82=ARRIVAL, 83=DEPARTURE (CDR 3)
100=NO, 101=NORMAL, 102=ARRIVAL, 103=DEPARTURE (CDR 1+2)
120=NO, 121=NORMAL, 122=ARRIVAL, 123=DEPARTURE (CDR 1+3)
The query can therefore be easily modified for excluding only flights using any combination of
the above.
18 650 flights (out of 25 159 total for the day) are selected and this result is obtained in 29
542 ms, as shown in tabular output in PgAdmin3 (Figure B.4):
Figure B.5 shows the output visualisation in QGIS 2.
Note that there is no straightforward way to perform this query within NEST.
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Figure B.4: Query output in tabular form for Database Example 2
Figure B.5: Visualisation of the query output for Database Example 2
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Example 3: most regulated sectors
Find the sectors with the higher number of regulations for AIRAC 1312.
AIRAC 1312 ran from 14 November to 11 December 2013. During this cycle, a total of 993
regulations concerning airspace sectors or related traffic volumes were issued. This query ranks
sectors according to the number of regulations they were affected by.
SQL code for the query:
1 select count(*) as num, icao, tv
2 from sector_regulations
3 where start_date >= ’2013-11-14’ and start_date <= ’2013-12-11’
4 group by icao,tv order by num desc
Listing 3: SQL query for example 3: most regulated sectors
The code above identifies sector names and corresponding traffic volumes, together with the
number of regulations affecting them (identified by the count(*) function). The order by num
desc statement sorts the results in descending order.
In the current example the date interval corresponds to beginning date and end date of AIRAC
1312. The query however can be performed on any interval, like calendar months, seasons or
an entire year or reduced to a week or a single day.
With the query 185 entities are selected and this result is obtained in 2499 ms, as shown in the
tabular output in PgAdmin3 (Figure B.6).
Figure B.6: Query output in tabular form for Database Example 3
The 20 most regulated sectors are visualised in QGIS 2 (Figure B.7).
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Figure B.7: Visualisation of the query output for Database Example 3
The query could be further refined by filtering on specific regulation reasons only.
Example 4: traffic with mutual exclusion characteristics
Find all origin-destination pairs of flights between the UK and Germany that departed on 14th
November 2013, and flew exclusively through either Belgium or the Netherlands, together with
the distance flown in each country.
On 14th November 2013, 442 flights are reported between Germany and UK (in either di-
rection): 107 flights also cross the Belgian airspace only, 204 flights the Dutch airspace only,
two flights the Danish airspace only, and the remaining 129 flights both the Belgian and Dutch
airspaces. These 442 flights connect 173 different origin and destination airport pairs (O/D
pairs). This query identifies the O/D pairs that have at least two flights such that one flight
crosses the Belgian airspace only and the other one the Dutch airspace only. Out of 173, only
six O/D pairs are selected, which comprise 44 flights.
SQL code for the query:
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1 select uuid, adep, ades, aircraft, geog, weight as ac_weight,
2 -- Length of Adep - Entry-Pt segment
3 ST_Length(
4 ST_intersection(
5 (select geog from crco_areas where icao = ’EG’),
6 (select geog from traffic where uuid = tr.uuid )
7 ),true) as EG_distance,
8 -- Length of Entry - Pt Exit-Pt segment in the Netherlands
9 ST_Length(
10 ST_intersection(
11 (select geog from crco_areas where icao = ’EH’),
12 (select geog from traffic where uuid = tr.uuid )
13 ),true) as EH_distance,
14 -- Length of Entry - Pt Exit-Pt segment in Belgium
15 ST_Length(
16 ST_intersection(
17 (select geog from crco_areas where icao = ’EB’),
18 (select geog from traffic where uuid = tr.uuid)
19 ),true) as EB_distance,
20 -- Length of Exit-Pt -> Ades segment
21 ST_Length(
22 ST_intersection(
23 (select geog from crco_areas where icao = ’ED’),
24 (select geog from traffic where uuid = tr.uuid )
25 ),true) as ED_distance
26 from traffic as tr left join aircraft as ac on tr.aircraft = ac.name
27 where (adep,ades) in (
28 --O/D couples flying through the Netherlands
29 select distinct adep, ades
30 from traffic
31 where dep_date = ’2013-11-14’
32 and ((adep like ’EG%’ and ades like ’ED%’) or (adep like ’ED%’ and ades like ’EG%’))
33 -- exclude flights through Belgium
34 and not ST_intersects (geog, (select geog from crco_areas where icao = ’EB’))
35 -- exclude flights through Denmark
36 and not ST_intersects (geog, (select geog from crco_areas where icao = ’EK’))
37 intersect
38 --O/D couples flying through Belgium
39 select distinct adep, ades
40 from traffic
41 where dep_date = ’2013-11-14’
42 and ((adep like ’EG%’ and ades like ’ED%’) or (adep like ’ED%’ and ades like ’EG%’))
43 -- exclude flights through the Netherlands
44 and not ST_intersects (geog, (select geog from crco_areas where icao = ’EH’))
45 -- exclude flights through Denmark
46 and not ST_intersects (geog, (select geog from crco_areas where icao = ’EK’))
47 )
Listing 4: SQL query for example 4: traffic with mutual exclusion characteristics
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The first block of the code above selects the required flight data, calculates the distances
flown in each national airspace by intersecting the respective areas with each flight route and
calculates the length of the intersection (select block); the second block of code (from and where
clauses) filters the flights that match the given requirements, that is, crossing Belgian or Dutch
airspace only (thus excluding all flights flying through Denmark and through both Belgium and
the Netherlands). This filtering too is performed through an intersection between geographical
data. 44 flights are selected and this result is obtained in 12 830 ms, as shown in tabular output
in PgAdmin3 (Figure B.8).
Figure B.8: Query output in tabular form for Database Example 4
Output visualisation in QGIS 2 is shown in Figure B.9.
Figure B.9: Visualisation of the query output for Database Example 4
Even though this query is far more complex than those presented in the previous examples,
it is however, an easier way to solve the proposed request compared with NEST.
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Appendix C
Computational experiments tables
C.1 Parameters setting (Section 5.1)
C.1.1 Shift and revenue neutrality violation (Sec. 5.1.1)
10-Sep-14
Baseline solution
K1 value
Objective
value
Shift (min.)
N. of sector
cap. violations
N. of airport
cap. violations
Rev. neut.
violation (e)
Unit rate (e)
1.00E-07 17099.7 13433 61 0 6.66E+07 65.92
1.00E-06 17159.6 13433 61 0 6.66E+07 65.92
1.00E-05 17093 13433 61 0 0 65.92
1.00E-04 17093 13433 61 0 0 65.92
1.00E-03 17093 13433 61 0 0 65.92
1.00E-02 17093 13433 61 0 0 65.92
cPLP one solution, peak threshold = 50%
K1 value
Objective
value
Shift (min.)
N. of sector
cap. violations
N. of airport
cap. violations
Rev. neut.
violation (e)
Peak rate (e)
1.00E-07 16883.8 14177 45 0 6.84E+07 83.92
1.00E-06 16945.4 14177 45 0 6.84E+07 83.92
1.00E-05 16879.3 14177 45 0 226219 83.92
1.00E-04 16899.6 14177 45 0 226219 83.92
1.00E-03 17093 13433 61 0 0 65.92
1.00E-02 17093 13433 61 0 0 65.92
cPLP one solution, peak threshold = 70%
K1 value
Objective
value
Shift (min.)
N. of sector
cap. violations
N. of airport
cap. violations
Rev. neut.
violation (e)
Peak rate (e)
1.00E-07 16532.7 14126 40 0 6.68E+07 86.92
1.00E-06 16592.8 14126 40 0 6.68E+07 86.92
1.00E-05 16527.7 14126 40 0 169235 86.92
1.00E-04 16542.9 14126 40 0 169235 86.92
1.00E-03 16695.2 14126 40 0 169235 86.92
1.00E-02 17093 13433 61 0 0 65.92
Table C.1: Solution variation for different values of the K1 parameter; results for France data
instances for September 10, 2014
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09-Sep-14
Baseline solution
K1 value
Objective
value
Shift (min.)
N. of sector
cap. violations
N. of airport
cap. violations
Rev. neut.
violation (e)
Unit rate (e)
1.00E-07 20645.8 13019 127 0 6.79E+07 65.92
1.00E-06 20706.9 13019 127 0 6.79E+07 65.92
1.00E-05 20639 13019 127 0 0 65.92
1.00E-04 20639 13019 127 0 0 65.92
1.00E-03 20639 13019 127 0 0 65.92
1.00E-02 20639 13019 127 0 0 65.92
cPLP one solution, peak threshold = 50%
K1 value
Objective
value
Shift (min.)
N. of sector
cap. violations
N. of airport
cap. violations
Rev. neut.
violation (e)
Peak rate (e)
1.00E-07 20226.9 13440 113 0 6.94E+07 80.92
1.00E-06 20289.4 13440 113 0 6.94E+07 80.92
1.00E-05 20222 13440 113 0 202367 80.92
1.00E-04 20240.2 13440 113 0 202367 80.92
1.00E-03 20379.8 13330 115 0 149810 76.92
1.00E-02 20639 13019 127 0 0 65.92
cPLP one solution, peak threshold = 70%
K1 value
Objective
value
Shift (min.)
N. of sector
cap. violations
N. of airport
cap. violations
Rev. neut.
violation (e)
Peak rate (e)
1.00E-07 20235.7 13329 115 0 6.70E+07 76.92
1.00E-06 20296 13329 115 0 6.70E+07 76.92
1.00E-05 20230 13329 115 0 103075 76.92
1.00E-04 20239.3 13329 115 0 103075 76.92
1.00E-03 20323.8 13219 117 0 84807.5 74.92
1.00E-02 20639 13019 127 0 0 65.92
Table C.2: Solution variation for different values of the K1 parameter; results for France data
instances for September 9, 2014
184
08-Sep-14
Baseline solution
K1 value
Objective
value
Shift (min.)
N. of sector
cap. violations
N. of airport
cap. violations
Rev. neut.
violation (e)
Unit rate (e)
1.00E-07 21362.9 16012 89 4 6.93E+07 65.92
1.00E-06 21425.3 16012 89 4 6.93E+07 65.92
1.00E-05 21356 16012 89 4 0 65.92
1.00E-04 21356 16012 89 4 0 65.92
1.00E-03 21356 16012 89 4 0 65.92
1.00E-02 21356 16012 89 4 0 65.92
cPLP one solution, peak threshold = 50%
K1 value
Objective
value
Shift (min.)
N. of sector
cap. violations
N. of airport
cap. violations
Rev. neut.
violation (e)
Peak rate (e)
1.00E-07 20824 16973 4 64 7.03E+07 82.92
1.00E-06 20887.3 16973 4 64 7.03E+07 82.92
1.00E-05 20819.1 16973 4 64 211103 82.92
1.00E-04 20838.1 16973 4 64 211103 82.92
1.00E-03 20994.2 16496 4 73 114214 74.92
1.00E-02 21356 16012 4 89 0 65.92
cPLP one solution, peak threshold = 70%
K1 value
Objective
value
Shift (min.)
N. of sector
cap. violations
N. of airport
cap. violations
Rev. neut.
violation (e)
Peak rate (e)
1.00E-07 20772.8 16502 71 4 6.84E+07 77.92
1.00E-06 20834.4 16502 71 4 6.84E+07 77.92
1.00E-05 20767 16502 71 4 100515 77.92
1.00E-04 20776.1 16502 71 4 100515 77.92
1.00E-03 20866.5 16502 71 4 100515 77.92
1.00E-02 21324.6 16049 85 4 17161.1 67.92
Table C.3: Solution variation for different values of the K1 parameter; results for France data
instances for September 8, 2014
185
C.1.2 Shift and capacity violations (Sec. 5.1.2)
12-Sep-14
K2 Peak rate Objective value Total shift (min) Sector Cap. violations Airport Cap. violations
5 (Baseline) 65.92 7478.18 6374 218 6
5 69.92 7478.16 6424 208 6
10 72.92 8500.3 6466 202 6
15 76.92 9459.42 6640 187 6
20 77.92 10389.4 6655 186 6
25 77.92 11319.4 6655 186 6
30 77.92 12249.4 6655 186 6
35 77.92 13179.4 6655 186 6
40 77.92 14109.4 6655 186 6
45 80.92 15024.5 6910 180 6
50 95.92 15919.9 8956 139 5
55 95.92 16614.9 8956 139 5
60 95.92 17309.9 8956 139 5
65 95.92 18004.9 8956 139 5
70 95.92 18699.9 8956 139 5
75 95.92 19394.9 8956 139 5
80 95.92 20089.9 8956 139 5
85 95.92 20784.9 8956 139 5
90 95.92 21479.9 8956 139 5
95 95.92 22174.9 8956 139 5
100 95.92 22869.9 8956 139 5
10-Sep-14
K2 Peak rate Objective value Total shift (min) Sector Cap. violations Airport Cap. violations
5 (Baseline) 65.92 13744.7 13433 61 0
5 66.92 13731.6 13415 62 0
10 66.92 14041.6 13415 62 0
15 66.92 14351.6 13415 62 0
20 65.92 14659.7 13433 61 0
25 65.92 14964.7 13433 61 0
30 65.92 15269.7 13433 61 0
35 65.92 15574.7 13433 61 0
40 65.92 15879.7 13433 61 0
45 65.92 16184.7 13433 61 0
50 83.92 16433.8 14177 45 0
55 83.92 16658.8 14177 45 0
60 83.92 16883.8 14177 45 0
65 83.92 17108.8 14177 45 0
70 83.92 17333.8 14177 45 0
75 83.92 17558.8 14177 45 0
80 83.92 17783.8 14177 45 0
85 83.92 18008.8 14177 45 0
90 83.92 18233.8 14177 45 0
95 83.92 18458.8 14177 45 0
100 83.92 18680.8 14177 45 0
Table C.4: Solution variation for different values of the K2 parameter; results for France data
instances for September 12 and 10, 2014 with peak threshold set to 50% of nominal capacity
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09-Sep-14
K2 Peak rate Objective value Total shift (min) Sector Cap. violations Airport Cap. violations
5 (Baseline) 65.92 13660.8 13019 127 0
5 65.92 13660.8 13019 127 0
10 65.92 14295.8 13019 127 0
15 65.92 14930.8 13019 127 0
20 65.92 15565.8 13019 127 0
25 65.92 16200.8 13019 127 0
30 76.92 16786.9 13330 115 0
35 76.92 17361.9 13330 115 0
40 76.92 17936.9 13330 115 0
45 76.92 18511.9 13330 115 0
50 76.92 19086.9 13330 115 0
55 76.92 19661.9 13330 115 0
60 80.92 20226.9 13440 113 0
65 80.92 20791.9 13440 113 0
70 80.92 21356.9 13440 113 0
75 80.92 21921.9 13440 113 0
80 80.92 22486.9 13440 113 0
85 80.92 23051.9 13440 113 0
90 80.92 23616.9 13440 113 0
95 80.92 24181.9 13440 113 0
100 80.92 24746.5 13440 113 0
08-Sep-14
K2 Peak rate Objective value Total shift (min) Sector Cap. violations Airport Cap. violations
5 (Baseline) 65.92 16467.9 16012 89 4
5 65.92 16467.9 16012 89 4
10 65.92 16912.9 16012 89 4
15 65.92 17357.9 16012 89 4
20 65.92 17802.9 16012 89 4
25 68.92 18225.9 16140 83 4
30 68.92 18640.9 16140 83 4
35 68.92 19055.9 16140 83 4
40 74.92 19427 16496 73 4
45 77.92 19788 16582 71 4
50 77.92 20143 16582 71 4
55 78.92 20493 16632 70 4
60 82.92 20824 16973 64 4
65 82.92 21144 16973 64 4
70 82.92 21464 16973 64 4
75 82.92 21784 16973 64 4
80 82.92 22104 16973 64 4
85 82.92 22424 16973 64 4
90 82.92 22744 16973 64 4
95 82.92 23064 16973 64 4
100 82.92 23384 16973 64 4
Table C.5: Solution variation for different values of the K2 parameter; results for France data
instances for September 9 and 8, 2014 with peak threshold set to 50% of nominal capacity
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12-Sep-14
K2 Peak rate Objective value Total shift (min) Sector Cap. violations Airport Cap. violations
5 (Baseline) 65.92 7478.18 6374 218 6
5 70.92 7447.98 6419 203 6
10 70.92 8462.98 6419 203 6
15 75.92 9461.15 6612 189 6
20 80.92 10355.2 6821 176 6
25 80.92 11235.2 6821 176 6
30 80.92 12115.2 6821 176 6
35 80.92 12995.2 6821 176 6
40 80.92 13875.2 6821 176 6
45 80.92 14755.2 6821 176 6
50 92.92 15528.5 8314 144 6
55 92.92 16248.5 8314 144 6
60 92.92 16968.5 8314 144 6
65 92.92 17688.5 8314 144 6
70 98.92 18364.5 9670 124 6
75 98.92 18984.5 9670 124 6
80 98.92 19604.5 9670 124 6
85 98.92 20224.5 9670 124 6
90 98.92 20844.5 9670 124 6
95 102.92 21457.5 10613 114 6
100 102.92 21457.5 10613 114 6
10-Sep-14
K2 Peak rate Objective value Total shift (min) Sector Cap. violations Airport Cap. violations
5 (Baseline) 65.92 13744.7 13433 61 0
5 66.92 13738.5 13422 62 0
10 68.92 14032.5 13456 57 0
15 68.92 14317.5 13456 57 0
20 68.92 14602.5 13456 57 0
25 68.92 14887.5 13456 57 0
30 78.92 15144.6 13668 49 0
35 78.92 15389.6 13668 49 0
40 78.92 15634.6 13668 49 0
45 78.92 15879.6 13668 49 0
50 78.92 16124.6 13668 49 0
55 86.92 16332.7 14126 40 0
60 86.92 16532.7 14126 40 0
65 86.92 16732.7 14126 40 0
70 86.92 16932.7 14126 40 0
75 86.92 17132.7 14126 40 0
80 86.92 17332.7 14126 40 0
85 86.92 17532.7 14126 40 0
90 96.92 17689.7 15343 26 0
95 96.92 17819.7 15343 26 0
100 96.92 17949.7 15343 26 0
Table C.6: Solution variation for different values of the K2 parameter; results for France data
instances for September 12 and 10, 2014 with peak threshold set to 70% of nominal capacity
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09-Sep-14
K2 Peak rate Objective value Total shift (min) Sector Cap. violations Airport Cap. violations
5 (Baseline) 65.92 13660.8 13019 127 0
5 67.92 13650.6 13009 127 0
10 67.92 14285.6 13009 127 0
15 67.92 14920.6 13009 127 0
20 67.92 15555.6 13009 127 0
25 74.92 16150.7 13219 117 0
30 74.92 16735.7 13219 117 0
35 74.92 17320.7 13219 117 0
40 74.92 17905.7 13219 117 0
45 74.92 18490.7 13219 117 0
50 74.92 19075.7 13219 117 0
55 74.92 19660.7 13219 117 0
60 76.92 20235.7 13329 115 0
65 76.92 20810.7 13329 115 0
70 76.92 21385.7 13329 115 0
75 76.92 21960.7 13329 115 0
80 76.92 22535.7 13329 115 0
85 76.92 23110.7 13329 115 0
90 76.92 23685.7 13329 115 0
95 76.92 23685.7 13329 115 0
100 76.92 24260.7 13329 115 0
08-Sep-14
K2 Peak rate Objective value Total shift (min) Sector Cap. violations Airport Cap. violations
5 (Baseline) 65.92 16467.9 16012 89 4
5 65.92 16467.9 16012 89 4
10 67.92 16909.8 16049 85 4
15 67.92 17334.8 16049 85 4
20 67.92 17759.8 16049 85 4
25 67.92 18184.8 16049 85 4
30 70.92 18607.8 16137 82 4
35 77.92 18997.8 16502 71 4
40 77.92 19352.8 16502 71 4
45 77.92 19707.8 16502 71 4
50 77.92 20062.8 16502 71 4
55 77.92 20417.8 16502 71 4
60 77.92 20772.8 16502 71 4
65 77.92 21127.8 16502 71 4
70 78.92 21477.8 16567 70 4
75 78.92 21827.8 16567 70 4
80 78.92 22177.8 16567 70 4
85 78.92 22527.8 16567 70 4
90 92.92 22863.9 17723 57 4
95 92.92 23148.9 17723 57 4
100 92.92 23148.9 17723 57 4
Table C.7: Solution variation for different values of the K2 parameter; results for France data
instances for September 9 and 8, 2014 with peak threshold set to 70% of nominal capacity
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C.2 Exact resolution on regional instances (Sec.5.3)
historical data
Time
N. of
active sectors
N. of sec. with
<33% load
N. of sec. with
34-66% load
N. of sec. with
67-99% load
N. of sec. with
>100% load
N. of unconstrained
sectors
N. of peaks
(>50% load)
6:00-6:59 90 19 30 21 17 3 55
7:00-7:59 95 13 45 23 7 7 61
8:00-8:59 100 9 45 36 7 3 71
9:00-9:59 99 9 24 45 16 5 81
10:00-10:59 100 10 32 34 19 5 73
11:00-11:59 95 7 21 44 19 4 79
12:00-12:59 95 11 38 32 11 3 70
13:00-13:59 97 9 39 38 3 8 68
14:00-14:59 94 5 32 41 10 6 73
15:00-15:59 94 4 30 34 10 16 66
Table C.8: Sector loads in historical data
baseline solution
Time
N. of
active sectors
N. of sec. with
<33% load
N. of sec. with
34-66% load
N. of sec. with
67-99% load
N. of sec. with
>100% load
N. of unconstrained
sectors
N. of peaks
(>50% load)
6:00-6:59 90 71 16 0 0 3 4
7:00-7:59 95 22 53 13 0 7 39
8:00-8:59 100 14 51 28 2 5 57
9:00-9:59 99 10 33 42 9 5 73
10:00-10:59 100 13 34 40 9 4 73
11:00-11:59 95 7 25 45 11 7 74
12:00-12:59 95 12 50 25 5 3 54
13:00-13:59 97 11 44 35 3 4 59
14:00-14:59 94 26 53 11 1 3 34
15:00-15:59 94 80 1 0 0 13 0
Table C.9: Sector loads in baseline solution
cPLP one rate
Time
N. of
active sectors
N. of sec. with
<33% load
N. of sec. with
34-66% load
N. of sec. with
67-99% load
N. of sec. with
>100% load
N. of unconstrained
sectors
N. of peaks
(>50% load)
6:00-6:59 90 67 19 1 0 3 6
7:00-7:59 95 26 55 9 0 5 31
8:00-8:59 100 14 54 26 2 4 53
9:00-9:59 99 10 32 43 7 7 72
10:00-10:59 100 14 33 43 7 3 72
11:00-11:59 95 7 33 43 4 8 71
12:00-12:59 95 12 52 24 5 2 52
13:00-13:59 97 12 50 28 1 6 55
14:00-14:59 94 22 61 8 0 3 35
15:00-15:59 94 80 1 0 0 13 1
Table C.10: Sector loads in cPLP - one rate solution
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cPLP two rates
Time
N. of
active sectors
N. of sec. with
<33% load
N. of sec. with
34-66% load
N. of sec. with
67-99% load
N. of sec. with
>100% load
N. of unconstrained
sectors
N. of peaks
(>50% load)
6:00-6:59 90 73 14 0 0 3 4
7:00-7:59 95 23 53 14 0 5 37
8:00-8:59 100 15 53 26 3 3 55
9:00-9:59 99 10 33 42 7 7 73
10:00-10:59 100 14 33 43 7 3 73
11:00-11:59 95 7 34 42 6 6 70
12:00-12:59 95 13 51 24 5 2 50
13:00-13:59 97 11 47 32 1 6 57
14:00-14:59 94 27 55 8 1 3 34
15:00-15:59 94 79 1 0 0 14 0
Table C.11: Sector loads in cPLP - two rates solution
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Appendix D
Acronyms
ACC Area Control Centre
ACE ATM Cost-Effectiveness
ADEP Airport of departure
ADES Airport of destination
AFIL Air Filed Flight Plan
AIRAC Aeronautical Information Regula-
tion and Control
AIS Aeronautical Information Service
ANS Air navigation services
ANSP Air navigation service provider
AO Airline Operator
API Application programming interface
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCO Air Traffic Control Officer
ATFCM Air traffic flow and capacity man-
agement
ATFM Air traffic flow management
ATM Air traffic management
ATS Air traffic services
AU Airspace User
BADA Base of Aircraft Data
BP Binary Programming
CASA Computer Assisted Slot Allocation
CBL Customer Baseline Load (variant of
RTP pricing method)
CBCP Credit-based Congestion Pricing
(pricing method)
CBP Credit-based Pricing (pricing method)
CDR Conditional route
CFMU Central Flow Management Unit (now
NMOC)
CHT Charter (carrier)
CNS Communication Navigation Surveillance
CP (1) Central planner
CP (2) Congestion Pricing (pricing method)
CPLP Centralised peak load pricing (pricing
method)
CPP Critical Peak Pricing (pricing method)
CRCO Central Route Charges Office
CS Collapsed sector
CTFM Current Tactical Flight Model
CTOT Calculated takeoff Time
DB Database
DBMS Database management system
DDR2 Demand Data Repository (second
phase)
DRP Demand Reduction Programs (pricing
method)
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EASA European Aviation Safety Agency
E/R En-route
EC European Commission
ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference
EOBT Estimated off-block time
ES Elementary sector
ETFMS Enhanced Tactical Flow Manage-
ment System
ETO Estimated time over
ETOT Estimated take-off time
ETS EU’s Emission trading scheme
EU European Union
EUR Euro (currency)
EXP2 Combination of Expand (exp) and
Flight Info (flf) files (DDR2)
FAB Functional Airspace Block
FCFS First come first served
FDC Fully Distributed Costs (pricing
method)
FIR Flight Information Region
FL Flight level
FPFS First Planned First Served
FPL Flight plan
FSC Full service carrier
FTFM Filed Tactical Flight Model
GA Genetic Algorithm
GAT General Air Traffic
GIS Geographic Information System
IATA International Air Transport Associa-
tion
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion
IER Interruptible Electricity Rate (pricing
method)
IFPS Integrated Initial Flight Plan Process-
ing System
IFPU2 IFPS Bretigny unit
IFPZ IFPS Zone
IFR Instrument flight rules
IM Infrastructure Manager
IP Integer Programming
LCC Low-Cost Carrier
LMP Locational Marginal Pricing (pricing
method)
LP Linear Programming
M1 Model 1 (DDR2)
M2 Model 2 (DDR2)
M3 Model 3 (DDR2)
MIP Mixed Integer Programming
MTOW Maximum Take-Off Weight
MUAC Maastricht Upper Area Control Cen-
tre (ACC)
NDP Network Design Problem (bilevel opti-
misation problem)
NEST NEtwork Strategic Tool (software)
NM (1) Nautical Mile
NM (2) Network Manager
NMOC Network Manager Operations Centre
(formerly CFMU)
NMP Non-Monetary Pricing (pricing
method)
NOP Network Operations Plan
NPP Network Pricing Problem (bilevel opti-
misation problem)
NREG Regulation plan file
NSA National Supervisory Authorities
OAP Operational Air Traffic
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OD Origin-destination
pgAdmin Open source software graphical
user interface for PostgreSQL
PLP Peak Load Pricing (pricing method)
PostGIS Open source software support for
geographic objects in PostgreSQL
PostgreSQL Open source object-relational
database system
PRB Performance Review Body
QGIS Open source Geographic Information
System
QoS Quality of Service
RAD Route Availability Document
REG Regional carrier
RFL Requested flight level
RP Ramsey Pricing
RTFM Regulated Tactical Flight Model
RTP Real Time Pricing (pricing method)
SA Slot Analyzer
SAAM System for traffic Assignment and
Analysis at a Macroscopic level
SATURN Strategic Allocation of Traffic Un-
der Redistribution in the Network (WP-
E Project)
SES Single European Sky
SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research
SID Standard instrument departure
SJU SESAR Joint Undertaking
SO System optimum
SO6 Traffic segments file (DDR2)
SOBT Scheduled off-block time
SQL Structured Query Language
SRMC Short Run Marginal Costs (pricing
method)
STAR Standard instrument arrival
STATFOR Statistics and Forecast Service
(Eurocontrol)
TDP Time-dependent usage pricing (pricing
method)
TIP Time-independent usage pricing (pricing
method)
TMA Terminal manoeuvring area
TOU Time of usage (pricing method)
TV Traffic volume
TVF Traffic volume flow
UAC Upper area control centre
UIR Upper Information Region
UO User Optimum
UTA Upper (traffic) control area
UTC Coordinated universal time
VAT Value-added tax
VFR Visual flight rules
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